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Israel
Foreign Military Sales and Assistance
By the late 1980s, Israel had become one of the world's leading
suppliers of arms and security services, producing foreign exchange
earnings estimated at US$1.5 billion annually, which represented
one-third of the country's industrial exports. Because the defense
industry was not subsidized by the government, it was indispensable
for major arms manufacturers to develop export markets, which
accounted in some cases for as much as 65 percent of total output.
Foreign military sales at first consisted primarily of the transfer
of surplus and rehabilitated equipment stocks and the administration
of training and advisory missions. Particularly after the October
1973 War, however, foreign sales of surplus IDF stocks and weapons
systems from newly developed production lines increased dramatically.
Rehabilitated tanks and other Soviet equipment captured from Egypt
and Syria were among the products marketed abroad. In addition
to its economic and trade value, the expansion of the arms industry
assured Israel of the availability of a higher production capacity
to supply the IDF at wartime levels. It also provided Israel with
opportunities to develop common interests with countries with
which it did not maintain diplomatic relations and to cultivate
politically useful contacts with foreign military leaders.
Initially, most of Israel's arms sales were to Third World countries,
but, owing to financial difficulties faced by these clients and
to competition from new Third World arms producers such as Brazil
and Taiwan, different sales strategies had to be adopted. In part
through joint ventures and coproduction, Israel succeeded in breaking
into the more lucrative American and West European markets. By
the early 1980s, more than fifty countries on five continents
had become customers for Israeli military equipment. Among Israel's
clients were communist states (China and Romania), Muslim states
(Morocco, Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia), and so-called pariah
states (South Africa and Iran). To some degree, Israel was restricted
in its marketing by United States controls over arms transactions
involving the transfer of components or technology of United States
origin. In one well-publicized case, the United States vetoed
the sale of twelve Kfir fighters to Uruguay in 1978. Intimidation
of potential buyers by Arab states also presented a problem. Observers
believed that Arab pressure played a part in decisions by Austria
and Taiwan not to purchase the Kfir and in Brazil's decision not
to choose the Gabriel missile for its navy.
The broader issues of Israel's foreign military sales program
were decided by a cabinet committee on weapons transfers. Routine
applications to sell arms to countries approved by this committee
were reviewed by the Defense Sales Office of the Ministry of Defense.
The primary concerns were that arms supplied by Israel not fall
into the hands of its enemies and that secret design innovations
not be compromised. After 1982, however, security restrictions
were relaxed to permit export of high technology weapons and electronics.
South Africa was believed to be one of Israel's principal trade
partners in spite of the mandatory UN resolution of 1977 against
arms shipments to the Pretoria government. South Africa was known
to have acquired 6 Reshef missile boats, more than 100 Gabriel
missiles, and radar and communications systems, and to have obtained
Israel's assistance in upgrading its British-built Centurion tanks.
The South African-manufactured Cheetah fighter airplane unveiled
in 1986 was a copy of the Kfir C-2 produced in collaboration with
IAI. Subsequent to the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid
Act of 1986 in the United States, which mandated a cut-off of
military aid to countries selling arms to South Africa, Israel
announced that it would not enter into any new arms contracts
with Pretoria. Existing contracts, however, which would not be
canceled, were reported to be valued at between US$400 and US$800
million.
Military cooperation between Israel and Iran had been extensive
since the 1960s, under the shah's regime. After a brief rupture
of relations when Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini came
to power in 1979, cooperation resumed. The Israeli minister of
defense in 1982 acknowledged the negotiation of an arrangement
worth US$28 million, including spare parts for United States-manufactured
airplanes and tanks in the early 1980s. The Israeli motivating
factor was the belief that it was to Israel's strategic advantage
to help Iran in its war against Iraq, an Arab state bitterly hostile
to Israel. Although Israel announced an embargo of arms transactions
after disclosure of its involvement in the plan to trade arms
for the release of United States hostages in Lebanon, a stricter
directive had to be issued in November 1987, following reports
that weapons of Israeli origin continued to reach the Iranians.
Prior to the mass severance of diplomatic relations with Israel
after the October 1973 War, Israel had actively promoted military
collaboration with a number of African countries. Training or
advisory missions had been established in at least ten African
states. During the 1980s, Israel quietly resumed these activities
in several places, most notably Zaire. Israel dispatched teams
there to train elite units and to help reorganize and rearm a
division deployed in Shaba Province. Israel also equipped and
trained Cameroon's presidential guard unit. Limited pilot training
programs were extended to Liberia and to Ciskei, a South African
homeland (see Relations with African States , ch. 4).
Data as of December 1988
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