Colombia INTRODUCTION
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Colombia, 1988
IN THE LATE 1980S, Colombia remained a nation of
paradoxes. The
bearer of one of the strongest democratic traditions in
Latin
America, it was also subject to recurrent bouts of
political
violence and terrorism. A highly urbanized and
industrialized
country, its social structure continued to be influenced
by an
elite that traced its lineage to an earlier, more agrarian
period.
Despite a dynamic economy, the country suffered from a
skewed
distribution of income and delivery of essential services.
In contrast to the usual pattern found in Latin
America,
Colombia has had a long history of civilian rule and
control over
the armed forces. Since gaining independence from Spain in
the
early nineteenth century, Colombia has experienced only
three
intervals of military government. In 1830 General Rafael
Urdaneta
led a military dictatorship for eight months. In 1854
General José
María Melo staged a successful coup against an elected
government
controlled by the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal--PC) but
was
himself replaced within a year by an alliance of Liberals
and
members of the Conservative Party (Partido
Conservador--PL). In
1953 General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla overthrew a
Conservative
government that had proved incapable of addressing
widespread rural
violence. Although the coup initially had extensive
popular
support, civilians soon became disenchanted with the
regime and
sought a restoration of democracy. In 1957 elements of the
armed
forces forced Rojas Pinilla into exile and turned the
reins of
government over to civilians. In the thirty years since
the return
of democratic rule, five Colombian presidents have
dismissed key
military leaders whose public statements appeared to
challenge
government policies. The armed forces accepted each of
these
dismissals.
However, civilian control over the military has not
spared
Colombia from a long history of violent political
conflict. Instead
of civilian-military conflict, Colombia has experienced
conflict
between dominant political parties, the Liberals and
Conservatives.
Both parties emerged around 1850 during the presidency of
General
José Hilario López; for the remainder of the century,
Liberals and
Conservatives clashed frequently over the government of
the
respective departments, the division of authority between
the
president and the legislature, and the position in society
of the
Roman Catholic Church. The López administration drafted a
Liberal
constitution that granted substantial autonomy to the
provinces,
reduced the power of the executive, and established a
strict
separation of church and state. The PL initially consisted
of a
heterogeneous coalition of golgotas (merchants
supporting
free trade), draconianos (artisans and
manufacturers
supporting protectionism), and smaller landowners.
Conservatives,
in turn, drew their support from large landowners and the
Catholic
clergy. Peasants tended to support the parties of their
patróns, a pattern that continued well into the
twentieth
century and helped to explain the intensity of rural
political
conflict.
Liberals emerged victorious from a civil war in the
early 1860s
and held power until 1884. Under the leadership of Tomás
Cipriano
de Mosquera, the Liberals expropriated church lands.
Because the
beneficiaries of this action were merchants and landowners
rather
than peasants, the policy served mainly to intensify land
concentration in a few hands. Meeting in Rionegro in 1863,
the
government enacted a constitution that reserved for the
states all
powers not expressly granted to the federal government. In
spite of
these reforms, a radical faction overthrew Mosquera in
1867 and
instituted still stronger curbs in central government
authority.
Over the next twenty years, Liberal and Conservative
factions
engaged in an estimated forty violent local conflicts.
The election in 1884 of the Conservative Rafael Núñez
as
president resulted in a dramatic reversal of government
policies.
Reacting to the excesses of the radical Liberal faction,
legislators supported Núñez in adopting the Constitution
of 1886,
still in force in 1989. The Constitution established a
strong
president who appointed department governors and who had
broad
powers to shape central government policies. Although the
Constitution of 1886 finally settled the contentious issue
of the
scope of presidential power, its promulgation also set the
stage
for one of the most violent periods in Colombian history.
Liberals
split into Peace and War factions, with the latter
supporting armed
rebellion against the government. After staging
unsuccessful
revolts in 1893 and 1895, the War faction rebelled a third
time in
what came to be known as the War of a Thousand Days.
