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Egypt Parliament
Egypt had a two-chamber legislature made up of the lower
People's Assembly (Majlis ash Shaab), which was the locus of
legislative power, and the upper Consultative Council (Majlis ash
Shura). Power in the People's Assembly was concentrated in the
hands of the leadership, an elected speaker and the chairs of the
specialized committees into which the assembly was divided. The
president and prime minister began each legislative session, which
lasted seven months, with an overview of government policy. Laws
proposed by the executive or by legislators were first considered
in committee and then, with the consent of the legislative
leadership, by the full assembly.
The early parliaments under Nasser were dominated by officials
and by owners of medium-sized property. In the 1960s, the regime
decreed that half the seats had to be reserved for the lower
classes; thus, in each electoral district, one seat was filled by
a worker or peasant and the other by a professional or official.
Although this provision was never repealed, in practice, since
Nasser, those who filled peasant seats were actually either clients
of notables or wealthy peasants enriched by such ventures as labor
contracting, while most "worker" deputies were trade union
officials or government employees. There was no sign of any
parliamentary voice speaking for the have-nots, save the occasional
leftist intellectual who managed to get a seat but carried no
weight. Beginning in 1979, a third seat, to be filled by a woman,
was added in thirty constituencies, but this provision was
abolished in the 1980s under conservative Islamic influence. The
president appointed ten Copts to parliament to make sure this
minority had some representation
(see Coptic Church
, ch. 2).
Constitutional practice put parliament at a great disadvantage
in relation to the executive. The president is above parliamentary
authority and appoints the prime minister and his government.
Constitutionally, parliament must approve the government. Moreover,
it can remove a minister by a vote of no- confidence. It can also,
in theory, similarly challenge the prime minister and his cabinet;
if it does so, the president must dissolve the government or obtain
its endorsement in a popular referendum. In practice, however,
governments have changed exclusively at the will of the president
and never following a vote of no-confidence. The president can
legislate by decree when parliament is not in session and can
bypass parliament through a government-controlled plebiscite. Sadat
carried out some of his most politically controversial initiatives
independently of parliament, including his 1978 repression of the
New Wafd Party and his 1979 promulgation of a liberal law of
personal status that was resisted by Muslim opinion.
The cabinet and even individual ministers enjoyed, on the
authority of very loosely worded laws, what in effect amounted to
decree power, which they used to make crucial decisions, including
the cut in subsidies that touched off the 1977 riots. The budget
must be accepted or rejected in toto by parliament unless the
executive consents to amendments. The executive must present its
policy agenda to parliament, and ministers are subject to
interpolation, but parliament regularly approves executive
initiatives.
Because defense and foreign policy matters are reserved to the
executive, defense budgets are never debated in parliament.
Likewise, during negotiations over the peace treaty with Israel,
Sadat rejected, without repercussions, nearly unanimous
parliamentary resolutions to break off the negotiations, to give
the Arab Defense Pact priority over the treaty, and to permit
normalization of relations with Israel to proceed only within the
framework of a comprehensive settlement.
The president's trusted confidants were the legislative
leaders, and they easily set the agenda. The ruling party,
subordinate to the president, dominated the assembly and in a
number of cases ousted its own parliamentary peers when their
criticism antagonized the government. Many deputies were
economically dependent on the government; in the 1980s a third of
them were employed by the state. Because the executive can dissolve
parliament and through its control of the ruling party and the
electoral process replace incumbents with more docile deputies, the
legislature was really at the president's mercy. When opposition
parties appeared in parliament, it became a less submissive body,
but the members of the large government majority did not view
challenging the executive as part of their role. Generally, the
legislature, lacking all traditions of independence or collective
solidarity, had only the most modest capacity to check the
government or hold it accountable.
Nevertheless, as limited political liberalization advanced,
parliament played a growing, if still subordinate, role in the
political system. Two changes fostered this role: first, the
government relegated authority over lesser matters to parliament
and, along with it, wider scope for debate and expression; second,
opposition parties were permitted to win seats in parliament.
The chief result of this liberalization was that parliament
became an arena through which the state shared power with its
constituency, the dominant landed and business classes, allowing
them to articulate their interests, albeit generally within the
broader lines of presidential policy. Thus, parliamentary
committees were breeding grounds for an endless stream of
initiatives that sought to roll back state control or populist
regulation of the private sector. For example, the Planning and
Budget Committee demanded that the private sector get a fair share
of foreign exchange and bank credit, that public sector shares be
sold to investors, and that public industry be confined to areas
private firms could not undertake. The Housing Committee pressured
the Antiquities Department to divest itself of land coveted by
developers. The Religious Affairs Committee became a sounding board
for conservative religious opinion, pushing Islamization measures,
and proposing bans on alcohol, Western films, and even belly
dancing. Parliament also played some role in the budgetary process
by which public resources were allocated and on a number of
occasions blocked measures to levy taxes on wealthy farmers and
business people.
Parliament had no record of deciding the big issues, but
occasionally it became an arena for debating them. When the regime
wished to change policy, parliament was sometimes the arena for
testing the waters or for discrediting old policies as a prelude to
launching new ones. Sadat encouraged parliament under his
confidant, Sayyid Marii, to criticize the statist Sidqi government
and used parliament as a vehicle of his de-Nasserization campaign.
Once opposition parties took their seats in parliament, they
attempted, with mixed success, to raise issues in opposition to
government policy.
Parliament also played an "oversight" role, calling attention
to shortcomings in the performance of the bureaucracy or bringing
constituent grievances to government attention. Ministers were
constantly criticized over market shortages and service breakdowns,
and deputies who took their role seriously spent a great deal of
time intervening with the bureaucracy on behalf of constituents. On
occasion, parliament challenged the probity of actions by ministers
and high officials. It attacked the Sidqi government over
irregularities in the arrangements of a major oil pipeline project
and the Khalil government over the awarding of a telecommunications
contract. A project to build a resort near the pyramids, although
involving persons close to President Sadat, was investigated and
rejected in parliament. Whereas such parliamentary activities could
serve the leader as a useful way of controlling the bureaucracy and
as a safety valve for redress of grievances, if deputies went too
far, they invited a reaction. Sadat was so irritated by the rise of
parliamentary criticism that in 1979 he dissolved the People's
Assembly and called new elections, in which the regime, by a
combination of fraud and intimidation, made sure its main critics
lost their seats. Finally, however, for those deputies willing to
exercise their political skills in support of the government,
parliamentary seats could be stepping-stones to political influence
and elite careers. Parliamentary seats allowed deputies to act as
brokers between government and their constituency, might serve as
a base from which to cultivate strategic connections in government,
and became something of a political apprenticeship by which certain
more influential deputies became eligible for ministerial office.
Parliament also served as a repository for high officials out of
office who wished to keep their hand in the political pot. Judging
by the number of candidates who sought parliamentary seats, these
seats were worthwhile for developing connections in the capital and
influence at home.
A second chamber was added to the legislature in the late 1970s
when the Central Committee of the ASU was transformed into the
Consultative Council, essentially an advisory chamber of notables
and retired officials. In 1980 the membership was overhauled; 70
members were appointed by the president, and the ruling party won
all 140 elected seats. In 1989 the ruling party again took all
seats.
Data as of December 1990
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