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Israel
Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-
During the first twenty years of Israeli occupation, security
in the territories fluctuated between periods of calm and periods
of unrest. Discontent was chronic, however, especially among the
younger Palestinians in refugee camps. Nearly half the Arab population
of the occupied territories lived in twenty camps in the West
Bank and eight camps in the Gaza Strip, in overcrowded and unsanitary
conditions. The camps had existed since the flight of Arabs displaced
after the partition of Palestine in 1948. Communal conflict was
liable to break out at any time between Palestinians and Israeli
settlers. Friction also arose from security measures taken by
Israeli authorities to counter perceived threats to order.
An upsurge of instability and violence in 1987 resulted partly
from deliberate provocations by PLO factions and PLO dissident
groups, but much of it generated spontaneously. Violence by Israeli
settlers increased, including the initiation of unauthorized armed
patrols and physical harassment of Palestinians. Although some
settlers were arrested, the Palestinians asserted that the authorities
were lenient with Israelis who violated security regulations.
The escalating level of Palestinian unrest precipitated a series
of protests and violent demonstrations that began on December
9, 1987, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and later spread
to Arab communities in Jerusalem and Israel itself. Thousands
of mostly teen-aged Palestinians banded together, setting up barricades
in refugee camps, confronting soldiers and Border Police, and
attacking road traffic with rocks. Unlike previous demonstrations,
the violence did not appear to be directed or coordinated by the
PLO and continued almost unabated for many months. By October
1988, more than 250 Palestinians had been killed and 5 Israeli
deaths had occurred. Although mass violence had diminished, many
individual incidents of rock-throwing and the tossing of gasoline
bombs by small roving bands continued to occur. The army's retaliation
was tougher and more rapid, with aggressive use of clubs and plastic
bullets, demolition of houses, orchards, wells, and gardens, and
economic sanctions against recalcitrant villages.
The young IDF conscripts called upon to impose order at first
responded erratically, in some cases with restraint and in other
cases with brutality. Lacking proper equipment and training in
riot control, the soldiers often fired indiscriminately at Arab
protesters, causing many casualties. Later, after troops were
ordered to use batons and rifle butts, demonstrators were often
badly beaten both before and after arrest, suffering fractured
bones. There were reports of soldiers entering Arab houses to
administer collective punishment and beating and harassing doctors
and nurses in hospitals where wounded Arabs were being treated.
Under mounting international criticism for the harsh and undisciplined
behavior of the IDF, the military authorities acquired additional
riot control equipment, including rubber and plastic bullets,
tear gas, and specially-equipped command cars. New tactics were
introduced, notably the deployment of large forces to snuff out
riots as soon as they began. The IDF instituted a code of conduct
and a special one-week training program in internal security.
The uprising forced the IDF to cancel normal troop training and
exercises. About 15,000 soldiers--several times the normal number--
were assigned to maintain security in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. The military authorities later replaced most of the conscripts
with reservists who had demonstrated greater restraint when confronted
by rock-throwing demonstrators. Nonetheless, several hundred reservists,
disagreeing with Israeli policy, refused to serve in the occupied
territories.
As of mid-1988, fifteen soldiers had been court-martialed for
some of the most serious offenses, including a widely publicized
case in which four Arab demonstrators had been severely beaten
and then buried under a load of sand. Other soldiers had faced
lower-level disciplinary proceedings. There was growing evidence
that the morale of the IDF was eroding as a result of the stress
of daily confrontations with hostile demonstrators. Senior officers
contended that the riot control mission had induced a crisis of
confidence that would affect the army's performance in orthodox
conflict. The IDF's reputation as a humane, superbly trained,
and motivated force had clearly been tarnished.
IDF commanders said that they had reduced the number of soldiers
assigned to riot control duty by nearly one-third since the mass
demonstrations had tapered off but feared that the cost of controlling
the uprising (estimated at US$300 million) would necessitate curtailing
IDF equipment purchases. Although they foresaw that the violence
might continue indefinitely, they did not regard it as a serious
threat in strategic terms.
Data as of December 1988
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