Conservatives
eventually prevailed in 1902, but at a cost of an
estimated 100,000
deaths.
The war's devastation discredited extremists in both
parties.
Conservative and Liberal moderates recognized that the
rebuilding
of the country's economy required the cooperation of both
parties.
Although Conservatives retained national power until 1930,
a
succession of presidents appointed bipartisan cabinets.
Cooperation
helped generate extensive economic growth and
industrialization,
which produced new urban groups that supported social
reform.
Liberal reformists led by Alfonso López Pumarejo swept to
power in
1930 and instituted the "Revolution on the March," a
series of
measures that included agrarian reform, support for labor
unions,
and the enactment of public assistance. López Pumarejo's
ambitious
social agenda threatened Conservative landowners; in
addition, the
loss of the presidency stripped the Conservatives of
control of
extensive local patronage. As a result, relations between
the two
parties became increasingly polarized during the 1930s and
early
1940s.
Violence soon overwhelmed the political system. In
April 1948,
populist Liberal politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán--a leader
of many
of Colombia's urban poor and a likely presidential
candidate in
1950--was assassinated in Bogotá. Gaitán's murder sparked
a riot,
known as the Bogotazo, that destroyed much of the capital
and left
2,000 dead. Although the government soon contained the
situation in
the capital, it could not handle the violence that spread
through
much of the countryside. Rural violence became the norm as
some
20,000 armed combatants claiming to be operating in the
name of the
Liberals and Conservatives settled old political scores;
over the
next eighteen years, la violencia (1948-66) claimed
the
lives of over 200,000 Colombians. Although Mariano Ospina
Pérez,
who was elected president in 1946, came from the moderate
wing of
the PC, his administration became increasingly repressive
and
relied extensively on the military. His successor,
Laureano Gómez
Castro, was a Conservative extremist who curtailed civil
liberties
and used the rural police as his party's agents; these
actions
merely served to polarize the nation, to escalate the
level of
violence, and to spawn the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship. It
took five
years for democracy to be restored.
As was the case following the War of a Thousand Days,
Liberal
and Conservative leaders recognized that the survival of
the
political system required political cooperation rather
than
polarization. This recognition led to an innovative
power-sharing
arrangement known as the National Front. From 1958 to
1974, the two
parties agreed to rotate the presidency every four years,
to
establish parity in all elective and appointive government
positions, and to require a two-thirds vote in Congress
for all
legislation. The National Front proved invaluable in
allowing the
return of civilian rule and an end to party-related
violence.
Analysts also contended, however, that the noncompetitive
nature of
National Front elections weakened party identification
among the
population, especially urban Colombians, and generated
notably
higher levels of voter absenteeism.
Reconciliation between the two parties did not produce
social
peace, however. In the 1960s, three major left-wing
guerrilla
organizations--the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia--FARC), the National
Liberation
Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional--ELN), and the
Popular
Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación--EPL)--and
several
smaller groups established bases in the Colombian
countryside. In
the 1970s, a fourth major organization--the 19th of April
Movement
(Movimiento 19 de Abril--M-19)--began urban operations.
Guerrillas
sought to undermine public order through kidnappings,
murders,
robberies, assaults on military and police facilities, and
destruction of key economic installations.
