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Israel
Potential Causes of War
Israel made clear to the Arabs that certain actions, even if
not overtly hostile or aimed at Israel, would trigger an Israeli
preemptive attack. Israel announced various potential causes of
war. Some causes, such as interference with Israeli freedom of
navigation in the Strait of Tiran, were officially designated
as such. In 1982 Sharon listed four actions that would lead to
an attack: the attempt by an Arab country to acquire or manufacture
an atomic bomb, the militarization of the Sinai Peninsula, the
entry of the Iraqi army into Jordan, and the supply of sophisticated
United States arms to Jordan. In 1988 the government of Israel
continued to communicate potential causes to its Arab adversaries.
Their tacit acquiescence in these unilateral Israeli demands constituted
a system of unwritten but mutually understood agreements protecting
the short-term status quo.
Since the establishment of Israel, the IDF has been obliged to
deal with terrorist actions, cross-border raids, and artillery
and missile barrages of the various Palestinian organizations
under the loose leadership of the PLO. The IDF's approach in contending
with PLO activity has combined extreme vigilance with prompt and
damaging retaliatory measures, including punishment of Arab nations
giving sanctuary to terrorists and guerrillas. The presence of
innocent noncombatants was not accepted as a reason for withholding
counterstrikes. Although striving to limit harm to uninvolved
persons, the Israelis gave priority to the need to demonstrate
that acts of terrorism would meet with quick retribution in painful
and unpredictable forms.
Israeli strategists believed the periodic outbreak of war to
be virtually inevitable and that once war broke out it was essential
that it be brief and lead to decisive victory. The requirement
of a rapid war followed from at least two factors. During full
mobilization, virtually the entire Israeli population was engaged
in the defense effort and the peacetime economy ground to a halt.
Sustaining full mobilization for more than several weeks would
prove disastrous to the economy, and stockpiling sufficient supplies
for a long war would be difficult and very costly. Experience
from past wars also showed Israel that prolonged hostilities invited
superpower intervention. As a result, Israeli strategists stressed
the need to create a clear margin of victory before a cease-fire
was imposed from the outside. This concept was extended in the
1980s, when Israeli military leaders formulated the strategy of
engaging in a "war of annihilation" in the event of a new round
of all-out warfare. Israel's goal would be to destroy the Arab
armies so completely as to preclude a military threat for ten
years. Such a scenario might prove elusive, however, because destroyed
equipment could be quickly replaced, and the Arab countries had
sufficient manpower to rebuild shattered forces.
Data as of December 1988
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