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Pakistan
The Military Reasserts Itself
Although General Zia asserted that this military intervention
in politics would be brief and there would be new elections within
ninety days, he had the longest tenure of any Pakistani ruler.
Although he came to power more as a spokesman of military interests--a
first among equals--and was thought to be a political naif, he
was highly skilled in gathering power into his own hands.
On assuming power, Zia named himself chief martial law administrator
and suspended parts of the 1973 constitution. (Zia assumed the
presidency as well in September 1978.) Because it appeared that
Bhutto, if freed and available as a candidate, might easily win
the elections, Zia postponed them and undertook a campaign to
discredit his predecessor politically. Zia's initial assumption
of power was peaceful, and even his subsequent decision to allow
Bhutto to be hanged after Bhutto's conviction as an accomplice
to murder a political opponent, did not bring disturbances severe
enough to threaten his regime. There was, however, continued opposition
to military rule, and Zia was able to maintain himself in power
only through a combination of political luck, skill, and authoritarianism.
Although the military regime was often repressive, state violence
was downplayed, and some observers believe that human rights conditions
were better than during the Bhutto years. Zia also emphasized
the corruption in political life and the need for reform. Ethnic
resistance in Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province
was dealt with adroitly; only the ethnic Sindhis remained profoundly
alienated (see Zia ul-Haq and Military Domination, 1977-88 , ch.
1). Zia also proved politically skillful in employing a strategy
of continually holding out the promise of free elections when
circumstances permitted, making political concessions that would
strengthen rather than undermine his position and, especially
after 1979, co-opting influential political groups among orthodox
Muslims. )
The first years of Zia's tenure marked another low point in the
security situation. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 overthrew one
of Pakistan's staunchest friends, and the missionary zeal of its
new Islamist regime did not bode well for Pakistan-Iran relations.
The Saur Revolution (April Revolution) in Afghanistan in 1978
ousted a government that had become conciliatory in its relations
with Pakistan, replacing it with a group that also preached radical
change--this time, communist. When the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan
in December 1979, Pakistan found itself in a security nightmare--for
the first time, the Soviet Union posed a potentially immediate
threat.
Relations with the United States were also at a low point. The
administration of President Jimmy Carter had adopted an extremely
hard line on Pakistan's nuclear program and suspended all military
and economic assistance in April 1979. In March 1979, after the
Iranian Revolution, Pakistan withdrew from a moribund CENTO. Tensions
with the United States peaked when a Pakistani mob burned the
United States embassy in Islamabad in November 1979, killing two
Americans and two Pakistani employees, in response to a BBC radio
broadcast of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's speech, in which he
falsely accused the United States of invading the Grand Mosque
in Mecca. Although China remained a good friend, political scientist
Robert G. Wirsing's assessment proved accurate: "Never before
had Pakistan been quite so isolated and quite so threatened at
the same time."
Data as of April 1994
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