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El Salvador Left-Wing Extremism
Background to the Insurgency
The FMLN insurgency was rooted in the 1960s when reform-
minded groups emerged to challenge the alliance of the right-wing
military and the landowning oligarchy. With the electoral option
blocked by fraudulent presidential elections in 1972 and 1977,
leftist groups resorted to militant demonstrations and terrorism
to promote change. A pattern of mounting violence and
polarization resulted
(see The 1970s: The Road to Revolt
, ch. 1).
As in the early 1930s, the growing conflict had focused on the
peasant population; most campesinos still lived at a subsistence
level, and about two-fifths of rural families had no land at all
(see Rural Life
, ch. 2). The regime's token land reform of 1976
did little to address this longstanding problem. Political
violence and the suspension of rights through the declaration of
states of siege only served to further radicalize the left,
including the Catholic groups increasingly influenced by
liberation theology (see Glossary).
The Salvadoran guerrilla groups that emerged in the 1970s
derived directly or indirectly from a 1969 split within the
illegal, Moscow-line Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido
Comunista de El Salvador--PCES) between the old-line Communists
and a vocal minority faction of firebrand revolutionaries led by
PCES secretary general Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial"). In
April 1970, Carpio and his followers broke away from the PCES and
founded the Popular Liberation Forces (Fuerzas Populares de
Liberacion--FPL). Under Carpio's leadership, the FPL advocated
doctrinaire adherence to a Vietnamese-style "prolonged popular
war" strategy against "imperialism" and the Salvadoran oligarchy.
During the FPL's formative years, the National University in San
Salvador was the largest urban center for recruiting and training
members of the FPL and its mass organization, the Revolutionary
Popular Bloc (Bloque Popular Revolucionario--BPR). With the aid
of the clergy, the FPL recruited its cadres mostly from the
National Association of Salvadoran Educators (Asociacion Nacional
de Educadores Salvadorenos--ANDES) and its rank-and-file mainly
from the Federation of Salvadoran Christian Peasants (Federacion
de Campesinos Cristianos Salvadorenos--Feccas) and the Union of
Farm Workers (Union de Trabajadores del Campo--UTC).
In 1971 another group of PCES dissidents, disenchanted with
the FPL's strategy of a prolonged popular war, left the party and
joined with dissident students, religious activists, and PDC
members to form the People's Revolutionary Army (Ejercito
Revolucionario del Pueblo--ERP). The ERP's "militarist" faction,
headed by Joaquin Villalobos Hueso ("Rene Cruz"), contended that
Sandinista-style popular insurrection could be sparked by
dramatic armed attacks on the existing power structure. The ERP's
"political" faction, led by Roque Dalton, a communist Salvadoran
poet, emphasized the ideological preparation of the masses before
undertaking major armed actions and the development of broad
coalitions with other groups. After the Villalobos group passed
death sentences on Dalton's followers, Villalobos reportedly
murdered Dalton on May 10, 1975.
Under the leadership of Villalobos, the ERP advocated a
strongly pro-Cuban, Marxist-Leninist ideology based on Ernesto
"Che" Guevara's foco, or insurrectional center, theory of
guerrilla warfare, as well as Maoist and West European
revolutionary theories. Most of the ERP's cadres were of middle-
class background, mainly university dropouts or professionals.
They included considerably more women and foreigners than the
other guerrilla groups. A leading ERP field commander, Ana
Guadalupe Martinez, author of the propagandistic El Salvador's
Clandestine Prisons, served as a main spokesperson on
international affairs for the Revolutionary Democratic Front
(Frente Democratico Revolucionario--FDR). Some cadres had radical
Christian backgrounds. Rank-and-file elements generally were
workers but also included some forcibly recruited peasants.
Although the PCES and the other guerrilla groups that formed the
FMLN in 1980 initially ostracized the ERP, Cuban leader Fidel
Castro Ruz pressured the FMLN groups into including the ERP in
the alliance.
Immediately after Dalton's murder, his followers broke away
from the ERP and established the Armed Forces of National
Resistance (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional--FARN). The
FARN originated at the National University, and most of its
cadres came from the middle class. Although led by a self-
described Marxist, Eduardo Sancho Castaneda ("Ferman
Cienfuegos"), the FARN developed close ties internationally with
moderate social democrats and domestically with liberal members
of the Salvadoran armed forces. On February 2, 1977, FARN and
PCES dissidents, together with Salvadoran exiles living in Costa
Rica, formed a Salvadoran branch of a Trotskyite regional
organization called the Revolutionary Party of Central American
Workers (Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos-
-PRTC). The PRTC recruited primarily from the National University
in San Salvador, which PRTC leader Francisco Jovel ("Roberto
Roca") had attended, and from the labor unions. Although the PRTC
initially had a reputation for unpredictable radicalism and close
ties to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea),
it moved toward more orthodox Marxism-Leninism after joining the
FMLN in December 1980. Nevertheless, it continued to advocate a
nonaligned international stance.