Successive administrations employed a variety of
tactics to
deal with the guerrilla threat. Although military
counterinsurgency
operations placed the guerrillas on the defensive during
the late
1960s and early 1970s, they regained much of their
strength in the
late 1970s. In response, President Julio César Turbay
Ayala
employed his state of siege powers in 1978 to decree the
National
Security Statute. The statute gave expanded arrest powers
to the
armed forces, granted military tribunals jurisdiction over
numerous
crimes, and subjected the media to censorship. Although
critics
charged that the statute legalized numerous human rights
violations, it did not succeed in reducing the scope or
intensity
of guerrilla operations. Turbay's successor, Belisario
Betancur
Cuartas, proposed a political rather than military
solution to the
guerrilla problem. Under the terms of the 1984 National
Dialogue,
the FARC, EPL, and M-19 signed cease-fires that were
designed to
allow their reincorporation into national life. As part of
the
peace process, the FARC established a political front, the
Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica--UP), which participated
in
national elections. But the guerrillas, who were allowed
to keep
their weapons, soon violated the cease-fires. The National
Dialogue
collapsed in November 1985 when M-19 commandos stormed the
Palace
of Justice, the Supreme Court building, in Bogotá. In the
ensuing
battle between the military and guerrillas, over 100 died,
including 11 Supreme Court justices.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Colombian democracy also
came under
attack from major narcotics trafficking syndicates based
in
Medellín and Cali. Initially, drug traffickers
concentrated their
efforts on furnishing marijuana to the United States
market;
increasingly, however, they shifted their attention to the
vastly
more lucrative cocaine trade. The Medellín and Cali
cartels became
vast international networks that coordinated the
production of coca
in Peru and Bolivia, its conversion into cocaine in
Colombian
laboratories, and transportation to and distribution in
the United
States. By the early 1980s, Colombian traffickers had firm
control
over the United States cocaine market. The cocaine trade
generated
huge profits and created a boom in the real estate and
construction
industries because of the traffickers' need to launder
money.
Overall, however, the cartels' presence had a highly
corrosive
effect on the Colombian economy, exacerbating inflation,
skewing
income distribution, and undercutting national economic
planning.
The cartels had an even more disastrous impact on the
political
system. Traffickers employed hired assassins known as
sicarios to intimidate judges and politicians and
corrupted
other public officials with huge payoffs. Traffickers also
had ties
with various right-wing "paramilitary" groups that
systematically
killed leftist politicians and their supporters; during
the 1980s,
these groups allegedly murdered several hundred UP
members.
As was the case with the guerrillas, Colombian
administrations
varied in their response to the cartels. Turbay sent the
military
into the Guajira Peninsula in an effort to root out
marijuana
production and also approved a treaty allowing for the
extradition
to the United States of Colombian narcotics traffickers
accused of
crimes in the United States. Although Betancur initially
opposed
extradition on grounds of national sovereignty, he changed
his
position after the April 1984 assassination of Justice
Minister
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. Declaring a "war without quarter"
against the
cartels, Betancur authorized the extradition of thirteen
narcotics
traffickers. In two rulings in 1987, however, the
Colombian Supreme
Court invalidated the 1979 extradition treaty, thereby
depriving
the new president, Virgilio Barco Vargas, of the weapon
most feared
by traffickers. Following the January 1988 assassination
of
Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos Jiménez, Barco beefed
up
interdiction efforts by the military.
The paradoxical character of Colombia was apparent not
only in
its political system but also in its social structure.
This
structure was a legacy of the Spanish colonial and
postindependence
periods. Spanish authorities established a highly
stratified social
system in New Granada, as Colombia was known during the
colonial
era as well as for much of the nineteenth century.
Peninsulares, persons of Spanish descent born in
Spain,
controlled the key colonial institutions. Immediately
below them
were the criollos, those of Spanish descent born in New
Granada.
Mestizos constituted the lower stratum of society.
Mulattoes,
zambos (black-Indian mix), and blacks remained at
the margin
of colonial society, and Indians were virtually outside of
it.
Change and continuity occurred in New Granada's social
structure as
a result of independence. Criollos replaced
peninsulares at
the pinnacle of the social pyramid, and mixed-race
citizens gained
a modicum of social mobility. Such mobility, however, was
granted
to individuals only and not to entire groups and required
adherence
to traditional Spanish values and culture.
The stable political environment that Liberals and
Conservatives fashioned in the wake of the War of a
Thousand Days
allowed for sustained economic growth, which subsequently
generated
dramatic social changes. The emergence of the industrial
centers of
Bogotá, Cali, Medellín, and Barranquilla spurred massive
migration
from the countryside. By the early 1980s, approximately 70
percent
of all Colombians lived in urban areas, one of the highest
rates in
Latin America. Urbanization also weakened kinship ties and
the
extended family structure.
