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Pakistan
Defense Strategy
Pakistan remains, despite its substantial military force, a nation
with a gaping security deficit. India disposes of forces sometimes
almost three times as large as Pakistan's, and this disparity
is only partially offset by India's need to defend its border
with China. Senior Pakistani officers are well aware of the fact
that their forces are not equal to India's, and few would willingly
provoke a test of strength. Further, although Pakistan had built
up its fuel and ammunition reserves to fortyfive days' supplies
by 1992, past experience has taught the nation not to count on
replenishment. War avoidance has been the primary goal of Pakistani
security policy, especially since the Zia years. At the same time,
the military accepts the fact that war is possible and is determined
to acquit itself well.
Pakistan, like virtually every other nation, proclaims that its
forces and strategy are defensive. Faced with a much superior
enemy, uncertain sources of supply, and little strategic depth,
Pakistan cannot expect to absorb an initial attack and to successfully
fight a protracted defensive war. Thus, in terms of conventional
strategy, Pakistan has emphasized a doctrine of "offensive defense,"
which provides for quick preemptive strikes once a war begins
in order to disrupt an enemy advance and inflict high costs. In
addition, such actions are designed to gain salients in enemy
territory, which can be used as trade-offs in peace negotiations.
Navy and air force roles would be mainly defensive. The large-scale
exercise Zarb-e-Momin (Sword of the Faithful), which took place
in 1989, was held far enough away from the border not to frighten
India, and, indeed, foreign observers were invited. Its scenario
and the publicity that attended it were, however, meant to illustrate
the offensivedefense doctrine and to make sure that India understood
it.
Data as of April 1994
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