The PCES, under its new leader, Jorge Shafik Handal, followed
the Moscow line in the 1970s, supporting reformist, noncommunist
governments and an electoral strategy. At its April 1979 party
congress, however, the PCES, which already had begun organizing
its own guerrilla group, the Armed Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas
Armadas de Liberacion-- FAL), adopted an "armed struggle" policy.
While serving in the reformist government that came to power in a
civil-military coup in October 1979, the PCES continued to
prepare for guerrilla and terrorist activities by sending its
recruits to training camps in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
Cuba, and Nicaragua. Although commanded exclusively by PCES
cadres, FAL was made up mostly, not of party members, but of
rural-based guerrillas who had been gradually indoctrinated into
serving as PCES followers. By the late 1970s, the PCES consisted
primarily of middle-class elements and cadres of some workers'
organizations. Although Handal espoused a "dialectical
combination" of the ERP's insurrectional approach and the FPL's
protracted popular war strategy, he remained more oriented toward
the ERP.
During the 1977-79 period, the left-wing mass organizations
conducted a campaign of civil disobedience, demonstrations, and
takeovers of churches, government buildings, and foreign
embassies. Much of this activity was perpetrated by the three
largest mass organizations--the FPL's BPR, the FARN's United
Popular Action Front (Frente de Accion Popular Unidad--FAPU), and
the ERP's 28th of February Popular Leagues (Ligas Populares 28 de
Febrero--LP-28). At the same time, the extreme left engaged in
numerous significant acts of terrorism, such as the kidnapping of
foreign businessmen for fund-raising purposes, political
kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings. The FARN specialized
in kidnapping and claimed to have raised US$60 million in ransoms
in the late 1970s.
Most of the mass organizations rejected talks with the
reformist junta that took power in January 1980. Instead, they
consolidated their forces by forming the Revolutionary
Coordinator of the Masses (Coordinadora Revolucionaria de las
Masas--CRM) at the same time that the armed left increased its
own efforts at greater coordination. In April 1980, the CRM
allied itself with the Democratic Front (Frente Democratico)--an
alliance consisting of disaffected Christian Democrats, Social
Democrats led by Guillermo Manuel Ungo Revelo, and a small
association of professionals. The merger of these two umbrella
organizations created the FDR, which recognized the guerrilla
movement as its "vanguard." Although the Romero assassination
enabled the FDR, through the mass organizations, to mobilize tens
of thousands of demonstrators in the spring of 1980, the overall
movement was hampered by a lack of arms, poor coordination
between guerrilla and noncombatant forces, continued infighting,
and severe repression by the security forces.
In May 1980, the guerrilla leaders met in Havana and formed a
political-military command, the Unified Revolutionary Directorate
(Direccion Revolucionaria Unificada--DRU), as their central
executive arm for political and military planning. Unification of
forces reportedly was a precondition for Cuban aid to the
Salvadoran insurgents. The DRU established its headquarters near
Managua and helped to direct planning and operations and
coordinate logistical support for its forces in El Salvador. The
fifteen-member DRU included three leaders from each of the five
guerrilla groups: the ERP, FPL, FARN, FAL/PCES, and, beginning in
late 1980, the PRTC. The DRU also included a five-member
executive directorate, known as the General Command, consisting
of the principal leaders of the five guerrilla groups: the ERP's
Villalobos (the first among equals of the FMLN commanders), the
FPL's Leonel Gonzalez, the FARN's Sancho, the PRTC's Francisco
Jovel, and the FAL/PCES's Handal.
The guerrilla groups took a step toward closer unity in
October 1980 by forming the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional-Frente
Democratico Revolucionario--FMLN-FDR, which constituted an
umbrella entity or alliance for operational and strategic
coordination among the insurgent forces and their popular fronts.
The FMLN had a leadership structure (DRU), a regional military
organization (five guerrilla fronts), and a political-diplomatic
front (the FDR). A self-described Marxist-Leninist movement with
a generally pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban orientation, the FMLN-FDR
committed itself to seizing power through a two-pronged military
strategy of economic sabotage and a prolonged guerrilla war of
attrition based on a combination of Maoist, Vietnamese, and
Guevarist principles. It sought to entrench its rural guerrilla
forces while developing urban support bases in preparation for an
eventual general insurrection. During the 1980-82 period,
politically related violence in El Salvador increased
dramatically as the former terrorist groups completed their
transition to primarily guerrilla organizations.
