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Indonesia The Army
The Army of the Republic of Indonesia (ADRI)
historically has
been the dominant service, with administrative control of
the
armed forces resting with the army chief of staff, in 1992
a
four-star general. His staff included a vice chief of
staff, an
inspector general, and assistant chiefs of staff for
logistics,
operations, personnel, planning and budget, security, and
territorial affairs. Total army strength, which had not
changed
substantially during the New Order era, as of 1992 was
some
217,000, not including several thousand in nonmilitary
positions
throughout the government.
The chief of staff was responsible for personnel,
training,
administration, and logistical support of the army, but he
did
not exercise direct authority over the ten Kodams, the
regional
commands of the army that reported directly to the
commander in
chief. Commanders and staff of each Kodam were responsible
for
administration, logistics, personnel, training, and the
general
welfare of assigned and attached combat units. Each Kodam
was
divided into successively smaller administrative units.
These
included the Military Resort (Garrison) Command (Korem);
Military
District Command (Kodim); and Military Subdistrict Command
(Koramil). At the bottom of the structure, noncommissioned
officers (NCOs) were assigned to every village in the
country.
Approximately two-thirds of the army was engaged in the
national defense aspect of the armed forces'
dwifungsi
mission. Operations were rarely, if ever, conducted in any
formation larger than a battalion. Each Korem had control
of at
least one battalion and one or more battalions came under
the
direct control of the Kodam. Army doctrine differentiated
between
tactical battalions, which were found in Kostrad and at
least one
quick reaction force battalion for each Kodam; and
territorial
battalions, which made up the majority of the units
assigned to
the ten Kodams. Each battalion had a strength of nearly
700 men,
and personnel programs within a fixed staffing size called
for
recruitment of sufficient numbers to bring chronically
understrength units up to authorized levels. Some of these
forces
were occasionally assigned for temporary missions to
Kostrad or
Kopassus.
The army had its own small air arm that performed
liaison and
limited transport duties. It flew one helicopter squadron
and one
composite squadron composed mostly of light aircraft and
small
transports, such as the domestically produced CASA 235.
Factionalism within the army leadership, once a severe
problem, no longer disrupted operations in the early
1990s.
Traditional divisional identification continued to have
some
significance, however, especially in regard to that
developed in
the former Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawijaya divisions,
which
covered western, central, and eastern Java, respectively,
during
the war of independence and the years immediately
thereafter. The
detachment of the Jakarta area from the control of the
Siliwangi
division and the restructuring of the army from a
divisional
basis to the territorial Kodam system diffused the powers
of the
divisions and eliminated warlordism.
Most of the army personnel not assigned to combat
formations
were involved in carrying out the social and developmental
portions of the armed forces' dwifungsi mission.
Many were
attached to the Kodams as support elements, performing
intelligence and internal security functions, and
maintaining
liaison with local officials charged with implementing the
government's policies. Some military personnel filled
civilian
government positions from national and province levels
down to
the district, subdistrict, or village level. A large
portion of
the army's territorial forces participated in ABRI civic
action
projects, such as the nationally directed ABRI Masuk Desa
program
and locally directed programs at the Kodam level, as part
of
their mission to promote national development. They
constructed
roads, bridges, and public buildings, provided medical
service in
remote areas, and worked to improve rural conditions. The
military's civic action mission received added attention
after
1983 as part of a program designed to address the problems
of a
perceived growing gap between ABRI and the civilian
population.
By 1992 virtually all of the army's heavy Soviet- or
East
European-origin equipment had been eliminated and replaced
by
equipment produced indigenously or purchased from Western
countries. Because of funding constraints, emphasis was
placed on
maintenance and rehabilitation of older equipment. The
mainstay
of the armored force was the French-built AMX-13 light
tank and
AMX-VCI reconditioned armored personnel carriers, mostly
acquired
in the late 1970s (see
table 31, Appendix). The nation's
small
arms industry supplied nearly all of the army's small arms
requirements, although a substantial number of M-16 rifles
purchased from the United States in the 1980s remained in
the
inventory. Domestically produced arms included FMC rifles,
submachine guns, and machine guns made under
Belgian-licensed
production. Ammunition was in short supply
(see Defense Spending and Defense Industry
, this ch.).
Although army recruits received their basic training in
a
central training facility located in each Kodam area,
specialist
corps training was provided at the appropriate national
corps
centers. NCOs were required to attend training courses and
to
pass examinations in their fields prior to promotion.
Data as of November 1992
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