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Indonesia Leadership Transition
Defense planners have always been concerned with the
issue of
leadership transition within the armed forces. However,
the
maturity of the armed forces as an institution was
demonstrated
in the 1983-84 period, when in less than one year, the
entire
armed forces leadership structure was turned over without
turmoil, from the Generation of 1945--veterans of the war
of
independence--to a new generation of officers educated in
the
Indonesian military academy system. Too young to have
fought
during the independence struggle, these officers,
commissioned
after 1960, brought a new and more modern perspective to
the
armed forces.
The Generation of 1945, many of whom were the children
of
small merchants or minor officials, had been motivated to
join
the armed forces by deeply felt ideals of nationalism and
patriotism rather than by any desire to pursue a
conventional
military career. In other circumstances, they might have
sought
careers in business, politics, or government and so did
not
constitute a "barracks military." Most were fairly young
at the
start of the National Revolution--for example, General
Sudirman,
the revered army commander from 1945 to 1950, was only
thirty-two
years old in 1945. This generation of officers had
maintained
exclusive control of positions of responsibility well into
the
late 1970s, often to the frustration of younger officers.
Their
main concern as they entered retirement was to ensure that
their
deeply held values were transferred to the new generation,
who
they perceived as being, less politically attuned and thus
less
aware of the senior officers great sacrifices to secure
and
maintain national independence.
Younger officers had moved into most armed forces
leadership
positions by 1983. Almost all were graduates of Akabri,
which had
produced its first full class in 1960. Many of these
officers had
entered ABRI because they believed that acquiring an
academy
education and becoming an ABRI officer brought a
reasonable
living and was one sure way to enter national ruling
circles.
Most came from middle-class backgrounds, although farmers
as well
as the wealthy urban class were well represented too. Sons
of
ABRI personnel made up a large number, but far less than a
majority, of Akabri classes. Members of the academy
generation
had no experience with the struggle for independence and
the
political turmoil of the early 1950s that had led their
elders to
distrust civilian politicians. Few, if any, had extensive
experience in performing purely nonmilitary tasks, and
most had
received more professional military training than had
their
elders.
The character of middle-level and junior officers and
the
effects of their Akabri education compared with that given
more
senior officers at Magelang remained unclear in 1992. It
appeared, however, that a generational discontinuity had
developed between those officers who began training in or
after
the late 1970s and their predecessors. This generational
shift
manifested itself primarily in the desire of younger
officers to
become true military professionals; they viewed some
aspects of
the dwifungsi doctrine as detracting from that
goal. These
younger officers, as a result of greater communication and
openness in general society, did not share their seniors'
inhibitions about seeking training and equipment from
friendly
foreign countries and favored increased professional
military
ties with the armed forces of such countries as Australia
and the
United States.
The armed forces began preparing in the early 1970s for
the
turnover of leadership from the Generation of 1945 after a
survey
conducted at the Army Command and Staff School revealed
certain
differences in motivation and outlook between younger
officers
attending the school and their superiors. In 1972
high-ranking
officers met with representatives of students attending
the
school to decide which values of the Generation of 1945
should be
fostered in order to prevent a discontinuity of leadership
when
the older officers retired. Those values, which centered
on the
dual role of ABRI personnel as defenders of the nation and
as a
force for promoting national development, were raised to
the
level of ABRI doctrine, then disseminated throughout the
services
and made the subject of subsequent ABRI curricula.
Beginning in
1978, junior officers were required to attend periodic
Pancasila
indoctrination programs to ensure inculcation of these
values
(see Pancasila: The State Ideology
, ch. 4). Pancasila
classes
were found throughout both the military and the civilian
governmental structure in the early 1990s, with the
content
differing according to the level of seniority at which the
classes were directed.
Data as of November 1992
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