El Salvador The Military under Democratic Rule, 1984-88
Army personnel in the field
Courtesy United States Department of Defense
In the 1984-88 period, the military largely adhered to its
new constitutional obligations to remain apolitical and obedient
to civilian rule
(see Mission and Organization
, this ch.). It
made no effort to influence the outcome of the elections that
brought Duarte and the Legislative Assembly into office. The
elected leadership determined the country's domestic and foreign
policy, generally without discernible interference by the
military. President Duarte normally made the basic decisions on
how to deal with the guerrillas, and he set the rules of
engagement, which the military obeyed. Military leaders spurned
attempts by antidemocratic right-wing extremists to incite coups,
and by late 1988 no military coup attempt had been made.
Nevertheless, there were occasions when civil-military relations
were seriously strained. For example, in October 1985 a group of
army officers accused Duarte of endangering the national security
by allowing 123 rebels to go free in exchange for the release of
his kidnapped daughter. Although the officers asked the High
Command to consider replacing the president, a day-long debate in
that body defused the dissent.
The military reportedly also still set its own rules of
conduct much of the time, despite Duarte's efforts to strengthen
civilian control. For example, the military resisted civilian
efforts to force it to make a public accounting of the
involvement of some officers in a multimillion-dollar kidnapping
ring, a corrupt arms deal, and the murder of several United
States citizens. In addition, some army officers with records of
human rights abuses continued to be promoted. Moreover, with the
exceptions of Vides and Blandon, who became identified with
Duarte and his administration, the military kept its distance
from the PDC government and cultivated its own ties with
political parties, the Roman Catholic Church, and business and
labor groups.
Although the armed forces remained a powerful institution,
exerting a strong, behind-the-scenes influence on national
security affairs during the Duarte administration, usually
through the High Command, the military's direct political
involvement decreased. Observers cited three reasons why a
consensus toward a professional, apolitical military institution
gradually developed. First and foremost, the military understood
that its submission to civilian authority was essential for
obtaining United States support to carry out its primary national
security mission, namely counterinsurgency. Second, a more
apolitical stance by the military was necessary if the country
wished to end its international isolation and improve economic,
diplomatic, and perhaps even military cooperation with West
European and Latin American democracies. And third, most military
leaders understood that the political appeal of the insurgency
could best be neutralized by setting up representative civilian
institutions and the infrastructure of a democratic society, even
though these were historically alien to the country. Thus, the
military's role in Salvadoran political life changed dramatically
during the Duarte administration. The military publicly supported
the democratic process and remained neutral in it; military
leaders stated repeatedly that civilian officials were
responsible for determining El Salvador's political, economic,
social, and foreign policies.
In 1987 the Duarte administration's relations with the
military were strained, however, by the government's long-range
plans to build up a police force independent of the army, by the
release of guerrilla prisoners, and by a brief unilateral ceasefire declared by the president in order to comply with the
Central American Peace Agreement that Duarte signed on behalf of
El Salvador on August 7, 1987
(see The Crisis in Central America
, ch. 4). Although the High Command approved peace talks with the
guerrillas in September 1987, the military's public support for
the dialogue seemed less than enthusiastic.
Two events in late November 1987 further strained civilmilitary relations. One was the temporary return from exile of
two leaders of the political front of the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion
Nacional--FMLN), the Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente
Democratico Revolucionario--FDR). Another was Duarte's release of
new evidence purportedly linking Roberto D'Aubuisson Arrieta, the
Arena leader, with the 1980 murder of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo
Romero y Galdamez. In response to these two events, Salvadoran
right-wing political leaders, including D'Aubuisson and Ochoa,
began appealing for "patriotic action" by their traditional ally,
the army. Ochoa stressed the duty of the military commanders in
the field to defend El Salvador from both the "terrorists" and
the Christian democratic government. These rightist leaders also
attempted to appeal to the nationalism of army officers who
resented the United States embassy's influence over their
actions. One target of the rightists was Colonel Carlos Reynaldo
Lopez Nuila, a senior army officer and the PN director general.
Lopez Nuila had strongly supported Duarte, had tried to loosen
the army's control over police forces in San Salvador, and had
actively investigated human rights abuses and other crimes by
some senior army officers.
In mid-1988 the military, like the government, appeared to be
in a transitional period. Reportedly disenchanted with the
Christian democratic government over its handling of the economy
and its efforts at dialogue with the guerrillas, and uneasy over
the potential investigation of military officers accused of
crimes, the military appeared receptive to the assumption of
power by the right and by Arena. The military was particularly
worried that after the 1989 presidential election the country
would still have a weak civilian government. By mid-1988
Lieutenant Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce Torres, commander of the
army's First Infantry Brigade in eastern San Miguel Department,
had become publicly critical of civilians, saying bureaucratic
infighting and the political parties' inability to resolve their
differences were weakening the war effort. Ponce's renewed
efforts to win over citizens in zones of conflict worried some in
the civilian government, who felt that the powerful, more
cohesive military was usurping their functions.
The High Command held a series of meetings to define its
position and also met with politicians to discuss the electoral
dispute that delayed the convening of the Legislative Assembly
elected in March 1988. Defense Minister Vides publicly dismissed
the possibility that a coup would result from the political
crisis that had developed by June 1988, when Duarte left the
country to receive medical treatment for what was reported to be
terminal cancer. Meanwhile, members of the military academy's
class of 1966 (the so-called tandona, or big class), led
by Colonel Ponce, were beginning to move into positions of power
(see Officer Corps Dynamics
, this ch.). By mid-1988, after five
years on the job, General Vides and General Blandon appeared to
be losing influence as younger, more aggressive officers, some of
whose attitudes toward the democratic process were unclear,
anticipated the generals' approaching retirement.
Data as of November 1988
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