In preparation for the FMLN's "final offensive" of January
1981 (the name of which seemed to contradict the FPL's long-term
strategy), tons of modern weapons, primarily United States-made
arms from captured stockpiles in Vietnam, were delivered covertly
to guerrilla forces in El Salvador, mostly through Cuba and
Nicaragua. Despite the substantial weapons deliveries, the 1981
offensive failed in its effort to incite a countrywide
insurrection; the FMLN had greatly overestimated its popular
support and the efficiency of its outside supply system.
Salvadoran military and security forces, operating with minimal
United States assistance (military aid had been suspended until
then), beat back the offensive after about ten days of combat.
The vast majority of Salvadorans ignored the FMLN's call for an
uprising, much to the chagrin of guerrilla strategists. The FMLN
tried and failed again to defeat the army in a general offensive
in early 1982. After these setbacks, however, the five FMLN
groups worked to increase their strategic and tactical
coordination and made substantial progress during 1982 in
overcoming logistical and communications problems. They began to
equip their forces increasingly with United States-made weapons
and equipment captured from the army or purchased in the
international gray arms market. In addition, United States
officials maintained that Nicaraguan supplies for the FMLN
continued to be sent by sea, air, and land to El Salvador almost
daily.
The FMLN overcame major factional disputes during 1983. At a
January 1983 meeting of the FPL's Central Committee, the
doctrinaire line of Carpio, a long-time opponent of close
cooperation with other FMLN groups, reportedly was voted down in
favor of greater FMLN unity of action, as advocated by another
senior FPL leader, Ana Melinda Montes ("Ana Maria").
Nevertheless, the existence of a continuing deep division over
policy within the guerrilla forces was revealed in April 1983 by
the bizarre murder and suicide, respectively, in Managua of
Carpio and Montes. The deaths weakened the FPL's influence in the
FMLN in favor of the ERP, whose leader, Villalobos, had long
advocated greater operational cooperation. In September 1983,
however, the long-standing policy dispute within the FPL eased
substantially with the consolidation of a position emphasizing
unity with other FMLN groups and openness toward cooperation with
outside groups. The FPL's policy shift reduced friction with the
FMLN's four other military factions and with Nicaragua's ruling
Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de
Liberacion Nacional--FSLN). Furthermore, the FPL, which
previously had operated largely independently of other FMLN
groups, formally agreed to cooperate in a centralized military
command (the DRU).
The relatively united FMLN again went on the offensive that
September and decisively escalated the war from company- to
battalion-level guerrilla combat, involving as many as 500
guerrillas in an offensive. Over the next five years, the
conflict remained a military stalemate. The FMLN established a
sophisticated internal communications system linking its fronts
and became--allegedly with Cuban and Nicaraguan assistance--
better trained and armed. The organization, which by 1984
reportedly was receiving mostly ammunition, not weapons, from
Nicaragua, also achieved important military tactical successes.
By early 1984, the Salvadoran Army held less than a four-to-one
advantage over a guerrilla force of at least 9,000 combatants,
down from 10,000 to 12,000 in 1983 (military tacticians usually
consider a ten-to-one advantage the minimum necessary to defeat a
guerrilla insurgency).
Some commentators opined that the insurgents had failed
decisively by the end of 1984 and that the war was winding down.
The FMLN was put on the defensive in 1984 and 1985 when
substantial United States military aid was rushed in and the
Salvadoran Army expanded rapidly. Under heavy pressure in the
rural area it once dominated, the FMLN committed itself to a new
long-term strategy and began rebuilding its political bases--
peasant, labor, and student militant groups--in cities and towns.
Many guerrillas hid their weapons and moved into San Salvador. By
mid-1985 the FMLN had adapted to the army's new tactics and
capabilities by breaking down its large guerrilla columns into
smaller squads assigned to ambush and sabotage government
targets. By late December 1985, the number of guerrillas dropped
to between 5,000 and 7,000, of which at least 2,000 remained
active in the rural areas.
The FMLN also reverted to classic guerrilla tactics and
increased its use of land mines, which it called "popular
armament." In mid-1985 the FMLN, in addition to kidnapping or
assassinating numerous military and government officials, began
kidnapping and assassinating mayors and burning their offices. It
also targeted United States military personnel for assassination.
In June 1985, PRTC terrorists assassinated four off-duty United
States embassy Marine guards at a sidewalk cafe in San Salvador
in a massacre that also left nine civilians, including two United
States businessmen, dead and fifteen others wounded. According to
the FMLN high command, the chief purpose of its raid on the
army's basic training center in eastern La Union Department in
October 1985 was to kill or capture United States soldiers
serving there.
Data as of November 1988
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