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Israel
October 1973 War
The October 1973 War (known in Israel as the Yom Kippur War and
in the Arab world as the Ramadan War) developed rapidly, and the
coordinated Egyptian-Syrian offensive caught Israel by surprise.
On September 28, Palestinian guerrillas detained an Austrian train
carrying Soviet Jews en route to Israel. Subsequent Egyptian and
Syrian military deployments were interpreted by Israel as defensive
actions in anticipation of Israeli reprisals. For one week, Israel
postponed mobilizing its troops. Not until the morning of Yom
Kippur (October 6), about six hours before the Arab offensive,
were Israeli officials convinced that war was imminent; a mobilization
of the reserves was then ordered. In the early days of the war,
the IDF suffered heavy losses as Egyptian forces crossed the Suez
Canal and overran Israeli strongholds, while Syrians marched deep
into the Golan Heights. Israel launched its counteroffensive first
against the Syrian front, and only when it had pushed the Syrians
back well east of the 1967 cease-fire line (by October 15) did
Israel turn its attention to the Egyptian front. In ten days of
fighting, Israel pushed the Egyptian army back across the canal,
and the IDF made deep incursions into Egypt. On October 24, with
Israeli soldiers about one kilometer from the main Cairo-Ismailia
highway and the Soviet Union threatening direct military intervention,
the UN imposed a cease-fire.
After several months of negotiations, during which sporadic fighting
continued, Israel reached a disengagement agreement in January
1974, whereby the IDF withdrew across the canal and Israeli and
Egyptian troops were separated in the Sinai by a UNEF-manned buffer
zone. Israel signed a similar agreement with Syria on May 31,
1974, whereby Israel withdrew to the 1967 cease-fire line in the
Golan Heights and a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
(UNDOF) occupied a buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces.
On September 4, 1975, after further negotiations, the Second Sinai
Disengagement Agreement was signed between Egypt and Israel that
widened the buffer zone and secured a further Israeli withdrawal
to the east of the strategic Gidi and Mitla passes.
Israel's military victory in 1973 came at a heavy price of more
than 2,400 lives and an estimated US$5 billion in equipment, of
which more than US$1 billion was airlifted by the United States
during the war when it became apparent that Israel's ammunition
stores were dangerously low. This action, and the threatened Soviet
intervention, raised more clearly than ever the specter of the
Arab-Israeli conflict escalating rapidly into a confrontation
between the superpowers. The October 1973 War also cost Israel
its self-confidence in its military superiority over its Arab
enemy. The government appointed a special commission, headed by
Chief Justice Shimon Agranat, president of the Israeli Supreme
Court, to investigate why Israel had been caught by surprise and
why so much had gone wrong during the war itself. The commission's
report, completed in January 1975, was highly critical of the
performance of the IDF on several levels, including intelligence
gathering, discipline within the ranks, and the mobilization of
reserves. The euphoria of the post-1967 era faded.
Data as of December 1988
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