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Colombia The Liberal Tenure
The first president elected in the post-National Front
period,
López Michelsen (1974-78), faced difficult situations in
three
areas: the economy, the guerrilla movement, and the drug
trade.
Subsequent governments inherited these same problems. The
influx of
foreign exchange from the coffee boom and the illicit drug
trade
created a glut of money in the financial sector that
increased the
rate of inflation. To counteract this, López Michelsen
immediately
instituted a stabilization program that included austere
measures,
such as cutting back on public investment and social
welfare
programs and tightening credit and raising the interest
rate. By
declaring a state of economic emergency, López Michelsen
was able
to pass unpopular yet necessary economic measures without
legislative action.
Another key component of López Michelsen's economic
policy was
designed to improve income distribution. The cornerstone
of this
effort was the "To Close the Gap" program. This program
addressed
the rural sector by proposing to increase productivity and
employment in the countryside and integrate the rural
sector into
the monetary market with the support of the Integrated
Rural
Development program.
The "To Close the Gap" plan had its greatest impact,
however
temporary, in the tax reform of 1974. The tax reform,
instituted
two months after López Michelsen took office, made changes
in the
sales tax, export taxes and incentives, import surcharges,
the tax
treatment of government agencies, and personal and
corporate income
taxes. The reform had four general goals: to make the tax
system
more progressive, to reduce the distorting effects of the
tax
system on resource allocation, to promote economic
stability by
increasing revenues on a one-time basis and by enhancing
the built-
in response of the tax system to growth in the national
income, and
to simplify tax administration and compliance and thereby
reduce
evasion and increase yields. The government recorded a
short-term
fiscal improvement; nevertheless, inflation and a failure
to
improve administrative procedures allowed for continued
large-scale
tax evasion and an ultimate drop in revenues.
The austerity that the López Michelsen administration
forced on
the country had unpopular consequences. Inflation
outstripped wage
increases, nontraditional exports faced unfavorable trade
conditions, and the industrial sector entered into a
slump.
Students and labor groups engaged in periodic protests and
strikes.
In October 1976, López Michelsen imposed a state of siege
following
two months of strikes by social security employees. The
continuing
discontent with the government erupted again in September
1977 when
the four major labor unions joined in a strike to protest
the high
cost of living. Under the state of siege measures still in
effect,
the administration declared the strike illegal. Riots
following the
government's attempt to suppress the strike resulted in
twenty
deaths. Several cabinet ministers resigned in protest over
the way
the strike had been handled.
Guerrilla activity resurged during the López Michelsen
administration, although some groups actually became less
active.
The FARC was the most active, operating in rural areas in
the
departments of Antioquia, Tolima, Magdalena, Boyacá,
Caquetá, and
Meta. The M-19 kidnapped and held more than 400 people for
ransom.
The ELN, especially active in southern Bolívar Department,
kidnapped several prominent people and ambushed army
patrols. The
EPL, however, declined in importance after the death of
its
founder, Pedro León Arboleda, in 1975.
Although López Michelsen did not view drug trafficking
as a
serious threat at the beginning of his administration, by
1978 he
recognized the ruinous impact that the drug industry was
having on
the political and economic structure of Colombian society
(see Narcotics Control and Interdiction
, ch. 5). Corruption
financed by
the drug rings permeated all levels of the political
system. Those
in office or campaigning for office who spoke out against
the major
drug traffickers rightfully feared for their lives. In
some areas,
prominent drug traffickers were so powerful that they were
able to
get themselves elected to local or state offices.
Although the narcotics industry contributed to a
foreign
exchange surplus and generated employment, its overall
impact was
detrimental to the national economy. The influx of dollars
contributed to the increase in the money supply and the
creation of
a parallel economy that competed with the official economy
for
financial resources
(see Foreign Trade
, ch. 3). The
industry
created "boom towns" in rural Colombia that rose and fell
within
short periods of time. The income provided by the drug
industry was
used primarily for conspicuous consumption rather than for
productive investment. The slash-and-burn method of
cultivating
marijuana destroyed fertile land that could have been used
for
legal food production, resulting in both a damaged
environment and
a national need to import food. The parallel economy
contaminated
the official economy through the laundering of
narcodollars, often
through the "side windows" of government banks and the
real estate
industry. Drug traffickers also purchased legitimate
businesses,
such as banks, textile mills, and sports teams. The drug
traffickers' control over a large portion of the illicit
economy
and a significant amount of the official economy undercut
government efforts at national economic planning. In
addition,
government efforts to combat drug trafficking drained
funds that
could have been used more productively elsewhere.
