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Pakistan
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
In mid-1965 Pakistan sent guerrilla forces into the Indian part
of Kashmir in the hope of stirring up a rebellion that would either
oust the Indians or at least force the issue back onto the international
agenda. Pakistani forces did not find as much support among the
Kashmiri population as they had hoped, but fighting spread by
August, and a process of escalation culminated in a full-scale
Indian offensive toward Lahore on September 6. Fighting, frequently
very bitter, continued until a UN-sponsored cease-fire took hold
on September 23. Both sides had tacitly agreed not to let the
war spread to the East Wing of Pakistan.
The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners
and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively
heavy--on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and
3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian
pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led
to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis,
schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to
accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu
India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain
their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude
of Ayub Khan and his government.
Pakistan was rudely shocked by the reaction of the United States
to the war. Judging the matter to be largely Pakistan s fault,
the United States not only refused to come to Pakistan s aid under
the terms of the Agreement of Cooperation, but issued a statement
declaring its neutrality while also cutting off military supplies.
The Pakistanis were embittered at what they considered a friend's
betrayal, and the experience taught them to avoid relying on any
single source of support. For its part, the United States was
disillusioned by a war in which both sides used United States-supplied
equipment. The war brought other repercussions for the security
relationship as well. The United States withdrew its military
assistance advisory group in July 1967. In response to these events,
Pakistan declined to renew the lease on the Peshawar military
facility, which ended in 1969. Eventually, United States-Pakistan
relations grew measurably weaker as the United States became more
deeply involved in Vietnam and as its broader interest in the
security of South Asia waned.
Iran, Indonesia, and especially China gave political support
to Pakistan during the war, thus suggesting new directions in
Pakistan that might translate into support for its security concerns.
Most striking was the attitude of the Soviet Union. Its post-Khrushchev
leadership, rather than rallying reflexively to India's side,
adopted a neutral position and ultimately provided the good offices
at Tashkent, which led to the January 1966 Tashkent Declaration
that restored the status quo ante.
The aftermath of the 1965 war saw a dramatic shift in Pakistan's
security environment. Instead of a single alignment with the United
States against China and the Soviet Union, Pakistan found itself
cut off from United States military support, on increasingly warm
terms with China, and treated equitably by the Soviet Union. Unchanged
was the enmity with which India and Pakistan regarded each other
over Kashmir. The result was the elaboration of a new security
approach, called by Ayub Khan the "triangular tightrope"--a tricky
endeavor to maintain good ties with the United States while cultivating
China and the Soviet Union. Support from other developing nations
was also welcome. None of the new relationships carried the weight
of previous ties with the United States, but, taken together,
they at least provided Pakistan with a political counterbalance
to India.
Pakistan needed other sources of military supply, most urgently
because of its wartime losses and the United States embargo. After
1965 China became Pakistan's principal military supplier, providing
matériel to all three services in substantial quantity and at
attractive prices. Submarines and Mirage aircraft were also purchased
from France. The Soviet Union sought to woo Pakistan with military
equipment, but that program never really developed because of
Moscow's concern not to jeopardize its more important relationship
with India. The United States gradually relaxed its embargo; however,
it was only in 1973 that substantial supplies again flowed to
Pakistan.
The late 1960s were politically turbulent times for Pakistan;
by 1969 conditions had deteriorated to the point where the army
once again felt called on to intervene. On March 25, an ailing
and discredited Ayub Khan transferred power to army commander
in chief General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, who declared himself
president as well as chief martial law administrator (CMLA) and
announced that Pakistan would have national general elections--
for the first time since independence--and a new constitution.
The elections in December 1970 were fair but led to the breakup
of Pakistan (see Yahya Khan and Bangladesh , ch. 1). In the process,
the army and Pakistan's security situation deteriorated still
further.
The largely Punjabi army was in a politically untenable position
in East Pakistan, which had voted overwhelmingly for an autonomist
party. Once it became clear that a compromise between the civilian
leaders of West Pakistan and East Pakistan was unattainable, Yahya
Khan was forced to choose between the two sides, and his actions
were seen by the Bengalis of the East Wing as favoring the interests
of West Pakistan, which were hardly distinguishable from those
of the armed forces. Yahya Khan decided to postpone indefinitely
the convening of the new National Assembly, which would have been
dominated by Bengalis. It was feared that a government dominated
by East Pakistani interests would cut back sharply on military
prerogatives and roll back the dominance of Punjab in national
affairs. Within days, unrest spread throughout East Pakistan.
Bengalis went on strike and stopped paying taxes. Bengali autonomists
became separatists.
Army elements in East Pakistan were strengthened in the spring
of 1971 and were used to suppress Bengali recalcitrance. The task
was undertaken with ferocity; killing, rape, looting, and brutality
were widespread and resulted in the flight of nearly 10 million
refugees to India over six months. International outrage was growing
and forced the Richard M. Nixon administration in the United States
to halt its attempts to reopen military supply lines to Pakistan.
The army was generally successful during the spring and summer
of 1971 in restoring order in East Pakistan, but increasing Indian
support of the antigovernment Bengali guerrillas known as the
Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force) began to shift the balance. When
Indian troops finally intervened directly in December, there was
no hope of stopping them. Even though the garrison in East Pakistan
had been reinforced, national strategy was still based on the
assumption that Pakistan could not simultaneously defend both
wings of the country against an Indian attack; hence, an attack
in the east would be countered in the west. On December 3, Pakistani
forces began hostilities in the west with attacks on Indian airfields.
