|
Egypt Elite Ideology
A dominant ideology has generally bound the Egyptian political
elite, but its content changed significantly over time. Under
Nasser this ideology was revolutionary nationalism, but thereafter
the ideology of the 1952 Revolution was gradually replaced by a new
conservative consensus that reflected the interests of an
establishment with no interest in further radical change. Sadat
pioneered this ideological transformation in the October Working
Paper, which outlined his view of Egypt's new course after the
October l973 War; through a "de-Nasserization" propaganda campaign
launched in the mid-1970s; and by subsequent efforts to revive the
legitimacy of capitalism and to justify his Western alignment.
Under Mubarak, Nasser's heritage was symbolically revered, but
Sadat's revision of that heritage had by no means been reversed.
Nasserism was built on Egypt's opposition to "imperialist
influence" in the Arab world and on a belief in the benefits of
pan-Arab unity. Nationalism required the creation of a strong state
with a powerful military and a mission to defend the Arab world
against imperialism and Zionism. Under Sadat Arab nationalist
challenges to Western interests and to Israel were displaced by a
stress on cooperation with the Western powers and on regional
peace. For a period in the late Sadat era when Egypt's separate
peace with Israel isolated the country from the other Arab states,
a palpable anti-Arabism radiated from elite circles. Sadat insisted
the attempts of the Arab rulers to ostracize Egypt were doomed
because the Arab leaders had no practical alternative to Egypt's
course and Egypt remained the heart of the Arab world. Egypt's role
was now to lead the Arabs to peace, and the treaty with Israel was
a first step toward an overall just peace. Under Mubarak the
Nasserist vision of Egyptian leadership of the Arabs was again
vigorously promoted. But far from being a promoter of radical
nationalism, Egypt weighed in on the side of moderation and
stability in the Arab world.
The elite's conception of the proper nature of Egyptian society
underwent a considerable change after the Nasser era. Under Nasser
Egypt was seen as a revolutionary society in which the reduction of
inherited inequalities was a major ideal. In the economic sphere,
Nasser advocated Arab socialism. This policy laid heavy stress on
state planning and the public sector as the engines of economic
development and guarantors of national self-sufficiency and
economic independence. The state also assumed responsibility for
ensuring the basic needs of the people and for an equitable
distribution of wealth. Several populist reforms redistributed
national resources to the benefit of the middle and lower classes.
Under Sadat socialism was denounced as a vehicle of envy and
extremism; instead, Sadat promoted a traditional concept in which
society was seen as an extension of the patriarchal family and
characterized by harmony among classes and belief in religion. In
the economic sphere, the elite argued that the state had assumed
too many responsibilities at the expense of private initiative.
Capitalism had to be revived and the public sector, no longer seen
as the cutting edge of development, had to be reduced to a mere
support for private enterprise. Egalitarianism and redistribution
were thought to have gone too far, to the detriment of economic
growth. Private initiative had to be liberated from stultifying
state controls; those who distinguished themselves were to be
allowed rewards and individuals with capital permitted to "earn
freely without limits." The pursuit of self-interest, formerly
castigated, was now relegitimized. Capitalist development, it was
argued, would bring "trickle-down" benefits for the masses in place
of their dependence on state-supported programs.
This ideological thrust, in part a reaction against Nasserism,
was, however, tempered by a more moderate strain of thinking that
became more influential under Mubarak. The moderate view was not
convinced that laissez-faire was the cure to all of Egypt's ills;
it insisted on a continuing role for state regulation and
progressive taxation to curb the inegalitarian tendencies of the
market and the social conflict and political instability that these
tendencies generated. Indeed, under Mubarak a limited Nasserist
restoration could be seen in the return to the concept of the state
as autonomous guardian of the public interest, in the continuing
defense of the public sector, and in a new stress on bringing the
excesses of the infitah bourgeoisie under state control.
Mubarak sought a balance between liberal and statist factions in
the elite, rejected calls to dismantle the public sector, and
called for an "equal partnership" between the public and private
sectors. Generally, the elite agreed on the need to avoid both the
"anarchic individualism" of unregulated capitalism and the class
conflict promoted by Marxism.
Finally, in the political sphere, Nasser had created a powerful
authoritarian state; this concentration of power was legitimized by
the charisma of the leader and the revolutionary mission of the
country. Under Sadat the legitimacy formula was changed. On the one
hand, it was retraditionalized as Sadat sought to infuse his office
with patriarchal authority and the aura of religion. He promoted
himself as the "believing president" and was constantly seen at
prayer; more and more, the state sought to legitimize its authority
in Islamic terms. But on the other hand, both Sadat and Mubarak
also sought to root legitimacy in constitutionalism and democracy.
Egypt had moved, Sadat declared, to a state of laws and
institutions rather than to one of people. Under Mubarak
democratization became the main legitimacy formula. Nevertheless,
it was limited. The masses were held not to be prepared for fullblown democracy; lacking sufficient responsibility and
consciousness, they were susceptible to "alien" (leftist) or
"fanatical" (fundamentalist) ideas. Strong presidential tutelage,
the careful channeling of political discourse through regimemanaged institutions, and limits on overt attempts to "incite" the
masses were needed for the sake of social peace. By the Mubarak
era, this new conservative consensus seemed to bind the elite,
effacing ideological divisions. But the consensus did not prevent
elite rivalries over personal power or disagreements over specific
issues.
Data as of December 1990
|
