Indonesia ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES
Figure 12. Organization of the Department of Defense and Security
(Hankam), 1992
Figure 13. Organization of the Armed Forces, 1992
Administrative and Command Structure
Figure 14. Military Regional Commands (Kodams), 1992
Figure 15. Navy Fleet Commands (Armadas), 1992
Figure 16. Air Force Operations Commands (Ko-Ops), 1992
The nation's four armed services, collectively termed
ABRI,
consisted of the three military services--the army, navy,
and air
force--and the police. In 1985 a major reorganization
separated
Hankam from the ABRI headquarters and staff. Hankam was
responsible for planning, acquisition, and management
tasks but
had no command or control of troop units. The ABRI
commander in
chief retained command and control of all armed forces and
continued by tradition to be the senior military officer
in the
country. The minister of defense and security in 1992 was
a
retired general, Leonardus B. "Benny" Murdani. Both the
minister
and the ABRI commander in chief, in 1992 General Try
Sutrisno,
had cabinet rank and direct access to the president.
Since the separation of the ministry from the armed
forces
headquarters in 1985, the Hankam staff has been composed
largely
of retired military personnel. The split provided
positions of
responsibility for highly qualified but relatively young
retired
officers of the Generation of 1945 while also opening up
highlevel billets in ABRI to younger active-duty officers who
had
been frustrated by slow rates of promotion.
In 1992, the administrastive structure of Hankam
consisted of
a minister, secretary general, inspector general, three
directorates general and a number of functional centers
and
institutes
(see
fig. 12). The minister, inspector general,
and
three directors general were retired senior military
officers;
the secretary general (who acted as deputy minister) and
most
functional center chiefs were active-duty military
officers.
The role of the separate armed services in 1992 had not
changed since 1969, when the heads of the army, navy, and
air
force were reduced to chiefs of staff. Operational control
of
almost all their military units was vested in the
commander in
chief, reducing the headquarters of each military service
to the
status of administrative organs. Only the police chief
continued
to exercise operational control over his own personnel.
Largely retained intact when split off from Hankam in
1985,
the ABRI staff and its functions remained directly
subordinate to
the commander in chief, who remained, in turn, directly
responsible to the president, also the supreme commander
of the
armed forces
(see
fig. 13). Under the commander in chief,
there
was a provision for a deputy, a position that in 1992 was
not
filled. There were two ABRI chiefs of staff, one for the
general
staff and one for social-political affairs. The inspector
general
and the assistant for plans and budget, as well as a
number of
agencies and institutes, remained directly under the
commander in
chief. The ABRI chief of general staff directed assistants
for
communications/electronics, intelligence, logistics,
operations,
personnel, public security affairs, and territorial
affairs, the
chief of staff for social-political affairs directed the
armed
forces' dwifungsi operations in the civilian sector
of the
government through assistants for nonmilitary workers'
affairs
and for social-political affairs. The ABRI joint staff
supported
the headquarters of each of the four services. Staff
personnel
were drawn from all four services. Police officers served
only in
positions related to internal security.
The 1985 reorganization also made significant changes
in the
armed forces chain of command. The four multiservice
Regional
Defense Commands (Kowilhans) and the National Strategic
Command
(Kostranas) were eliminated from the defense structure,
establishing the Military Regional Command (Kodam), or
area
command, as the key organization for strategic, tactical,
and
territorial operations for all services. The chain of
command
flowed directly from the ABRI commander in chief to the
ten Kodam
commanders, and then to subordinate army territorial
commands.
The former territorial commands of the air force and navy
were
eliminated from the structure altogether, with each of
those
services represented on the Kodam staff by a senior
liaison
officer. The navy and air force territorial commands were
replaced by operational commands. The air force formed two
Operations Commands (Ko-Ops) while the navy had its
Eastern Fleet
and Western Fleet--Armadas. The air force's National Air
Defense
Command (Kohanudna) remained under the ABRI commander in
chief.
It had an essentially defensive function that included
responsibility for the early warning system.
The commander in chief exercised control over most of
the
combat elements of the army, navy, and air force through
the ten
army Kodams, the two air force Ko-Ops, and the two navy
Armadas.
The geographic extent of the army Kodam in the early 1990s
was as
follows: Kodam I, Special Region of Aceh and Sumatera
Utara,
Sumatera Barat, and Riau provinces; Kodam II, Jambi,
Bengkulu,
Sumatera Selatan, and Lampung provinces; Kodam III, Jawa
Barat
Province; Kodam IV, Jawa Tengah Province and the Special
Region
of Yogyakarta; Kodam V, Jawa Timur Province; Kodam VI, the
four
provinces of Kalimantan; Kodam VII, the four provinces of
Sulawesi; Kodam VIII, Maluku and Irian Jaya provinces;
Kodam IX,
Bali, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Nusa Tenggara Barat, and Timor
Timur
provinces; and Kodam Jaya Jakarta, the Special Capital
City
Region of Jakarta
(see
fig. 14). The air force Ko-Ops and
the
navy fleets split in approximately the same way, with
Ko-Ops I
and the Western Fleet corresponding to Kodams I through IV
and VI
and with Ko-Ops II and the Eastern Fleet corresponding to
Kodam V
and Kodams VII through IX
(see
fig. 15;
fig. 16).
The commander in chief also exercised operational
control
over two special strike force commands. The first was
Kostrad,
which had been formed in the early 1960s during the West
Irian
campaign. It was from his position as Kostrad commander,
in fact,
that Suharto organized resistance to the 1965 coup. Since
then
the powerful post has been filled by officers considered
particularly loyal to Suharto. By 1992 Kostrad had a
strength of
some 35,000 to 40,000 army personnel. It consisted of two
divisions, each containing airborne and infantry brigades;
a
separate airborne brigade; one cavalry brigade; two field
artillery regiments; and several combat support and
service
support units.
A second strike force command was the Special Forces
Command
(Kopassus). This organization, formerly called Kopassandha
(which
also means Special Forces Command), was reorganized and
reduced
in size in 1985. In 1992 Kopassus forces numbered some
2,500 army
personnel identifiable by their distinctive red berets.
Organized
into two operational groups and one training group, these
special
forces were trained in intelligence gathering, a variety
of
special operations techniques, sabotage, and airborne and
seaborne landings.
In addition to the regular armed forces, there were
militiastyle paramilitary formations throughout the country.
Estimates
of the national strength of these forces ranged between
70,000
and 100,000. These units came under the army territorial
hierarchy, which provided them with officers and training.
In
times of emergency, they came under the command of the
army area
commander. As of 1992, information regarding military and
civilian reserve forces was not available.
Data as of November 1992
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