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China Military Modernization in the 1970s
In January 1974 the PLA saw action in the South China Sea
following a long-simmering dispute with the Republic of Vietnam
(South Vietnam) over the Xisha (Paracel) Islands
(see Vietnam
, this
ch.). South Vietnamese and PLA naval forces skirmished over 3
islands occupied by South Vietnamese troops, and the PLA
successfully seized control of the islands in a joint amphibious
operation involving 500 troops and air support.
By the mid-1970s concerns among Chinese leaders about military
weakness, especially vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, resulted in a
decision to modernize the PLA. Two initial steps were taken to
promote military modernization. First, in 1975 vacant key positions
in the military structure and the party Central Military Commission
were filled. (The state Central Military Commission was not founded
until 1982; see
the National People's Congress
, ch. 10).
Nonetheless, to ensure party control of the PLA, civilians were
appointed to key positions. Deng Xiaoping was appointed chief of
general staff, while Gang of Four member Zhang Chunqiao was
appointed director of the General Political Department. Second, in
the summer following Premier Zhou Enlai's January 1975 proclamation
of the
Four Modernizations (see Glossary)
as national policy, the
party Central Military Commission convened an enlarged meeting to
chart the development of military modernization. The military
modernization program, codified in Central Directive No. 18 of
1975, instructed the military to withdraw from politics and to
concentrate on military training and other defense matters.
Factional struggles between party moderates and radicals in 1975
and 1976, however, led to the dismissal of Deng from all his posts
and the delay of military modernization until after the death of
Mao Zedong. Within a month of Mao's death, military leaders headed
by Minister of National Defense Ye Jianying cooperated with party
chairman Hua Guofeng to arrest the Gang of Four, thus ending a
decade of radical politics.
The Chinese leadership resumed the military modernization
program in early 1977. Three crucial events in the late 1970s
shaped the course of this program: the second rehabilitation of
Deng Xiaoping, the major civilian proponent of military
modernization; the re-ordering of priorities in the Four
Modernizations, relegating national defense modernization from
third to fourth place (following agriculture, industry, and science
and technology); and the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979. In
July 1977, with the backing of moderate military leaders, Deng
Xiaoping reassumed his position as PLA chief of general staff as
well as his other party and state posts. At the same time, Deng
became a vice chairman of the party Central Military Commission. In
February 1980 Deng resigned his PLA position in favor of
professional military commander Yang Dezhi; Deng improved his party
Central Military Commission position, becoming chairman of it at
the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in June 1981.
With enormous prestige in both the military and the civilian
sectors, Deng vigorously promoted military modernization, the
further disengagement of the military from politics, and the shift
in national priorities to economic development at the expense of
defense.
In 1977-78 military and civilian leaders debated whether the
military or the civilian economy should receive priority in
allocating resources for the Four Modernizations. The military
hoped for additional resources to promote its own modernization,
while civilian leaders stressed the overall, balanced development
of the economy, including civilian industry and science and
technology. By arguing that a rapid military buildup would hinder
the economy and harm the defense industrial base, civilian leaders
convinced the PLA to accept the relegation of national defense to
last place in the Four Modernizations. The defense budget
accordingly was reduced. Nonetheless, the Chinese military and
civilian leadership remained firmly committed to military
modernization.
The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war, although only sixteen days
long, revealed specific shortcomings in military capabilities and
thus provided an additional impetus to the military modernization
effort. The border war, the PLA's largest military operation since
the Korean War, was essentially a limited, offensive, ground-force
campaign. China claimed victory, but the war had mixed results
militarily and politically. Although the numerically superior
Chinese forces penetrated about fifty kilometers into Vietnam, the
PLA sustained heavy casualties. PLA performance suffered from poor
mobility, weak logistics, and outdated weaponry. Inadequate
communications, an unclear chain of command, and the lack of
military ranks also created confusion and adversely affected PLA
combat effectiveness.
Data as of July 1987
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