Israel
Police Reform
In an attempt to analyze the growth of organized crime and the
degree of effectiveness of the police, in 1977 the government
appointed a Commission to Examine the Topic of Crime in Israel,
known as the Shimron Commission. The group's report cited many
shortcomings in the Israel Police, including the neglect of training,
especially of investigators, high turnover, weak enforcement of
traffic laws, a need for improved community relations, lack of
communications and transportation equipment, poor supervision
of precinct operations, and duplication of activities between
national and district headquarters. Many of the administrative
reorganizations recommended by the Shimron Commission were adopted,
but implementation of major reforms lagged. In early 1980, the
unusual step was taken of introducing an outsider, General Herzl
Shafir, a recently retired IDF officer, as inspector general.
Following an intensive six-month study of police problems, Shafir
developed a five-year strategy to reorganize the police. Known
as Tirosh (new wine), the strategy included plans for the expanded
use of computers to determine the most efficient employment of
manpower and resources; innovative approaches to community relations;
the routine rotation of personnel to counter staleness and petty
corruption; major redeployment of police resources, including
2,000 new policemen to patrol 800 new local beats; the establishment
of forty-five new police stations, many of them in Arab communities
of Israel; and a 40 percent cutback in administrative personnel.
After one year in office, Shafir was dismissed on the ground
of inability to accept civilian control. He had demonstrated political
insensitivity by ordering a police raid on the files of the Ministry
of Religious Affairs to investigate suspicions of fraud and bribery
involving the minister. Despite the institution of many aspects
of the Tirosh program, the lack of strong leadership after Shafir's
departure thwarted the comprehensive reforms that he had advocated.
In particular, Shafir's vision of transplanting the high esprit
de corps of the IDF to the Israel Police failed; morale, which
had surged as a result of his efforts, reportedly sank back to
its previous low state.
Data as of December 1988
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