Indonesia National Security
The magical white monkey Begoman Anoman
(right), who fights on the side of the Pandawas, and Kokrosono
(left), a young knight who fights for the Kurawas, the Pandawas'
cousins and mortal enemies
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA (ABRI;
for this
and other acronyms, see table A) play a role in national
society
that is perhaps unique in the world. The military
establishment
in the early 1990s was involved in many affairs of state
that
elsewhere were not normally associated with military
forces and
acknowledged as the dominant political institution in the
country. Yet, in comparison with countries with a similar
background and state of national development, ABRI has
been
cautious in its exercise of power. Indonesia since the
mid-1960s
has been truly a nation with military personnel in
government,
not a nation with a military government. The difference is
crucial to understanding the role of the armed forces in
Indonesia in the 1990s.
The armed forces establishment, led by the dominant
branch,
the army, has been the country's premier institution since
1966
when, in its own view, it answered the summons of the
people and
moved to the center stage of national life. Comprising the
three
military services and the police, the armed forces
operated
according to dwifungsi, or dual function, a
doctrine of
their own evolution, under which they undertook a double
role as
both defenders of the nation and as a social-political
force in
national development. In the role of defenders of the
nation, the
armed forces performed those traditional national defense
duties
common to most nations. The unique element of
dwifungsi is
the military's second role as a social-political force.
This very
broad charter formed the basis by which military personnel
were
assigned throughout the government to posts traditionally
filled
in other countries by civil servants or politically
appointed
civilians. Most prevalent of these assignments for
active-duty
and retired military officers were as provincial
governors,
district heads, legislative members, numerous
functionaries
within civilian governmental departments, and as
ambassadors
abroad.
However, the government cannot properly be
characterized as
military in nature. Not all top national, provincial,
regional,
and district jobs are held by the military and the number
of
military personnel assigned to dwifungsi civilian
positions at all levels of the government was probably
fewer than
5,000 officers in 1992 and had declined throughout the
1980s and
1990s. In 1992, approximately half of the country's
district
heads (bupati) and one-third of the twenty-seven
provincial or region governors were military officers.
Still,
under the dwifungsi doctrine, legitimizing its
performance
of both military and nonmilitary missions, ABRI became a
dominant
factor in the political life of the country and has acted
as a
major executive agent of government policies, with which
it has
been in firm agreement.
The close personal relationship between President
Suharto,
who served constitutionally as the supreme commander of
the armed
forces, and ABRI dominated leadership dynamics at the
beginning
of Suharto's New Order government in 1967. By the 1990s,
the
personal tie between Suharto and his generals had
diminished
somewhat as a result of the growing age gap between them
and an
increasing desire on the part of the new armed forces
leadership
to resist a personal tie to the presidential office.
Nevertheless, the tie between the president and the
military
leadership remained close in 1992, and the armed forces
remained
loyal to the institution of the presidency and to Suharto
and his
policies as he prepared to enter a sixth five-year term of
office
in 1993.
Since the beginning of Suharto's rise to power in 1965,
the
armed forces have accepted and supported the foundation of
his
regime, namely, the belief that economic and social
development
was the nation's first priority and that social and
political
stability was absolutely essential if that goal were to be
achieved. The primary mission of the armed forces has
therefore
been to maintain internal stability. They have been
eminently
successful in this regard, leading the nation out of a
period of
political and social upheaval in the mid-1960s into a
period of
relatively long-lasting domestic order and unprecedented
economic
growth, with an increasingly diversified economy that must
maintain a growth rate sufficient to absorb a large annual
increase in the work force (estimated in 1992 to be
approximately
2.4 million new workers each year)
(see Employment and Income
, ch. 3).
Because the Suharto government viewed national and
regional
stability as essential to maintaining the pace of national
development, the maintenance of internal security was
considered
an integral part of national defense itself. Indonesian
doctrine
considers national defense within the broader context of
"national resilience," a concept that stresses the
importance of
the ideological, political, economic, social, and military
strength of the nation. Like dwifungsi, this
concept has
also legitimized activities of the armed forces in areas
not
ordinarily considered belonging to the military sphere.
The absence of a perceived external threat since the
mid1970s in Southeast Asia has been widely credited with
allowing
Indonesia to concentrate on its internal defense and
national
development priorities. Although the internal security
mission
has always been paramount, by the late 1970s greater
attention
began to be paid to development of a credible conventional
defense capability against potential foreign threats. This
defense capability had previously been neglected under
Suharto
for both economic and doctrinal reasons and because the
nation
had not faced a serious external threat. Neglect of a
conventional defense capability resulted in deteriorated
equipment throughout the armed forces and raised doubts
about the
military's capability to confront either a foreign or a
severe
domestic threat. Under then ABRI Commander General
Mohammad
Jusuf, the armed forces initiated extensive retraining and
reorganization programs that culminated in a major
reorganization
of the armed forces in 1985. Since then, the armed forces
have
gradually upgraded their military capability, particularly
that
of the navy and the air force. Both had been seriously
weakened
by national spending priorities that--with the full
support of
the armed forces--continued to stress economic development
and
relegated defense spending to a much lower priority than
found in
most developing nations. Although the world's fourth most
populous nation, Indonesia in the late 1980s ranked only
48th in
total military expenditures and, at about US$8 per capita,
115th
in per capita military expenditures. The low priority
given to
defense spending continued into the early 1990s. In 1991,
with
its large population, Indonesia fielded only 1.5 military
personnel per 1,000 inhabitants, ranking it 122d in the
world.
For comparison, the United States, at nine military
personnel per
1,000, ranked forty-second.
Crime and the administration of criminal justice
continued to
be important issues as the nation entered the 1990s.
Although
political offenses had always been viewed as threatening
the
social order and national stability, for the first time
the
government also came to view the rising rates of ordinary
crime
in the same manner. Lack of reliable data made it
difficult to
determine the actual scope of the problem, but it was
taken very
seriously in official circles. This concern culminated in
a
covert military action against ordinary criminals in the
early
1980s, an action that was officially disclosed only in
Suharto's
1989 autobiography.
A long-promised revision of the law governing criminal
procedure was passed after much debate in late 1981. All
concerned agreed that it represented a considerable
improvement
over the old code, which dated from the Dutch colonial era
(see European Intrusions
, ch. 1). Provisions excluding the
law's
application over economic and political offenses, however,
raised
some criticism from those who wished to bring under
regular legal
constraints the activities of the internal security
organization
that often dealt with these offenses.
Data as of November 1992
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