They had little success, and within twenty-four hours India had
seized air superiority, launched attacks against West Pakistan,
and blockaded the coast. Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered
to the Indian army on December 16, and India offered a cease-fire.
In the face of superior force on all fronts, Pakistan had little
choice but to accept the breakup of the country.
The armed forces were shattered and their equipment destroyed;
9,000 troops were lost, and 90,000 prisoners of war were in the
hands of Indians and Bengalis in Bangladesh (the former East Pakistan).
Yahya Khan resigned in disgrace, and the winner of the elections
in West Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, succeeded him as CMLA and
president. Pakistan, a country originally created in the name
of religion, lost its raison d'être as the homeland of Muslims
in the subcontinent and was much reduced in size. Although the
politicians were ultimately responsible for the events of 1971,
the army and its leaders were the obvious villains.
The security situation of the nation also changed. Any illusions
of parity vis-à-vis India were demolished. Although both China
and the United States had tilted toward Pakistan politically,
it was abundantly clear that neither of those superpowers was
in a position to offset Indian primacy in the region, especially
in view of the friendship treaty that India had signed with the
Soviet Union in August 1971, just before the outbreak of hostilities.
The Soviet Union, forced to choose sides, opted for India, and
the rapprochement that had taken place between Pakistan and the
Soviet Union evaporated. Pakistan stood largely alone and at the
mercy of India. The 1972 bilateral Simla Agreement restored most
of the status quo ante the 1971 war in the relations between the
two nations. The agreement states that "the two countries are
resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through
bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually
agreed upon between them." Although India maintained the more
narrow interpretation that disputes be settled bilaterally, Pakistan
in subsequent years favored a looser interpretation--one that
did not exclude a multilateral settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
Yet the loss of East Pakistan also had positive implications
for Pakistan's security. The loss of the East Pakistani population
as a recruitment pool was only of minor significance. By shedding
its most dissident and poorest province, Pakistan emerged stronger
and was able to focus its energies more effectively. A major strategic
problem--the geographic division of the country--was eliminated.
The loss of East Pakistan also removed the need for a Pakistani
role in Southeast Asia. Pakistan withdrew from SEATO, and Bhutto
refocused national attention toward Muslim West Asia. He apparently
tried to develop ways of putting the Kashmir issue to rest so
that Pakistan could greatly reduce its preoccupation with South
Asia. No longer closely tied to the United States, Bhutto sought
a larger role for Pakistan among the nonaligned countries and,
especially, within the Islamic world. A brilliant diplomat, he
was able in a very few years to restore Pakistan's prestige, stake
out a leading role for Pakistan among Muslim nations, court the
superpowers, and even establish cordial relations with Bangladesh.
These triumphs were not shared with the military, as Bhutto moved
to create a "professional but docile" military. Senior officers
were dismissed, and their replacements were chosen by Bhutto.
The military establishment was reorganized so that it would be
under more effective civilian control. Bhutto's 1973 constitution
narrowly defined the role of the military as defending Pakistan
against external aggression and "subject to law" acting in aid-to-the-civil
power when called on so to do. Any attempt to abrogate the constitution
was deemed high treason (see Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional
System , ch. 1).
In 1972 Bhutto established the Federal Security Force of some
18,000 men to provide assistance to the civil administration and
police and to do civic action work. Not under military control,
the Federal Security Force was, in effect, Bhutto's private political
army. The military, beaten and demoralized, had no choice but
to accept this further setback, even as it harbored deep concerns
over the impact Bhutto was having on the integrity of the army
and its ability to defend Pakistan.
In 1973 Bhutto began to focus on rebuilding the tamed military
because Pakistan continued to face serious security threats from
abroad, highlighted by the Indian nuclear test in 1974, and at
home--a major insurgency from 1973 to 1977 in Balochistan, which
ultimately required the involvement of 80,000 army troops. New
military production facilities and a navy air wing were established.
Bhutto's diplomacy resulted in a partial lifting of the United
States embargo on military sales to Pakistan in 1973 and a complete
removal of the embargo in 1977. He also used diplomacy to tap
into the burgeoning oil revenues of the Middle East; still, Pakistan
could not afford to buy much, and its inventories of weapons were
increasingly made up of outdated and ill-matched equipment from
a variety of sources. Nonetheless, the army's self-confidence
again began to grow. Expenditures on defense by 1974 had reattained
the 1969 level-- even though the gross national product (GNP--see
Glossary) was little more than half of the amount that had been
produced before Bangladesh became independent. The defense budget
continued to increase over the next several years, supporting
a somewhat expanded strength--428,000 personnel in 1976. Pakistan's
nuclear program was also established by Bhutto. )
Bhutto's domestic position, however, eroded rapidly in the mid-1970s,
and, as his charisma waned, he turned to the army to deal with
domestic unrest. The rigged elections of March 1977 resulted in
mass demonstrations demanding Bhutto's resignation. General Mohammad
Zia ul-Haq, chief of the army staff--a new title for service chiefs
replacing the former title of commander in chief--saw that the
army was unwilling to engage in the violence that would be necessary
to put down the unrest. In a stunning move, Zia arrested Bhutto
and other political leaders on July 5, 1977, and declared Pakistan's
third period of martial law.
Data as of April 1994
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