Yet despite these changes, a relatively small upper
class
continued to dominate the nation's economic and political
institutions. The upper class, which constituted about 5
percent of
the population in the mid-1980s, consisted of both
traditional
large landowners with distinguished family lineages and
major
entrepreneurs. With the notable exception of Antioquia
Department,
the elite was largely white. Regarding itself as the
keeper of the
nation's cultural heritage, the elite was the only class
to exhibit
a strong sense of collective consciousness. Although about
20
percent of Colombians were middle class, the sector's
heterogeneous
nature inhibited a shared identity; instead, many members
of the
middle class sought to emulate the culture and life-style
of the
elite. Even lower levels of common identity were found
among the 50
percent of the population considered to be members of the
lower
class or the remaining 25 percent engaged in peripheral,
subsistence occupations.
Paradoxes were also evident in Colombia's economy.
Colombia was
one of the first Latin American countries to recognize
that
protectionist trade policies generated inefficiencies in
domestic
manufacturing and penalized the more dynamic,
export-oriented
industries. As a result, entrepreneurs and government
officials
joined forces in the mid-1960s to support a strategy of
export
promotion and gradual economic liberalization. The export
program
emphasized nontraditional goods such as textiles, coal,
oil, and
noncoffee agricultural products and was designed to
complement
Colombia's strong coffee export business. This export
promotion
campaign led to sustained growth in the nation's gross
domestic
product throughout the 1970s, although the global
recession of the
early 1980s revealed that Colombia remained too dependent
on the
international coffee market. Colombia actively sought
foreign
investment, especially in potentially lucrative export
industries.
The government relied heavily on private capital to
sustain
economic growth, and it generally limited its role to
designing an
appropriate fiscal and monetary policy, providing vital
infrastructure, and ensuring a political climate conducive
to
economic growth. The government did take an active role in
the
management of coal and oil production, however. Although
the
nation's total external debt more than doubled during the
1980s,
analysts considered that it remained manageable.
Yet economic growth did not produce a more equitable
distribution of income. Analysts estimated that the top 20
percent
of the population held roughly 70 percent of total
national income.
A national agricultural census in the early 1970s revealed
that 10
percent of Colombia's farmers and ranchers held 80 percent
of all
farmland. These inequities were also evident in the
delivery of
essential services. In contrast to the rest of the
population, the
rural and urban poor experienced notably higher mortality
and
morbidity rates. Only about 60 percent of Colombians were
served by
a sanitary water supply and only about half by a sewerage
system.
Finally, the upper and middle classes continued to provide
a
disproportionate share of secondary and university
students.
Colombian democracy thus faced varied challenges in the
late
1980s. The most immediate challenge confronting government
leaders
was the serious threat to public order from forces on both
the left
and the right. Over the longer term, however, the
government's
ability to address the needs of Colombia's lower classes
may prove
to be the more important key to political stability.
February 15, 1989
* * *
In the months following completion of research and
writing of
this book, significant developments occurred on both the
guerrilla
and the narcotics trafficking fronts. The Barco
administration and
the M-19 signed a series of agreements to allow the
latter's
incorporation into the political system. Other guerrilla
organizations, with the notable exception of the ELN,
expressed
interest in the peace process. This progress was
counterbalanced,
however, by a dramatic escalation of terrorism by
"paramilitary"
groups and drug traffickers.
In a major address in September 1988, Barco had offered
guerrillas a three-phase peace plan. The initial
pacification phase
was designed to create a climate of understanding between
the
government and interested guerrilla groups and consisted
of several
major elements. First, guerrilla organizations were
required both
to state their willingness to reach a peace accord and to
suspend
all terrorist activities. Second, government and guerrilla
representatives were to meet to establish procedures for
the
guerrillas' return to normal life. Third, the guerrillas'
representatives were to be allowed to propose
constitutional
reforms to Congress. Finally, the president was to present
a bill
to Congress pardoning guerrillas for their crimes; this
bill was to
take effect only after the completion of the entire peace
plan.
