|
Egypt Interest Groups
The widening scope for interest-group politics was one of the
most significant dimensions of the limited liberalization begun
under Sadat. Under the Nasser regime, which distrusted the effect
of pressure groups on public policy, interest groups were brought
into a corporatist system whereby their leaders were government
appointed. They were thus rendered powerless to deflect the
mounting state assault on private interests launched in the name of
socialism. Sadat, seeking to win the support of the land- owning
and educated classes, permitted their associated interest groups
greater autonomy and opened greater access for them into the
decision-making process. Their members turned parliament into a
channel for promoting their interests, and their representatives
carried weight in the system of consultative national councils.
Under Mubarak the numbers and influence of interest groups grew,
and although the relation between the state and these associations
was by no means free of conflict, they carried much more weight in
policy councils than the unorganized mass public. Of all interests,
business made the best use of the widened scope for interest-group
activity. In men such as Osman Ahmad Osman, business enjoyed the
direct access to Sadat critical for steering the transition from
statism. But organizations like the Chamber of Commerce and the
Federation of Industries also spoke with increasing authority for
their interests against both the state sector and labor. The
Businessmen's Association and the Egyptian-American Chamber of
Commerce united the most powerful business interests and
facilitated their access to state resources. The government even
encouraged formation of new business organizations, such as a joint
venture investors' association and an exporters' union.
To be sure, the bourgeoisie was far from united on many issues.
Business people vied for lucrative privileged deals with the public
sector, and those connected to its patronage networks were much
more favorable to the state than those in competition with it. Such
competition included the bankers, who fought the public sector for
control of foreign exchange, and others who had to pay off
officials merely to operate. Clashes also occurred between the
interests of importers and of local industrialists and between the
secular haute bourgeoisie and Islamic-oriented small
business.
Nevertheless, on the big issues such as infitah,
government regulation, taxation, prices, and wages, business shared
a common view. Thus, business people and business groups were
instrumental in pressuring for the widening of infitah under
Sadat. They continually lobbied, with considerable success, for tax
reductions and exemptions on the ground that the mobilization of
savings and investment required these concessions. The government
responded by reducing the progressive rates of the income tax and
permitting a proliferation of "tax holidays" for new investment.
The ability of the rich to evade taxes had become such a scandal by
the end of the 1970s that Sadat declared the rich were not paying
their fair share of taxes. The Chamber of Commerce lobbied
aggressively against attempts by the Ministry of Supply to fix
profit ceilings on imported commodities and fought back pressures
from the trade unions for increases in minimum wages. Construction
and real estate interests, operating through the Housing Committee
of parliament, pushed through the demolition of lower-income
neighborhoods to make way for luxury hotels, highways, parking
lots, and office towers. The Federation of Industries launched a
campaign to roll back public sector monopolies in fields where
industrialists wanted to invest, while at the same time pushing for
protection from foreign competition. Owners of large farms were
also successful in advancing their interests. Operating through the
Agricultural Affairs Committee of parliament, they won an
alteration in the Law on Agrarian Relations, reducing the security
of tenants and raising their rents; had public money allocated to
compensate victims of the Nasserite land reforms; and won the right
to bid on reclaimed state land, unrestricted by the agrarian reform
ceiling.
The professional syndicates or unions also worked to defend the
interests of their members. The medical syndicate, for example,
lobbied to restrain the indiscriminate expansion of professional
school enrollments, which it said was producing a surplus of
undertrained graduates. The engineers' syndicate insisted that
foreign firms be required to hire a quota of Egyptian engineers.
The actions of the journalists' and lawyers' syndicates stood
out as cases where professionals took positions on wider political
issues in opposition to the regime. The syndicates took these
positions partly because these associations were battlegrounds
between rival political forces and partly because their
professional interests demanded political freedoms greater than
those that the regime was willing to concede. Thus, the
journalists' union long fought to expand press freedoms. Sadat
inserted a trusted confidant to discipline the union, and when the
strong leftist influence in the profession led to the election of
a leftist, he tried unsuccessfully to abolish the union. The
Mubarak regime, however, managed to reassert its control.
The lawyers' syndicate also became an independent force
troublesome to the regime. While lawyers generally applauded
Sadat's liberalization and the restoration of the rule of law, he
did not go far enough to please many. The union gave New Wafdist
leader Fuad Siraj ad Din (also seen as Serag al Din) a forum for
his attempt to resurrect his party. Siraj ad Din vigorously
attacked Sadat's Law of Shame by which he attempted to outlaw all
criticism "disrespectful" of presidential authority. Sadat finally
purged the syndicate leadership when it attacked the normalization
of relations with Israel. Under Mubarak the syndicate became an
even more contentious defender of civil liberties; in 1986 lawyers
staged a strike against the continuation of emergency laws, and in
1988 the syndicate raised a public storm when it launched a
campaign against the abuse of emergency laws and illegal
detentions.
Public sector managers also entered the interest group arena as
the infitah unfolded, embodying both threats and
opportunities for them. The Ministry of Industry convened
assemblies in which public sector officials were allowed to vent
their grievances. Seeking to compete and survive in a freer
economy, they demanded discretion to raise prices as costs rose,
reduction of their tax burden, and authority over personnel policy
to "link incentives to production." They also lobbied against a
joint- venture textile factory that threatened to flood the market
at the expense of the public textile industry. The managers had but
limited success, however, because their desire for lower taxes
clashed with the needs of the treasury, and their desire to raise
prices and dismiss excess labor risked a popular reaction the
government could ill afford. Public sector managers increasingly
saw their salvation, therefore, in joint ventures with foreign
firms that would release them from government restrictions and from
the provisions of the labor code. Pushing from the other side with
mixed success, the trade unions voiced the objections of public
sector workers to any weakening of the labor code. The unions
fought for increases in the minimum wage, too, but raises always
seemed to lag behind the rising cost of living.
Generally speaking, the widened scope for interest-group
politics in post-Nasser Egypt opened access for the "haves" to the
policy process. But this was to the exclusion of, and often at the
expense of, the less well connected or unorganized masses.
Data as of December 1990
|
