Pakistan
THE ARMED SERVICES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Colonial Background
At its creation in 1947, Pakistan looked back on two traditions
while seeking to reject a third. One was the more than 100 years
of British colonial rule that radically reshaped the superstructure
of the subcontinent and was the door to modernity. The other inheritance,
the Muslim conquest and dominance from the thirteenth century
to the nineteenth century, provided the Islamic factor that led
to the partition of India and shaped modern-day Pakistan. The
Muslim conquest also offered a useful mythology of exaggerated
Islamic military prowess and dominance. The tradition that the
new nation rejected and sought to leave behind was that of largely
Hindu India. Indeed, differentiation from that heritage was the
raison d'être of Pakistan, yet it remains important, for much
of Pakistan's cultural heritage is shared with India. India also
remains the primary preoccupation of Pakistan's foreign policy
and security concerns.
The country's British heritage has played the greatest role in
shaping the often amorphous military tradition of the Muslim period
into streamlined modern forces. Beginning in the earliest days
of the East India Company (chartered in 1600), native guards were
hired by the British to protect trading posts. As time went by,
these troops were given additional training and were organized
under British officers into the armies of the company's presidencies
at Calcutta (Fort William), Madras (Fort St. George), and Bombay.
In 1748 the presidency armies were brought under the command of
Major Stringer Lawrence, who subsequently became known as the
father of the British Indian Army. A series of military reforms,
first undertaken by Robert Clive in the mideighteenth century,
continued through the first half of the nineteenth century as
the British Parliament asserted increasing control over the East
India Company and its military arm. Part of the legacy that shaped
the British Indian Army was the growing understanding that civil
and military spheres of activity were distinct and that each must
respect the other but that ultimate control rested with the civilian
power, whether in later times the governor general or the local
district magistrate. The role of the military was to give "aid-to-the-civil
power."
The critical event in the evolution of the British Indian Army
was the uprising of 1857-58--known as the Indian Mutiny or Sepoy
Rebellion by British historians and sometimes as the First War
of Independence by later Indian nationalists--when troops in north-central
India, Muslim and Hindu alike, rose up against the British (see
The Seeds of Muslim Nationalism , ch. 1). Some bonds of loyalty
held, but many Indian troops slaughtered both their British leaders
and hapless civilians. With the help of Indian troops who did
not join the rebellion--especially Sikhs and Muslims from the
Punjab--the mutineers were put down with a violence that matched
the atrocities that they had committed.
The bond between Indian and Briton had been broken, and a rethinking
of British military policy in India was set in motion. East India
Company rule was abolished, and direct British rule-- the British
Raj--was instituted in 1858. Emphasis was put on recruiting in
areas where disaffection was least and where the British discerned
the existence of "martial races" (ethnic groups) noted for their
military tradition, lack of political sophistication, and demonstrated
loyalty. By these criteria, the most fertile area for recruitment
was in the Punjab region of northwestern India. The Punjabization
of the British Indian Army and the assumptions that underlay it
would weigh heavily on both the international and the domestic
politics of Pakistan once it was created as an independent entity.
The Pakistan Army structure of the early 1990s in many ways bore
a close resemblance to the British Indian Army structure at the
end of the nineteenth century. During that period, recruitment
into individual, homogeneous regiments depended on class and caste,
rather than on territory. Over time, these regiments became sources
of immense pride to the men who served in them and to the ethnic
group from which they were frequently recruited. Service in a
specific regiment passed from father to son; the eventual shift
from British to Pakistani rule went with hardly a ripple in the
structure except for the change in nationality of the senior officer
corps.
The British experimented with various forms of recruitment and
of elevation to officer rank. During the period between the two
world wars (1919-39), the British trained Indian officers to command
at least Indian troops, and training establishments were set up
to produce an indigenous officer corps. A small number of officer
candidates were sent to Britain to the Royal Military Academy
at Sandhurst; after 1932 the majority of candidates were trained
at the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun.
A rank that predated that of the native officer was the viceroy's
commissioned officer--an Indian who had risen from the ranks and
performed officer functions (except for commanding officer), especially
at the company level. The viceroy's commissioned officer came
from the same social background as did the troops in his unit
and performed a dual function: for the troops, he was a role model
and figure of respect to whom they could turn for advice; he was
also an invaluable intermediary between the troops and the British
officer who commanded them.
The British Indian Army came under immense stress during both
world wars, when it was rapidly expanded and deployed abroad to
wherever the British Empire appeared threatened. During World
War I, nearly 750,000 Indian troops were recruited for service;
some 36,000 were killed, and twice as many were wounded. The troops
generally acquitted themselves well, and their contribution was
used as an arguing point by Indian nationalist politicians who
sought greater autonomy for their country.
The army encountered a different kind of stress during the interwar
period and beyond, when it was called on to suppress the growing
wave of nationalist resistance. This use of Indian personnel alienated
the nationalist leaders, especially those of the Indian National
Congress, who would become the leaders of India in 1947. The problem
was much less serious in what was to become Pakistan. Indeed,
during the "Quit India" movement during World War II, when the
British sought to crush Congress with special vigor because of
its resistance to the war, the All-India Muslim League and the
army supported the British cause (see Toward Partition , ch. 1).
During World War II, the British Indian Army (together with the
small Royal Indian Navy and Royal Indian Air Force) grew to meet
imperial requirements, expanding from essentially a constabulary
force of 175,000 to a mass army of more than 2 million. This growth
meant appointing many Indians as officers, who received only short
training courses, and general recruitment in areas of the country
where "martial" spirit had not been discerned before. Once again,
Indian troops performed loyally and effectively, even while the
country was in political turmoil.
Data as of April 1994
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