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Pakistan
The Armed Forces in a New World Order
The Zia era ended as it had begun, with a Bhutto in power, for
Benazir's party emerged with a narrow victory. Her position was
much different from that of her father. She became prime minister
under a constitution that left great power in the hands of the
president, her parliamentary majority was narrow, and the army
was strong, self-confident, and unwilling to renounce its political
role. As the price of power, Benazir had to negotiate an arrangement
with President Ishaq Khan and General Beg by which she reportedly
promised to keep Zia's constitutional changes and to limit her
involvement in military affairs, including management of the fighting
in Afghanistan and nuclear weapons policy.
Several times Benazir ineffectually challenged the armed forces
and the president on military matters. She was never able to find
a comfortable relationship with these other two major players
of the triangle of political power in Pakistan. She showed interest
in improving relations with India but had little scope to take
concrete steps. She skillfully cultivated her good ties to Washington,
but overall her performance as prime minister was disappointing,
and when the president--with the obvious backing of the army--dismissed
her in August 1990 and called for new elections, there was little
opposition.
The elections brought to power the Islamic Democratic Alliance
(Islami Jamhoori Ittehad--IJI), a coalition that enjoyed the implicit
support of both the president and the armed forces. Punjab's chief
minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, a businessman and protégé of Zia,
became prime minister. Although the dismissal of Benazir had been
against the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitution, the
new power arrangement seemed to offer Pakistan favorable prospects
for stable representative rule because the three power centers
were all in apparent alignment, and Nawaz Sharif represented the
interests of the Punjabi majority. The arrangement worked adequately
for some time, and when General Beg's time for retirement as chief
of the army staff came, he did not attempt to force an extension
of his tour of duty.
Beg's replacement, General Asif Nawaz Janjua, was a much lower-profile
leader and sought to lead the army away from corruption and toward
a renewed emphasis on professionalism and a sensible adaptation
to the post-Cold War realities of Pakistan's strategic position.
The army, however, was drawn into politics in May 1992 when the
law and order situation in Sindh deteriorated so badly that the
provincial government invited the army to restore public order
under Article 147 of the constitution. Although the army could
not solve Sindh's many problems, it made significant progress
in combatting the cycle of terror, banditry, and kidnapping that
had plagued the province. The army stopped short of imposing martial
law, but it intervened in the politics of the province and, in
the process, moved against political allies of Nawaz Sharif, the
IJI coalition prime minister, who was already at odds with the
president.
General Janjua died suddenly in January 1993, and President Ishaq
Khan used his prerogative to reach well down the list of lieutenant
generals to appoint Abdul Waheed, a highly regarded officer without
apparent political aspirations. Waheed seemed to fit Pakistani
political scientist Mohammad Waseem's description as "the transition
from a group of conservative generals led by Zia who were inspired
by Islamic ideals to a relatively liberal and modernist generation
of military officers who have positive attitudes toward Western-style
democracy."
Waheed was quickly called upon to demonstrate his commitment
to democratic process. When a power struggle between the president
and the prime minister in April 1993 resulted in Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif's ouster, the military resisted the temptation to
take charge during the ensuing period of political turmoil. In
July, Waheed brokered a settlement in which both the prime minister
and the president resigned, a neutral caretaker government was
appointed, and new elections were scheduled for October (see "The
Silent Revolution": A Year of Political Struggle, ch. 4).
There remained different points of view within the officer corps,
almost all of whom had little respect for politicians and feared
that an incompetent civilian leader might irreparably damage their
core values--the integrity of the military and the security of
Pakistan. Some officers were politically ambitious and had found
their period of power under Zia rewarding-- financially and otherwise.
Many, however, believed that any political activity, whether in
the context of martial law or in the context of helping elected
leaders deal with crises caused by politicians' ineptitude, undermined
discipline and morale and detracted from the ability of the armed
forces to perform military missions. Retired General Shaukat Riza,
describing an earlier period of martial law observed: "After a
short period of hot, righteous action, military men succumb to
setting their mark on whatever is served up to them. Martial Law
is disarmed, leaving in its wake a debris of shattered dreams
and wasting social order."