During the second, transitional, phase, the government was
to
temporarily relocate the guerrillas to a neutral site and
provide
them with medical services, food, and lodging. The armed
forces
were to suspend all patrol activities at that site and
offer
maximum protection to the guerrillas. The final phase was
to
involve the complete incorporation of the guerrillas into
the
democratic process. The government pledged to protect the
lives of
the demobilized guerrillas, to provide them with economic
assistance for a reasonable period, and to allow their
full
participation in elections.
The Barco peace plan was greeted with widespread
scepticism.
Nonetheless, by January 1989 the Barco administration and
the M-19
had agreed to negotiate terms of peace. The specifics of
the
transition phase were reached in March when the government
granted
the M-19 a neutral zone in Santo Domingo, Cauca
Department, and
barred military and police operations in the area. The
government
and the M-19 signed a final peace accord in September
1989. The
guerrilla movement announced its intention to demobilize,
although
this had not occurred by November 1989, and to reestablish
itself
as a political party.
Apparently impressed with the positive nature of the
negotiations between the government and the M-19, several
other
guerrilla organizations--including the FARC and the
EPL--sought a
dialogue with the Barco administration. After several
false starts,
government representatives traveled to eastern Colombia in
October
1989 to begin discussion with the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla
Coordinating Board (Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón
Bolívar),
ostensibly the umbrella group for all leftist guerrilla
organizations operating in the country.
It was clear, however, that the board lacked the
authority to
negotiate on behalf of the ELN. In an effort to force the
government to nationalize the petroleum industry and
terminate all
exploration contracts with multinational firms, the ELN
had carried
out over 100 attacks between January 1988 and June 1989 on
the
nation's largest oil pipeline. Analysts estimated that
government
losses from pipeline attacks in 1988 exceeded US$400
million. In
June 1989, ELN commandos destroyed the pipeline terminal
in
Coveñas, Sucre Department, resulting in a temporary
suspension of
oil exports from that facility. Finally, in October 1989
the ELN
assassinated the Catholic bishop of Arauca.
The most shocking acts of terrorism, however, were
committed by
"paramilitary" squads and narcotics traffickers. In 1988
"paramilitary" units staged several massacres of
individuals
residing in areas considered sympathetic to leftist
political
interests; in the three most violent incidents,
approximately 100
persons were killed in all. Drug traffickers also stepped
up their
terrorist campaign. During July and August 1989,
sicarios
assassinated the governor of Antioquia Department, a
district
superior court judge, the chief of police of Medellín, and
the head
of the New Liberalism Movement (Movimiento Liberalismo
Nuevo), Luis
Carlos Galán Sarmiento, who was a leading contender for
the PL
presidential nomination in 1990.
Galán's murder shocked the nation and spurred the Barco
administration to issue a sweeping series of decrees under
the
state of siege provision of the Constitution. The most
significant
decrees allowed officials to seize the personal property
of
narcotics traffickers, to detain suspected traffickers for
seven
days, and to extradite, through adminstrative procedures,
those
accused of crimes in the United States. Over the next
month, the
military arrested over 10,000 persons and confiscated
traffickers'
airplanes, helicopters, processing laboratories, and
residences. In
addition, the Colombian government extradited five
traffickers to
the United States. The most sought-after
traffickers--including
Pablo Escobar Gaviria, José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha, and
the
members of the Fabio Ochoa Restrepo clan--eluded capture,
however.
To support the Colombian effort, the United States
provided a US$65
million package of military equipment.
Clearly hurt by the government's offensive, the
Medellín Cartel
offered to end its trafficking activities and to
repatriate its
capital in exchange for a pardon--an offer immediately
rejected by
President Barco. Meanwhile, the cartel continued to engage
in
terrorism. Between August and October, traffickers bombed
dozens of
buildings in Bogotá and Medellín and murdered several
persons.