In late 1977, observers mistakenly predicted that the
Conservative Belisario Betancur Cuartas would win the 1978
presidential election because of the division of the PL
into rival
factions that supported Lleras Restrepo and Julio César
Turbay
Ayala. Turbay became the nominee of the PL after his
faction won
the most seats in the February 1978 congressional
elections. The
presidential campaign was largely personalistic in that
neither
candidate took specific positions on major issues. The
candidates
differed, however, in their reliance on partisan
machinery. Turbay
stressed the party connection, whereas Betancur,
representing the
minority party, claimed to be a candidate of its National
Movement
(Movimiento Nacional), which joined together
Conservatives,
dissident Liberals, remnants of Anapo, and members of the
Christian
Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrática
Cristiano--
PSDC)
(see Minor Third Parties
, ch. 4). Turbay won the
presidential
election by a narrow margin; approximately 60 percent of
all voters
abstained.
The Turbay administration (1978-82) inherited a
slightly
improved financial situation because the austerity
measures
instituted under López Michelsen and declining coffee
revenues had
produced a lower rate of inflation by 1978. Turbay focused
his
economic policy on reducing unemployment and avoiding an
impending
recession. A main goal was the decentralization of fiscal
resources
and the promotion of regional autonomy, which made public
investment in infrastructure a priority. His National
Integration
Plan (Plan de Integración Nacional--PIN) of 1979-82
foresaw growth
in public investment to reach 19 percent in real terms.
Because
government revenues from coffee exports were declining at
this
time, Turbay had to finance the growth in public spending
by
turning to foreign loans. The increased public spending
thus
contributed both to a renewed rise in inflation and to a
massive
increase in foreign debt. Attempting to avoid a recession,
Turbay
also encouraged foreign investment in Colombia and
promoted
domestic investment in labor-intensive industries to
reduce high
urban unemployment. In spite of increased government
spending,
Colombia experienced a recession caused by tight credit
and high
interest rates, a reduction in protectionist tariffs,
grants of
import licenses for industrial goods, smuggled imports,
and a
decreased world demand for industrial goods produced in
Colombia
(see Foreign Trade
, ch. 3).
Shortly after taking office, Turbay gave top priority
to
combating guerrilla activity and narcotics trafficking.
Although
designed ostensibly to counteract drug trafficking, the
institution
of a state of siege and the National Security Statute of
1978
substantially enhanced the government's ability to act
against
guerrillas
(see Internal Security Problems
, ch. 5).
Critics charged that the military and police forces
used the
security statute to detain indiscriminately "cultural
subversives"-
-including prominent journalists, artists, and
scholars--who were
suspected of being associated with left-wing elements.
Threats to
invoke the security statute in nonpolitical cases, such as
protests
for a better water supply, suppressed popular unrest.
Persons
arrested on political charges alleged that the armed
forces had
resorted to torture during interrogation. Although the
government
claimed that tough measures were needed to counter leftist
subversion, critics asserted that repression resulted from
the
worsening economic situation. The deteriorating human
rights
situation drew criticism from leaders of both parties and
from
international organizations such as Amnesty International.
Turbay
lifted the state of siege and nullified the security
statute in
June 1982, shortly before leaving office.
Despite the severe measures taken against leftist
subversion,
guerrilla activity increased and reached a peak during the
Turbay
administration. Although the ELN was less active than
during the
López Michelsen administration, the FARC expanded its
operations,
especially in Cauca and Caldas departments.
The M-19 emerged as the most active guerrilla group
during this
period. In January 1979, members of the M-19 tunneled into
a
military arsenal in Bogotá and took 5,000 guns. Within a
few weeks,
however, most of the weapons were recovered, and many of
the
participants were arrested. In October 1979, more than 200
accused
M-19 members were brought to trial in Bogotá. The delay of
other
military trials of M-19 members probably led to the
movement's
takeover of the embassy of the Dominican Republic in
February 1980,
in which fourteen diplomats, including the ambassador of
the United
States, were held hostage. The seizure ended peacefully
when the
kidnappers received safe conduct out of the city and a
promise that
the Inter-American Human Rights Commission would be
permitted to
investigate allegations of human rights abuses. By the end
of 1981,
the M-19 had shifted from purely urban to mostly rural
operations
and had formed a tenuous union with the other three
guerrilla
groups. In March of that year, Turbay proposed--and the
Senate
approved--a limited four-month amnesty for those
guerrillas already
detained if a sufficient number in the field were to lay
down their
arms. A second limited amnesty for those guerrillas who
surrendered
peacefully was approved for the period from February to
June 1982.
Turbay also took a strong stance against drug
traffickers. In
1978 the president gave the army a key role in the main
operation
to control drug trafficking and marijuana cultivation in
the
department of La Guajira, including allowing a military
occupation
of the region. Two years later, the government transferred
responsibility for the antidrug campaign in La Guajira to
units of
the National Police. Combined efforts with the United
States
produced some success; for example, the joint Operation
Tiburón,
which began in December 1980, resulted in the seizure of
more than
2,700 tons of marijuana. Despite some impressive
victories,
however, the drug traffickers continued to wield
increasing
economic and political power in the country.
