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Romania Gheorghiu-Dej's Defiance of Khrushchev
Khrushchev consolidated his power in the Soviet Union
by
ousting the so-called "anti-party" group in July 1957. A
year later
Gheorghiu-Dej, with Chinese support, coaxed the Soviet
Union into
removing its forces from Romanian soil. Khrushchev's
consolidation
freed his hands to revive Comecon and advocate
specialization of
its member countries. Part of his plan was to relegate
Romania to
the role of supplying agricultural products and raw
materials to
the more industrially advanced Comecon countries.
Gheorghiu-Dej, a
long-time disciple of rapid industrialization and, since
1954, a
supporter of "national" communism, opposed Khrushchev's
plan
vehemently. Romanian-Soviet trade soon slowed to a
trickle. With no
Soviet troops in Romania to intimidate him,
Gheorghiu-Dej's
defiance stiffened, and his negotiators began bringing
home Western
credits to finance purchases of technology for Romania's
expanding
industries. Khrushchev apparently sought to undermine
Gheorghiu-Dej
within the PMR and considered military intervention to
unseat him.
The Romanian leader countered by attacking anyone opposed
to his
industrialization plans and by removing Moscow-trained
officials
and appointing loyal bureaucrats in their place. The
November 1958
PMR plenum asserted that Romania had to strengthen its
economy to
withstand external pressures. Industrialization,
collectivization,
improved living standards, and trade with the West became
the focal
points of the party's economic policy.
The Sino-Soviet split, which Khrushchev announced at
the PMR's
1960 congress, and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis increased
Gheorghiu-Dej's room to maneuver without risking a
complete rupture
with Moscow. At a Comecon meeting in February 1963,
Romania
revealed its independent stance by stating publicly that
it would
not modify its industrialization program for regional
integration.
In subsequent months, the Romanian and Albanian media were
the only
official voices in Eastern Europe to report China's attack
on
Soviet policy. Also Gheorghiu-Dej and Tito established a
rapprochement and broke ground for a joint
Yugoslavian-Romanian
hydroelectric project. In 1964 the PMR issued the "April
Declaration," rejecting the Soviet Union's hegemony in the
communist bloc and proclaiming Romania's autonomy. After
the April
Declaration, Romanian diplomats set out to construct loose
alliances with countries of the international communist
movement,
Third World, and the West. China and Yugoslavia became its
closest
partners in the communist world; Hungary and the Soviet
Union were
its main communist opponents.
At home, the PMR maintained a firm grip on authority
but
granted amnesties to former "class enemies" and
"chauvinists" and
admitted to its ranks a broader range of individuals.
Gheorghiu-Dej
ordered "de-Russification" and nationalistic
"Romanianization"
measures to drum up mass support for his defiance of
Moscow and
deflect criticism of his own harsh domestic economic
policies.
Bucharest's Institute for Russian Studies metamorphosed
into a
foreign-languages institute, and Russian-language
instruction
disappeared from Romanian curricula. To promote Romanian
culture,
official historians resurrected Romanian heroes; the PMR
published
an anti-Russian anthology of Karl Marx's articles
denouncing
tsarist Russia's encroachments on Romania and backing
Romania's
claim to Bessarabia; workmen stripped Russian names from
street
signs and buildings. Cultural exchanges with the West
multiplied;
jamming of foreign radio broadcasts ceased; and Romania
began
siding against the Soviet Union in United Nations (UN)
votes. The
Romanianization campaign also ended political and cultural
concessions granted to the Hungarian minority during early
communist rule; subsequently Hungarians suffered extensive
discrimination.
Data as of July 1989
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