El Salvador Officer Corps Dynamics
Salvadoran Army officer and soldier
Courtesy United States Department of Defense
In the Salvadoran officer corps, personal ties and political
orientation have traditionally been more important than military
competence. The 1948 revolution institutionalized a caste-like
"old-boy network" within the army by bringing to power a
tanda, or military academy graduating class, for the first
time. Henceforth, the members of each tanda traditionally
were bound to lifelong loyalty to one another. A tanda
formed a tight clique, with its members taking their first
commands in the expectation that they would one day be running
the country. A tanda was important throughout an officer's
career, which by law could last thirty years. Tanda
loyalty counted more than political or personal differences. The
importance of a tanda increased with seniority, as its
leaders moved up into positions of power and wealth. Members of
one tanda often formed alliances with those of another,
although, as Richard L. Millett has observed, not with the class
one year ahead that had mistreated them during their first year,
nor with the class one year behind that they had themselves
harassed.
The 1963 tanda of D'Aubuisson, a former army and GN
intelligence officer and an ultraconservative politician,
dominated the army in the early 1980s. His tanda held
eleven of the top twenty field commands, controlling four of the
country's six infantry brigades, four of its seven regional
garrisons, the artillery brigade, and the mechanized cavalry
battalion. D'Aubuisson carefully cultivated this network. Merely
having classmates in so many key positions did not mean, however,
that he had their automatic support. Many of his classmates were
opposed to his extreme political viewpoint. The importance of
D'Aubuisson's tanda connections lay in the entree they
gave him into the cuarteles (barracks), where he also had
the support of a number of junior officers.
Some observers believed that the tanda system was
declining in importance by the mid-1980s because the much larger
class sizes and the smaller amount of time that classmates were
together were not conducive to developing strong bonds. The
emergence in the late 1980s of the forty-six member
tandona of 1966 appeared to contradict that view, however.
The so-called reformist members of the tandona who played
significant roles in the political system in the late 1970s and
early 1980s included Defense Minister Garcia, his deputy
Carranza, and the PN head, Colonel Lopez Nuila. These officers
advocated a hard line against the opposition.
The promotion, transfer, or retirement of at least thirty
senior officers in early July 1988 marked the start of the
ascension of the tandona to command posts. As a result of
the changes--in which younger, more conservative officers
replaced those more closely identified with President Duarte--the
tandona held five of the six prestigious infantry brigade
commands; controlled five of the seven military detachments, the
three security forces, and the intelligence, operations, and
personnel posts in the High Command; and occupied numerous other
key slots. The leading member of the tandona, Colonel
Ponce, was promoted to the position of chief of the Joint General
Staff in November 1988 and thus assumed the counterinsurgency
command. Although most of the top hierarchy was expected to be
replaced by March 1989, tandona members were moving into
the top posts slowly because the traditional seniority rule did
not allow them to displace officers who had graduated before
them. The sweeping command changes, however, angered many younger
officers, who viewed the colonels' unusual consolidation of
control as a power grab that blocked others' chances for
promotion. Officers above and below the tandona bitterly
resented it because of its size and influence.
Data as of November 1988
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