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Israel
The Military in Political Life
The Jewish military organizations of Palestine before Israeli
independence were fiercely political. The Haganah and Palmach
were closely associated with socialist-labor Mapai (see Appendix
B) and the kibbutz programs, whereas the Irgun was intimately
connected with the right-wing Revisionist Zionism of Vladimir
Jabotinsky and his disciple, Begin (see Revisionist Zionism ,
ch. 1). As the chief architect of the IDF, Ben-Gurion was determined
to eliminate all political overtones from Israel's unified, national
army and to establish clear civilian supremacy over the military.
He was extraordinarily successful in his efforts in that during
the first forty years of its history the IDF never overtly challenged
the authority of the civilian government. This did not mean, however,
that the IDF was a nonpolitical institution. On the contrary,
in the late 1980s the political impact of the armed forces remained
pervasive and profound. IDF officers influenced government foreign
affairs and national security policy through official and unofficial
channels. Under Ben-Gurion's successor, Levi Eshkol, the political
system was opened to permit greater interaction between the civilian
leadership and the military high command. The shift permitted
the chief of staff to advance the views of the IDF directly to
the cabinet and Knesset committees. The growing number of former
officers in political life also helped to legitimate the involvement
of the military in strategic policy debates.
Under Israeli law, the cabinet, which could be convened as the
Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs in order to enforce
the secrecy of its proceedings, set policy relating to national
security. The Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset
approved national security policy. The minister of defense often
was the principal policy formulator (although this depended on
his personality and the personalities of the prime minister and
the chief of staff) and could make decisions without consulting
fellow cabinet members if an urgent need arose. During the first
twenty years of Israel's existence, membership in the ruling Labor
Party often was a prerequisite for appointment to a high level
staff position. Political qualifications for top assignments gradually
declined in importance during the 1970s, although the chief of
staff's perceptions of Israel's security were necessarily consonant
with the aims of the government.
When Prime Minister Begin served as his own minister of defense
from 1980 to 1981, his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Rafael
Eitan, could assert the IDF position not only on defense matters
but also on foreign policy and economic questions. When Sharon--a
retired major general highly respected within the officer corps--
became defense minister in 1981, the focus of decision making
in both defense and foreign policy shifted to him. The minister
of defense after 1984, Rabin, also was a retired officer. Under
him, the balance of authority continued to rest with the Ministry
of Defense as opposed to the military establishment; however,
Rabin did not exercise the monopoly of control that had existed
under Sharon.
Although considered primarily the implementer of policy, the
IDF influenced many sectors of society. It had a major voice in
strategic planning, in such social matters as education and the
integration of immigrants, and in the government's role in the
occupied territories. Moreover, the enormous impact of the defense
establishment on the economy made its claims on the nation's resources
of major political significance.
The high command had ample opportunity to convey its views to
the civilian leadership. The chief of staff and the chief of military
intelligence met regularly with the Committee on Foreign Affairs
and Security and the Finance Committee of the Knesset. The chief
of staff participated regularly in cabinet meetings and gave opinions
on government security policy. The setbacks at the outset of the
October 1973 War gave rise to an exceptional period when senior
officers influenced political decisions through their contacts
with members of the cabinet and the Knesset. The situation was
complicated by the involvement of former senior officers who had
entered political life and who served as reserve officers in the
war. A committee created to investigate the errors committed during
the first days of the war led to the enactment in 1976 of the
new Basic Law: the Army governing the IDF. The government expended
much effort to redefine the roles of the prime minister, minister
of defense, and chief of staff. The new legal requirements, however,
proved less important than the personalities of the individuals
holding those positions at any given time.
Private consultations with the high command were viewed as essential
in light of the cabinet's need to be informed on security issues.
