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Israel
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC SECURITY CONCERNS
The Arab Military Threat
As of 1988, experts considered the IDF superior to any combination
of Arab forces that was likely to be massed against it in a future
conflict. The total manpower and firepower that could be directed
against Israel far outweighed the battlefield resources that Israel
could muster, yet Israel's dynamic military leadership, troop
proficiency, and sophisticated weaponry still promised to be decisive,
as they had been in previous wars. The Arab nations remained deeply
divided over a host of issues in mid-1988, including their postures
toward Israel. Although the Camp David peace process between Egypt
and Israel failed to achieve normalization of relations, Israel
no longer considered Egypt part of the circle of hostile states.
Nevertheless, Israeli planners did not rule out an upheaval in
Egyptian politics that would renew the risk of military confrontation.
With the Sinai region effectively demilitarized, the element of
surprise that had initially worked in Egypt's favor in the October
1973 War would not be available. In any future conflict, Egyptian
forces would have to cross 130 kilometers of desert exposed to
Israeli air power. Jordan's military weakness vis-à-vis Israel
and its exposure to Israeli retaliation seemed to rule out military
action except as a reluctant ally in a larger Arab coalition.
The modernization of Jordan's army and air force was continuing,
however, with the help of the United States and France. Many important
Israeli targets were within the range of Jordanian artillery and
rockets.
Syria posed the paramount threat. The Syrian armed forces had
pursued a massive build-up of offensive and defensive manpower
and equipment in an effort to maintain parity with Israel. Although
the inflexibility of their military strategy had resulted in crushing
defeats in engagements with the IDF, the Syrians had proved to
be skillful and stubborn fighters during the Lebanon conflict.
The concentrations of Syrian troops facing the Golan Heights probably
could make initial gains in a thrust against the IDF, but would
absorb heavy punishment once the Israelis mobilized for a counterattack.
Like other Arab states, Saudi Arabia had upgraded its naval and
air arms, improving its capability to defend its air space and
control activities in the Red Sea area. Saudi Arabia's outlook
and strategic doctrine were primarily defensive, and its primary
objective was stability in the Middle East to minimize the danger
to its oil facilities and other vital installations. Nevertheless,
from Israel's perspective, that country had the potential to undertake
offensive air operations in conjunction with other Arab air forces.
In the eyes of Israeli strategists, Saudi Arabia's 1988 purchase
of long-range missiles from China and its acquisition of Tornado
fighter-bombers from Britain enhanced its role in a future conflict.
The Iraqi army had not played a decisive role in previous wars.
During the October 1973 fighting, two Iraqi brigades were quickly
overcome in the IDF drive toward Damascus. If Iraq again attempted
to advance its forces to support Syria and Jordan, they would,
like those of Egypt, be vulnerable to Israeli air strikes. Nevertheless,
as of late 1988, Israeli officers were less confident of their
ability to neutralize Iraq's armed potential. During the war with
Iran, the Iraqi army had expanded to more than twenty divisions
and had acquired combat experience and skill in the use of sophisticated
weaponry. Iraq also had demonstrated the capacity and willingness
to resort to chemical weapons. On the other hand, Iraq was economically
drained and presumably tired of fighting after the eight-year
struggle with Iran. Israeli military analysts felt, moreover,
that tensions would persist in the Persian Gulf and that Iraq's
armed forces would be unlikely to welcome military involvement
elsewhere.
The buildup of the Arab armies between the October 1973 War and
the mid-1980s was both qualitative and quantitative. Egypt, Syria,
and Jordan had expanded the total of their divisions from twenty
to twenty-five during this period. Of these, the number of armored
and mechanized divisions rose from ten to twenty-two. Israeli
planners estimated that Iraq could contribute another ten divisions,
increasing the Arab disparity over Israel even more.
The lifting of restrictions on arms sales by the Western powers,
combined with the increased resources at the disposal of oil-exporting
countries, enabled the Arab powers vastly to expand their sophisticated
weaponry between 1973 and 1988. The tank inventories of Egypt,
Jordan, and Syria rose by 60 percent, while their stocks of aircraft,
helicopters, and armored personnel carriers roughly doubled. Both
Syria and Iraq had acquired high performance aircraft of Soviet
design. To the Arab countries' primary land weapons had been added
more self-propelled artillery, guided antitank missiles, new munitions--including
cluster and homing shells--improved fire-control systems, and
laser rangefinders. Previously vulnerable air defenses now could
be shielded using advanced mobile missile systems acquired from
both East and West. Most of the strategic sites in Israel were
exposed to Syrian striking power in the form of Soviet-supplied
SS-21 SSMs, with a range of 120 kilometers and far greater accuracy
than the earlier generation FROG-7 (70 kilometers) and Scud-B
(300 kilometers).
Israel could draw only tentative conclusions regarding the improvement
in Arab military leadership and manpower resources. Arab field
commanders had not yet demonstrated the successful adaptation
of modern command and control systems to battlefield situations.
Arab forces had in the past shown greater effectiveness in static
defense than in mobile offensive operations. The paucity of qualified
technical personnel in the Arab armies, attributed to deficiencies
in education and training, continued to detract from the ability
of the Arab armed forces to employ modern weaponry with full efficiency.
The superior skills of Israeli pilots had been decisive in the
1982 invasion of Lebanon and in earlier engagements. Although
the rising level of weapons technology presented more of a problem
to the Arab nations than to Israel, the Arabs' Soviet systems
were simpler to use and maintain than their more sophisticated
United States counterparts. The improved performance of the Iraqi
air force against Iran after 1985 offered some evidence that the
disparity in pilot skills and experience might be narrowing.
Data as of December 1988
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