Pakistan
The United States Alliance
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, it was natural for
Pakistan to covet the wealth and surplus military equipment of
the United States. United States-Pakistan relations were cordial,
and throughout the late 1940s, Pakistan sought to nurture those
close relations and gain access to United States military support;
initially, these attempts were rebuffed.
As the new decade opened, however, a series of events put new
hope into the possibility of United States-Pakistan cooperation.
First was the reassessment of Pakistan's military position undertaken
by Ayub Khan. The second event was the outbreak of the Korean
War (1950-53), which drew United States attention toward Asia
and marked the point of no return of the globalization of United
States security policy. The third factor was the advent of the
Eisenhower-Dulles team, which set to work building a ring of containment
around the Sino-Soviet bloc. India, committed itself to nonalignment,
had come into sharp disagreement with the United States in the
United Nations when it refused to censure China as an aggressor
in the Korean War and thus was viewed by the United States as
a voice for communist appeasement. India's refusal to join the
United States-sponsored 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan--a pact
among nations designed among other purposes to recruit Japan as
an ally against communist inroads in Asia--further divided the
two countries. India was not available as an ally; Pakistan was
the inevitable alternative (see Foreign Policy , ch. 4).
Pakistan and the United States drew closer together, highlevel
visits were exchanged, and the groundwork was laid for a security
relationship that seemed to meet Pakistan's political needs and
equipment deficit. At United States prompting, Pakistan and Turkey
concluded a security treaty in 1954--the TurkoPakistan Pact--which
immediately enabled United States military assistance to Pakistan
under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed the same
year. Pakistan also became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and joined the Baghdad Pact, later
renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959. Pakistan
had little interest in SEATO and discerned no danger to its interests
from China, joining mainly to oblige Washington. Even CENTO, which
offered the advantage of a new approach to the Muslim world, was
problematic because it drove a wedge between Pakistan and the
Arab countries that remained outside it and was seen by Pakistanis
as institutionally weak because the United States was never willing
to become a full member. None of these arrangements addressed
Pakistan's main concern, however--India.
At Pakistan's insistence, an additional agreement (the Agreement
of Cooperation) on security was concluded with the United States
in March 1959, by which the United States committed itself to
the "preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan"
and agreed to take "appropriate action, including the use of armed
forces, as may be mutually agreed upon . . . in order to assist
the Government of Pakistan at its request." The Agreement of Cooperation
also said nothing about India and was cast in the context of the
Eisenhower Doctrine, which dealt with communist threats to the
Middle East. Pakistan saw the agreement as representing a high
level of United States commitment, however, and some United States
officials apparently encouraged an interpretation that saw more
in the agreement than was actually there. There was considerable
self-deception on both sides--Pakistan believed that it had secured
an ally in its rivalry with India, and the United States focused
on Pakistan as an adherent to the anticommunist cause.
Tangible gains to Pakistan from the relationship were substantial.
Between 1954 and 1965, the United States provided Pakistan with
US$630 million in direct-grant assistance and more than US$670
million in concessional sales and defense-support assistance.
Pakistan received equipment for one additional armored division,
four infantry divisions, and one armored brigade and received
support elements for two corps. The Pakistan Air Force received
six squadrons of modern jet aircraft. The Pakistan Navy received
twelve ships. The ports of Karachi (in West Pakistan) and Chittagong
(in East Pakistan) were modernized. The program did not, however,
provide for the wholesale modernization of the military, much
less its expansion. Forces in Kashmir and East Pakistan were excluded,
and there was a continuing tug-of-war between the United States
and Pakistan as Pakistan sought to extend the scope of the program
and wring more benefits out of it.
The impact on the military of this new relationship was intense.
Pakistanis embraced the latest concepts in military organization
and thinking with enthusiasm and adopted United States training
and operational doctrine. The army and the air force were transformed
into fairly modern, well-equipped fighting forces. In the course
of the rearmament program, the military was substantially reorganized
along United States lines, and hundreds of Pakistani officers
were trained by United States officers, either in Pakistan or
in schools in the United States. Although many British traditions
remained, much of the tone of the army, especially the officer
corps, was Americanized.
Pakistan's hopes for an equitable settlement of its disputes
with India, especially over Kashmir, were probably small in any
event, but by bringing the United States directly into the South
Asian security equation, rapprochement with India became virtually
impossible. More important, India responded to Pakistan's new
alignment by turning to the Soviet Union for military and political
support--and the Soviet leader at the time, Nikita S. Khrushchev,
was only too happy to oblige. As a result, Pakistan not only incurred
Soviet hostility but also ultimately triggered a Soviet military
supply program in India that more than offset the United States
assistance to Pakistan. Soviet displeasure was further heightened
by Pakistan's decision to grant facilities at Peshawar for the
United States to conduct U-2 aerial reconnaissance missions over
the Soviet Union.
Data as of April 1994
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