Public statements of opinion concerning Israel's defense policy
(such as when and where to go to war, or when, how, or with whom
to make peace) were generally considered to be in the realm of
politics and improper for active-duty personnel. It became clear
that many senior officers had moral and political reservations
over the scope and tactics employed in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon,
but their dissent did not escalate into open protest. One exception
was the highly controversial case of Colonel Eli Geva, who asked
to be relieved of his command when his brigade was given the mission
of leading the army's entry into Beirut, an act that was bound
to cause many civilian casualties. Many officers regarded Geva's
conduct as outright insubordination. Others agreed that it was
proper for him to decline the performance of his military obligations
when they conflicted with his conscience. In spite of his outstanding
record as a combat leader, Geva was released from further service.
Members of the IDF could vote and engage in normal political
activity, albeit with certain restraints. They could join political
parties or politically oriented groups and attend meetings, but
they were barred from taking an active role as spokespersons either
for the IDF or for a political group. Analysts found little difference
between the political orientation of military personnel and of
civilians. Retired officers entering politics were not concentrated
in a particular part of the political spectrum. Few officers were
associated with the small minority of groups upholding autocratic
political values. Most appeared to accept unreservedly the prevailing
democratic political culture. Compared with most countries, Israel
had far less separatism, distinction between life styles, or social
distance between civilians and the officer corps.
The vast majority of the citizenry did not regard the practice
of retired officers "parachuting into politics" as threatening
to civilian control of the military. No ex-IDF officer had assumed
a cabinet position until 1955, and not until after the June 1967
War did it become a common practice. Israeli law prohibited retired
officers from running for the Knesset until 100 days after their
retirement, but no such law existed regarding cabinet positions.
Retired officers pursuing political careers were likely to be
called back to active duty because retired officers remained reserve
officers until age fifty-five. The problems that eventually could
arise became apparent in 1973, when Major General Sharon retired
in July to join the opposition Likud Party only to be recalled
to active duty during the October 1973 War. Sharon was highly
critical of the conduct of the war, becoming the most vocal participant
in the so-called War of the Generals, in which a number of active,
retired, and reserve general officers engaged in a public debate
over the management of the war for several months during and after
the hostilities. Sharon was elected to the Knesset in the December
1973 elections. Once there, he continued to criticize government
policy while he remained a senior reserve officer. As a result
of this situation, the government barred Knesset members from
holding senior reserve appointments.
Despite the prominence and visibility of former military officers
at the highest level of government, former officers have not formed
a cohesive and ideologically united group. Although two of the
most prominent military figures of the period, Sharon and Eitan
(chief of staff from 1978 to 83) were regarded as right wing on
Arab-Israeli issues, many more senior officers were moderates,
less persuaded than the Likud government or the public that military
force was the answer.
There has been little evidence of an identifiable military or
officer caste dedicated to protecting the army's own interests.
Militarism was deeply antithetical to the democratic, civilian-oriented
concept of Israeli society held by the vast majority of Israelis.
Society has, however, held prominent military personalities in
high esteem and treated them as national heroes. This was particularly
true after the stunning victory of the June 1967 War. After the
near disaster in 1973 and the controversies surrounding operations
in Lebanon in 1982, however, the prestige of the professional
military suffered. The Lebanon experience raised in its most acute
form the question of how effectively the civilian government could
control the military establishment. IDF operations ordered by
Sharon and Eitan often had been contrary to the government's decisions
and the cabinet had been kept ignorant of the military situation.
The cabinet's inability to oppose effectively Sharon and Eitan
was made possible by the passive attitude of Prime Minister Begin,
the relative lack of operational military experience among other
cabinet ministers, and the deliberate manipulation of reports
on the fighting. For a time, the checks and balances that had
previously prevented the defense establishment from dominating
the civilian decision-making authority seemed in jeopardy. Political
protest arose in the government, among the public, in the news
media, and even in sectors of the army that forced a reassessment
of the actions of the military leadership. Although no structural
changes were introduced, Sharon was removed from the Ministry
of Defense and a more normal pattern of military-civilian relations
was restored. In 1988, Chief of Staff Shomron, Deputy Chief of
Staff Major General Ehud Barak, and West Bank Commander Major
General Amrah Mitzna, all were perceived to be political liberals.
They were, however, careful not to draw attention in public to
possible differences with the government over its handling of
the uprising in the occupied territories.
Data as of December 1988
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