On balance, the army preferred to avoid direct involvement unless
the political order threatened to collapse completely. The crucial
question for Pakistan's political future was in the shaping of
the middle ground. Should the armed forces simply be recognized
as having a voice in Pakistan's politics, or should their role
be formally institutionalized? Zia's attempts to do the latter
through creation of a National Security Council had been successfully
resisted by Junejo, but the question remained central to Pakistan's
security as well as to its politics.
The external relations of the military deteriorated sharply in
the post-Zia period because of the collapse of Pakistan's relationship
with the United States. President George Bush determined in October
1990 that he could no longer certify that Pakistan did not possess
nuclear weapons and, as required by the Pressler Amendment to
the Foreign Assistance Act, terminated all United States assistance
to Pakistan that was not already in the pipeline. Pakistan handled
the cutoff with little public rancor and committed itself to freezing
the nuclear program in an attempt to placate the United States.
Washington permitted such commercial purchases as spare parts
for aircraft and the continued joint naval and special forces
exercises, but such key items as fighter aircraft on order were
kept in abeyance. Further, the United States moved to reclaim
nine ships that were on loan--about half of Pakistan's surface
fleet.
In late 1993, the administration of President William J. Clinton,
citing what it considered to be asymmetrical treatment accorded
to Pakistan and India over their respective nuclear programs,
proposed revising the Pressler Amendment and certain "country-specific"
sections of the Foreign Assistance Act. The administration argued
that by the time nuclear nonproliferation provisions had been
added to the Foreign Assistance Act, India had already acquired
the capability to build nuclear weapons and thus Pakistan had
borne the brunt of most United States sanctions. In early 1994,
the administration withdrew its proposal to revise the amendment
because of strong criticism from a number of influential members
of Congress, including Senator Pressler himself. In March the
administration was reported as "floating" a proposal for releasing
to Pakistan up to twenty- eight F-16 fighter aircraft--already
paid for and part of a long- standing commercial order but undeliverable
because of the Pressler Amendment. The proposal, which was certain
to be challenged in the United States Congress, was to be part
of a broader initiative to get India and Pakistan to halt their
production of weapons-grade nuclear material and to discourage
them from deploying surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.
The impact on Pakistan's military readiness by the United States
decision to halt assistance has been described by observers as
near catastrophic, but even more important than the money and
equipment involved was the strategic signal sent by the aid cutoff.
As long as Pakistan was in the front line of opposition to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States found ways of
continuing its aid despite Pakistan's nuclear program. Once the
Soviet forces left Afghanistan and the Soviet Union itself ceased
to exist, Pakistan's importance dwindled. Whatever limited successes
Pakistan may have had in salvaging parts of the relationship with
the United States, it was clear that the end of the Cold War marked
the end of Pakistan's strategic role.
The loss of United States support came at a difficult time. Unrest
in Indian Kashmir had developed rapidly after 1989, and Pakistan
inevitably supplied moral and covert matériel support, thus raising
the specter of a new conflict with India. There were serious concerns
in early 1990 that a war might break out. At United States prompting,
both sides took effective steps to reduce the danger. Neither
country wanted a conflict, but Pakistan remained in a quandary
because it could not ignore events in Kashmir although it did
not have substantial international support for its position. The
United States and China made clear their unwillingness to provide
political or matériel support to Pakistan, thus increasing still
further the latter's sense of isolation.
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan removed a potential threat
to Pakistan, and the substantial retreat of Russia from the security
affairs of the subcontinent offset somewhat the withdrawal of
the United States. For the first time since 1947, Pakistan was
not concerned about a two-front threat. Further, the emergence
of five independent Muslim republics in Central Asia raised hopes
that they might become allies and offer Pakistan both the political
support and the strategic depth it lacked. As long as Afghanistan
was in chaos, Pakistan would lack direct access to the new republics.
However, it was still far from certain in the early 1990s whether
or not the republics would find Pakistan an interesting political
partner.
Approaching the next century, Pakistan faces yet another reconfiguration
of the forces that determine its security environment. As Russia,
China, and the United States stand back from South Asia, there
are fewer constraints on India. Yet other sweeping changes are
under way in the international environment. Pakistan remains engaged
in its search for outside help to ensure its security. The end
of the Cold War was only changed the terms of the problem.
Data as of April 1994
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