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Pakistan
The Role of Islam
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto introduced certain Islamic practices, notably
prohibition of alcoholic beverages, into the army, and Zia encouraged
still more, including the assignment of mullahs (see Glossary)
as chaplains, some of whom reportedly go into combat with the
troops. Modest mosques have been built in military training areas,
Islamic texts are being introduced into training courses, mid-grade
officers must take courses and examinations on Islam, and there
are serious attempts under way to define an Islamic military doctrine,
as distinct from the "Western" doctrines that the Pakistanis have
been following.
In the early 1990s, Islamic military doctrine had not replaced
more traditional military doctrines, and it probably never will.
Military affairs specialist Stephen P. Cohen has, however, highlighted
several interesting points that have emerged. For instance, Islam
has traditionally been identified with the concept of jihad, a
righteous religious "striving" against unbelievers, and Islamic
governments have been assiduous in describing whatever wars they
fight--even against other Muslims--as jihad. Recent thinking,
however, has emphasized that jihad is not a perpetual invitation
to wage war against nonbelievers and, indeed, that it need not
necessarily entail violence. More specifically, Pakistani writers
have rejected as un-Islamic the idea of total war that emerged
in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They emphasize
the Quranic injunctions to conciliation and persuasion and see
force only as a last resort.
Further, these Pakistani theorists see the function of force
less as a capability for combat than as something that strikes
terror into the hearts of enemies and thus can actually prevent
war. There is an obvious parallel here to the idea that the most
terrifying of all weapons, nuclear ordnance, can act as a deterrent
to war. Many Western military writers have portrayed the era of
United States-Soviet mutual deterrence in these terms, and some
have even applied this view as a rationale for Pakistani and Indian
nuclear capabilities. Pakistani writers find this approach a convenient
justification for their nuclear programs, and, indeed, most of
the "Islamic" thinking on war still looks more like retroactive
rationalizations for strategies already adopted rather than guideposts
to new departures. Furthermore, Pakistanis are well aware that
air combat tactics or at-sea replenishment techniques are not
determined by religion, and the armed forces will continue to
look for secular guidance.
At the personnel level, the generation of cosmopolitan officers
who were trained in British and United States traditions and consider
religion a purely personal matter is passing from the scene. The
new generation of officers is less exposed to foreign influences
and is, increasingly, a product of a society that has been much
more influenced by "orthodox" Islam, in which the primacy of Islam
is continually emphasized and accepted.
Relatively few Pakistanis have turned to Islamic fundamentalism,
and because of the demands of their profession, Pakistani officers
and soldiers seem likely to keep at least one foot in the modernist
camp. Senior generals are reportedly concerned about religion
looming too large in military affairs, but unless there are major
changes in society and politics, the armed forces may increasingly
see itself as an Islamic as well as a nationalist force.
Data as of April 1994
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