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Afghanistan
Daoud as Prime Minister, 1953-63
In the wake of the failed political reforms of the 1949-52 period
came a major shake-up in the royal family. By mid-1953, the younger
members of the royal family, which may have included the king
himself, challenged domination by the king's uncles. The rift
became public in September 1953 when the king's cousin and brother-in-law,
Mohammad Daoud, became prime minister. Daoud was the first of
the young, Western-educated generation of the royal family to
wield power in Kabul. If opponents of the liberal experiment hoped
he would move toward a more open political system, however, they
were soon disappointed.
Despite Daoud's concern with correcting what he perceived as
previous governments' pro-Western bias, his keen interest in modernization
manifested itself in continued support of the Helmand Valley Project.
Daoud also proceeded cautiously on the question of the emancipation
of women. At the fortieth celebration of national independence
in 1959, the wives of his ministers appeared unveiled in public
at his behest. When religious leaders protested, he challenged
them to cite a single verse of the Quran specifically mandating
veiling. When they continued to resist, he jailed them for a week.
Daoud's social and economic policies were cautiously reformist
and relatively successful. Although fruitful in some respects,
his foreign policy caused severe economic dislocation, and, ultimately,
his own political eclipse. Daoud's foreign policy was guided by
two principles: balancing what he saw as pro-Western orientation
on the part of previous governments by improving relations with
the Soviet Union (without sacrificing U.S. economic aid), and
pursuing the Pashtunistan issue by every possible means. To some
extent the two goals were mutually reinforcing when hostile relations
with Pakistan caused the Kabul government to fall back on the
Soviet Union and its trade and transit link with the rest of the
world. Daoud believed that the rivalry between the two superpowers
for local allies created a condition whereby he could play one
against the other in his search for aid and development assistance.
Daoud's desire for improved bilateral relations with the Soviet
Union stepped up a notch to a necessity when the Pakistan-Afghan
border was closed for five months in 1955. When the Iranian and
United States governments declared that they were unable to create
an alternate trade access route through Afghanistan, the Afghans
had no choice but to request a renewal of their 1950 transit agreement
with the Soviet Union. Ratified in June 1955, it was followed
by a new bilateral barter agreement. After the Soviet leaders
Nikolay Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev visited Kabul in 1955,
they announced a US$100 million development loan for projects
to be mutually agreed upon.
Despite the Cold War climate between the two superpowers, the
Daoud regime also sought to strengthen its ties with the United
States, whose interest in Afghanistan had grown as a result of
United States efforts to forge an alliance among the countries
in the "Northern Tier": Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and
Turkey. Maintaining its nonaligned position, Afghanistan refused
to join the United States-sponsored Baghdad Pact. This rebuff
did not stop the United States from continuing its low-level aid
program, but it was reluctant to provide Afghanistan with military
assistance, so Daoud turned to the Soviet Union and its allies
for military aid, and in 1955 he received approximately US$25
million of military matériel. In addition, the Soviet bloc
also began construction of military airfields in Bagram, Mazar-e-Sharif,
and Shindand.
In the face of Daoud's virtual obsession with the Pashtunistan
issue, all other foreign policy issues faded in importance. In
1953 and 1954, Daoud applied more of his time-honored techniques
to press the Pashunistan issue, such as payments to tribesmen
on both sides of the border to subvert the Pakistani government
as well as dissemination of hostile propaganda. In 1955, however,
the situation became more critical from Daoud's point of view
when internal politics forced Pakistan to abolish the four provincial
governments of West Pakistan and form one provincial unit (the
One Unit Plan). The Afghan government protested the abolition
of the North-West Frontier Province (excluding the Tribal Agencies).
The Pakistan border closure in the spring and fall of 1955 again
highlighted the need for good relations with the Soviets in order
to keep transit routes open for Afghan trade.
Although the Afghans remained unresigned to accepting the status
quo on the Pashtunistan issue, the conflict remained dormant for
several years (in which time relations improved slightly between
the two nations). The 1958 coup that brought General Mohammad
Ayub Khan to power in Pakistan also failed to bring on any immediate
change in the situation. In 1960 Daoud sent troops across the
border into Bajaur in a foolhardy, unsuccessful attempt to manipulate
events in that area and to press the Pashtunistan issue, but Afghan
military forces were routed by the Pakistan military. During this
period the propaganda war, carried on by radio, was relentless.
Afghanistan and Pakistan severed relations on September 6, 1961.
Traffic between the two countries came to a halt, just as two
of Afghanistan's major export crops, grapes and pomegranates,
were ready to be shipped to India. In a valuable public relations
gesture, the Soviet Union offered to buy the crops and airlift
them from Afghanistan. What the Soviets did not ship, Ariana Afghan
Airlines flew to India in 1961 and 1962. At the same time, the
United States attempted to mediate the dispute, although its ties
with Pakistan were a stumbling block.
In addition, much of the equipment and material provided by foreign
aid programs and needed for development projects was held up in
Pakistan. Another outgrowth of the dispute was Pakistan's decision
to close the border to nomads (members of the Ghilzai, variously
known as Powindahs or Suleiman Khel), who had long been spending
winters in Pakistan and India and summers in Afghanistan. The
Pakistani government statement denying the decision was related
to the impasse with Afghanistan appeared disingenuous, and the
issue added to the brewing conflict between the two countries.
Afghanistan's economic situation continued to deteriorate. The
government was heavily dependent upon customs revenues, which
fell dramatically; trade suffered; and foreign exchange reserves
were seriously depleted.
By 1963 it became clear that neither Daoud of Afghanistan nor
Ayub Khan of Pakistan would yield; to settle the issue one of
them would have to be removed from power. Despite growing criticism
of Ayub among some of his countrymen, his position was generally
strong, whereas Afghanistan's economy was suffering. In March
1963, with the backing of the royal family, King Zahir Shah sought
Daoud's resignation on the basis that the country's economy was
deteriorating as a result of his Pashtunistan policy. Because
he controlled the armed forces, Daoud almost certainly had the
power to resist the king's request, yet he resigned, and Muhammad
Yousuf, a non-Pashtun, German-educated technocrat who had been
minister of mines and industries became prime minister.
Data as of 1997
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