|
Israel
The IDF as a Socializing Factor
The tradition of the IDF as a social service institution dates
from 1949, when it played a major role in tackling sudden and
widespread epidemics in transit camps for the flood of immigrants
to the new nation. In the same year, Ben-Gurion envisioned a vital
educational mission for the military. The IDF has fulfilled this
mission both indirectly and directly. The common experience of
conscription for about 90 percent of Jewish males and 50 percent
of Jewish females has itself fostered the homogenization of disparate
elements of Israeli society. The IDF made a concerted effort to
integrate within its various units persons from different social
backgrounds. Sephardim and Ashkenazim, men and women from kibbutzim
and cities, and sabra and immigrant Jewish youth often mixed for
the first time in their lives in the IDF.
More specifically, the IDF administered an educational program
that helped immigrant Sephardic youth, many of whom had been deprived
of basic education as children, to integrate into the Ashkenazi-dominated
society of Israel. Perhaps the most important educational function
of the IDF was the teaching of the national language, Hebrew.
Young immigrants could defer their entry until they had an adequate
grasp of the language and if needed could be assigned to a three-month
intensive course in Hebrew at the beginning of their service.
Conscripts who had failed to complete grade school attended a
special school prior to discharge in order to bring them to junior
high school level. In 1981, 60 percent of conscripts had the equivalent
of a high school education. It was estimated that by 1990 this
percentage would increase to 80 percent, while those insufficiently
educated for military service would diminish to almost none. A
variety of other educational opportunities, including secondary
and vocational school courses, was available to soldiers. The
IDF educational system also extended to civilians. Gadna and Nahal
members were deployed in rural settlements of recent immigrants,
where they taught material similar to that taught immigrant soldiers
and informed the new arrivals of state services available to them
(see Nahal; Gadna , this ch.).
Some Israeli sociologists, however, have criticized the IDF's
treatment of immigrant Sephardim. A 1984 study found that new
Oriental Jewish immigrants held lower ranks than did sabra Ashkenazim
of similar qualifications. Oriental immigrants also tended to
be assigned to the least prestigious IDF corps. A disproportionate
number of new immigrants served in peripheral support corps, such
as the Civil Defense Corps, the Guard Corps, and the General Service
Corps. Oriental immigrants were underrepresented in the air force
and in glamorous elite units, and those who served in combat instead
of support corps were overrepresented in the Artillery Corps and
the Combat Engineering Corps, where they were relegated to the
most dangerous and physically laborious positions. These newer
immigrants also were more liable to serve in units posted far
from their homes and to be taught skills that could not be transferred
to the civilian job market. The study concluded, however, that
this situation was caused not by prejudice in the IDF but, on
the contrary, by regulations permitting a shorter period of service
for those who were beyond the regular recruitment age of eighteen
or who were married and had children. The majority of newer immigrants
served less than one-third the time that nonimmigrants did, and
most remained at the rank of private. The brief service experience
limited their absorption into military life and mobility within
the defense organization. Their immigrant status and their adjustment
to Israeli society were thus prolonged and the likelihood of improving
their status later as civilians was reduced.
A newer aspect of the social impact of the IDF was its role in
the socialization of delinquent and formerly delinquent youth.
In the early 1970s, the IDF reversed its previous policy and began
conscripting all but the most serious offenders among delinquent
youth in an attempt both to increase its manpower pool and to
provide remedial socialization in the context of military discipline.
By 1978 it was clear that the policy was only partially successful.
Approximately half the youths (generally the less serious offenders)
released from detention to join the IDF had adjusted successfully;
the other half had been less successful. Many returned to criminal
activity and contributed to growing disciplinary problems within
the IDF that included rising drug use among soldiers and thefts
and violent crimes within IDF units. Others could not adjust to
army life and simply left or were expelled from the IDF. Despite
the problems associated with the new policy, IDF officials were
proud of their role in youth rehabilitation and felt that the
opportunity afforded delinquent youth to be reintegrated into
society outweighed the associated disciplinary problems.
Data as of December 1988
|