In the early 1980s, evidence came to the fore linking
some
Colombian drug traffickers with both Cuba and the M-19. In
1982 a
federal grand jury in Miami indicted four close aides of
Cuban
president Fidel Castro Ruz on charges of smuggling
narcotics into
the United States. According to the indictment, the aides
assisted
the operations of Colombia drug trafficker Jaime Guillot
Lara, who,
in turn, funneled arms and money on Cuba's behalf to the
M-19.
A contradictory episode in the relationship between the
guerrillas and the drug trade was the December 1981
founding of the
right-wing "paramilitary" group Death to Kidnappers
(Muerte a
Secuestradores--MAS) by prominent drug lords Carlos Ledher
Rivas
and Jorge Luis Ochoa Vásquez. MAS apparently was
established to
intimidate and punish those guerrilla groups, especially
the M-19,
that had engaged in the ransom of key members of the drug
community
in order to finance their operations. MAS subsequently
became a
death squad, targeting left-wing politicians, students,
and party
members.
The post-National Front Liberal presidencies proved
unable to
stem the growth in guerrilla activity and narcotics
trafficking. A
divided PL thus lost support and the presidency to the PC,
effecting a peaceful alternation of power between the two
parties.
In 1982 the PL presented López Michelsen for reelection,
supported
by the Turbay faction of the party. Opposing him from the
LP was
Luis Carlos Galán Sarmiento, a member of the Lleras
Restrepo
faction. In 1979 Galán had formed the New Liberalism
Movement
(Movimiento Nuevo Liberalismo--MNL) and accused the
Turbay-López
Michelsen forces of opportunism, clientelism, and
corruption. The
PC coalesced again behind Betancur and his National
Movement. López
Michelsen employed the partisan campaign style that Turbay
had used
in the previous election, counting on the Liberal majority
to
remain loyal to the party. Betancur retained his minority
strategy
of stressing coalition over party affiliation and received
endorsements from Gloria Eliécer Gaitán, daughter of Jorge
Gaitán,
and from María Eugenia Rojas. With the voter abstention
rate
reduced to 54 percent, Betancur won a decisive victory,
receiving
support from some traditionally Liberal areas. The
election
represented the first peaceful exchange of power between
the two
parties since the end of the National Front
(see Post-National Front Political Developments
, ch. 4).
Upon taking office, Betancur confronted the economic
and social
conditions bequeathed by his predecessors: economic
recession,
fiscal deficit, foreign debt, inflation, and unemployment.
The
parallel economy remained a major concern, as did the
growing
strength of drug traffickers. On the social front,
Betancur sought
to negotiate a peace with the guerrillas, offering them
unconditional amnesty and legitimate participation in the
political
system.
* * *
A variety of sources covering Colombian history are
available
in both English and Spanish. Harvey F. Kline's
Colombia:
Portrait of Unity and Diversity and Pat M. Holt's
Colombia
Today--And Tomorrow provide excellent overviews of
Colombia.
Historia de Colombia, by Carlos A. Mora, Margarita
Peña, and
Patricia Pinilla, and Colombia Hoy, edited by Mario
Arrubla,
also offer a comprehensive examination of Colombian
history.
Extensive data on political history, especially the
periods prior
to and including the National Front, can be found in
Colombia:
A Contemporary Political Survey by John D. Martz;
Politics
of Compromise, edited by R. Albert Berry, Ronald G.
Hellman,
and Mauricio Solaún; The Politics of Colombia by
Robert H.
Dix; and Kline's "Colombia: Modified Two-Party and Elitist
Politics." The relationship between politics and economic
development is treated comprehensively by Charles W.
Bergquist in
Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910. William
Paul
McGreevey deals with economic history in Colombia in An
Economic
History of Colombia, 1845-1930 and "The Transition to
Economic
Growth in Colombia." A comparable work in Spanish is
Colombia y
la Economía Mundial, 1830-1910 by José Antonio Ocampo.
More
recent economic and social trends are addressed in
State and
Society in Contemporary Colombia, edited by Bruce
Michael
Bagley, Francisco E. Thoumi, and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian.
Jonathan
Hartlyn's "Colombia: Old Problems, New Opportunities" and
Bagley's
"Colombian Politics: Crisis or Continuity" offer important
perspectives on contemporary Colombia. Two useful
examinations of
Colombia's drug problem are Thoumi's "Some Implications of
the
Growth of the Underground Economy in Colombia" and Richard
B.
Craig's "Illicit Drug Traffic: Implications for South
American
Source Countries." (For further information and complete
citations,
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of December 1988
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