El Salvador Counterinsurgency Tactics
Army civic action program, El Paisnal, San Salvador Department
Courtesy Ana B. Montes
Initially, the army used conventional warfare tactics against
the insurgents. It typically would rely on massive frontal
assaults or sweeps against guerrilla positions. These operations
were less risky than the small-unit tactics urged by United
States advisers but were ineffective against the more mobile
guerrilla units, which easily evaded the army forces. At
nightfall, the army invariably returned to the safety of its
garrisons instead of pursuing the insurgents. Although army
troops sometimes retook towns previously held by guerrillas, the
army usually withdrew after a short stay, and FMLN forces
returned.
United States military assistance helped to transform the
army into a more capable force. During the second part of 1982,
the Salvadoran government began deploying United States-trained
and United Statesd-equipped "hunter" counterinsurgency
battalions, consisting of 220 members. "Hunter" tactics called
for operations in highly mobile small units, carrying out night
patrolling and night attacks in place of the army's ineffective
massed assaults.
The army was slow to adopt these new tactics and largely
continued to conduct the war in a lackadaisical manner. It
responded to attacks by much larger FMLN units in 1983 by
abandoning the United States-inspired concept of the "hunter"
battalions. It replaced them with the 580-man Antiterrorist
Infantry Battalions (Batallones de Infanteria Antiterrorista--
BIAT) and 390-man Countersubversion Infantry Battalions
(Batallones de Infanteria para Contrasubversion--BIC). Again, the
guerrillas easily evaded these slow-moving forces in the field.
Badly needed organizational changes resulted from the May
1983 replacement of General Garcia by Vides. Within weeks,
Vides's new chief of staff of the armed forces, Colonel Blandon,
implemented United States-style organization and tactics in key
combat units, adopting new counterinsurgency objectives of
denying the guerrillas sanctuary, movement, and supplies. He also
announced a 20 percent increase in troop strength for 1984 to
bring the army's force level to 30,000. Blandon adopted more
aggressive actions using small, air-mobile combat units. These
moves turned the war in the army's favor, but subsequent
adjustments by the FMLN frustrated government forces and again
stalemated the conflict.
In mid-1983 the army also launched a United States-designed
and United States-funded pacification program consisting of
military sweeps followed by civic action programs designed to
reduce political violence. The army plan was to coordinate
military operations in two eastern departments with governmentsponsored economic development of the area and to establish local
civil defense and social improvement programs. The persistent
army presence, it was thought, would keep the guerrillas on the
move and isolate them from the civilian population. The first
phase of the program, called Operation Well-Being (Operacion
Bienestar), focused on San Vicente and Usulutan departments,
where guerrilla forces were particularly active. The program
called for the organization of paramilitary networks and their
integration into the counterinsurgency operations of the regular
army and security forces. The army stationed 4,000 troops in
central San Vicente Department with the objectives of forcing
guerrilla units out of their bases in the northern sector and
then establishing a buffer zone defended mainly by civil defense
units.
In September 1984, Colonel Ochoa, then commander of the
Fourth Infantry Brigade in Chalatenango Department, attempted a
similar campaign to clear guerrillas from the two northern
departments of Chalatenango and Cabanas. Villagers, however,
believing their safety depended on remaining neutral, were
uncooperative. By the end of 1985, the campaign had failed,
largely because the guerrilla forces easily evaded the army
troops and then frustrated implementation of civic action
programs.
Frustrated at its failure to defeat the FMLN after five years
of fighting, the army reportedly turned increasingly to the
forced relocation of the rebels' civilian supporters,
particularly in the Guazapa Volcano area some twenty kilometers
north of San Salvador, in northern Chalatenango Department, and
in the eastern departments. The Ministry of Interior's National
Commission to Assist the Displaced Persons of El Salvador
(Comision Nacional de Asistencia a los Desplazadas de El
Salvador--Conades) reported in July 1985 that 412,000 of El
Salvador's population of about 5 million had been displaced from
their homes by the war since 1981. According to some estimates,
an additional 500,000 had left the country altogether. Although
army officers suggested that the government's main concern was to
deprive the rebels of political and logistical support, Duarte
claimed that the new policy was designed to ensure the safety of
civilians.
In October 1986, Blandon introduced a second United Statesfinanced pacification plan, United to Rebuild (Unidos para
Reconstruir). In addition to giving the military control over
repopulation and reconstruction programs nationwide, it contained
a public relations element that gave the military the potential
to build a popular support base of its own. Although intended to
reassert army control and begin economic recuperation in war-torn
areas, it too failed as a result of a lack of resources,
incompetence in its implementation, and insufficient cooperation
from the population.
By mid-1988, according to some observers, the army had become
burdened by conventional tactics, mediocre officers, overreliance
on air power, and the need to defend against economic sabotage.
For example, fully a third of the government's troops were tied
down guarding bridges, electrical plants, and other economic
targets.
That fall Colonel Ponce launched a new counterinsurgency
campaign in rebel territory. Designed without the assistance of
United States military advisers, it relied heavily on night
patrols by fifteen-man groups of highly trained commandos. It
also took a new approach to civic action efforts. Instead of
merely handing out supplies to villagers, the new campaign,
called United to Work (Unidos para Trabajar), put greater
emphasis on forcibly evicting left-wing community groups and
replacing them with new organizations responsible for allocating
army donations of food and medicine. The army imposed two main
conditions for this aid: that the village establish a civil
defense unit and that it make its young men available for
conscription. The army's civic-action efforts were not
reassuring, however, to more than 7,000 Salvadoran refugees who
had returned from Honduran camps since the previous October to
abandoned villages in northern El Salvador. Suspicious of the
returning Salvadorans, the army prevented church and other
outside relief workers from delivering supplies to them.
Data as of November 1988
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