Following the October killing of a district superior court
judge in
Medellín, the Colombian judiciary staged a
seventy-two-hour strike
to demand increased security. The nation recognized that
it faced
a long and difficult struggle ahead.
November 1, 1989
* * *
As work on of this manuscript neared completion,
Colombians
witnessed several acts of narcotics-related terrorism and
the death
of a prominent leader of the Medellín Cartel; they also
and elected
a new president. In late 1989, traffickers dramatically
escalated
their campaign of terror designed to reverse the
government's
extradition policy. On November 27, a bomb exploded on an
Avianca
jet within minutes after takeoff from Bogotá, killing all
107
persons aboard. On December 6, sixty-two persons died when
a driver
on a suicide mission detonated an estimated 500 kilograms
of
dynamite outside the Bogotá headquarters of the Department
of
Administrative Security (Departamento de Seguridad
Administrativo).
The Medellín Cartel suffered an important setback,
however, on
December 15, when an elite Colombian police unit tracked
down
Rodríquez Gacha on one of his estates near Covenas, Sucre
Department; in the ensuing gun battle, Rodríquez Gacha,
his son,
and fifteen bodyguards were killed. In an attempt to sway
public
opinion, the cartel responded the following month with a
communique
asserting the government's victory over it and offering to
suspend
all violent and narcotics activities in exchange for
undefined
"constitutional and legal guarantees." Consistent with his
previous
responses to similar cartel statements, Barco immediately
rejected
the offer.
After a brief hiatus, traffickers resumed their
campaign of
terror on March 22, 1990, when they assassinated Bernardo
Jaramillo
Ossa, the presidential candidate of the UP, at the airport
in
Bogotá. Traffickers followed this operation with the
daring
assassination on April 26, 1990, of M-19 presidential
candidate
Carlos Pizarro during a domestic Avianca flight. Although
Jaramillo
and Pizarro were terrorist targets because of their
leftist
politics, each had also opposed extradition of narcotics
traffickers as a violation of national sovereignty. Thus,
many
analysts interpreted their murders as evidence that
traffickers
were engaged in an effort to destabilize Colombian
democracy.
With the assassinations of Jaramillo and Pizarro
serving as
tragic reminders of the dangers of public service,
Colombians went
to the polls on May 27, and elected PL candidate César
Gaviria
Trujillo as the nation's new president. Although Gaviria
captured
only 48 percent of the votes, he easily outdistanced his
nearest
competitor in a crowded field that included two Social
Conservative
Party (Partido Social Conservador--PSC) candidates--Alvaro
Gómez
Hurtado and Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo--and Pizarro's
successor as M-
19 standardbearer, Antonio Navarro Wolf. Gaviria benefited
not only
from the PSC split but also from having inherited Galán's
movement
following the latter's assassination in August 1989. A PL
insider
who had served as finance and interior ministers during
the Barco
administration, Gaviria had taken a bold move when he
agreed to
serve as Galán's campaign manager. As the nation followed
Galán's
funeral on radio and television, Galán's son turned to
Gaviria and
asked him to seek the presidency. Gaviria's nomination as
PL
candidate was assured on May 11, when he defeated two
others in the
party's first-ever primary. Galán had long fought for the
institution of the primary as a means of reducing the role
of party
bosses.
Following his victory, the president-elect pledged
institutional renovation and expressed strong support for
a future
constituent assembly that voters had also approved.
Gaviria also
committed himself to addressing the problem of poverty and
the need
for greater decentralization of authority. Analysts also
expected
that Gaviria would offer a prominent post to the M-19 in
the wake
of Navarro's having received 13 percent of the vote, an
unexpectedly strong showing. Finally, Gaviria promised to
continue
the battle against narcotics trafficking by supporting
both
extradition and more resources for judges and penal
officials.
June 30, 1990
Dennis M. Hanratty
Data as of December 1988
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