Indonesia Government and Politics
The young Prince Rama (left), the chief
figure in the epic drama Ramayana and the seventh incarnation of
Wisnu; Indrajit (right), who is disguised as Gutukatja, the
heroic son of Bima, is really the commander in chief for Rama's
enemy, the giant Dasamuka, who kidnapped Rama's wife, Dewi Sinta.
AFTER 1965 AND THE DESTRUCTION of the Indonesian
Communist
Party (PKI; for this and other acronyms, see table A), the
military dominated Indonesian politics. By exploiting
existing
constitutional structures and mobilizing civilian
political
support through a quasipolitical party of functional
groups
(Golkar--see Glossary),
Indonesia's leaders concentrated
power
and authority in a small military and bureaucratic elite.
At the
elite's head was President Suharto, a former army general
who was
instrumental in the forcible termination of the Guided
Democracy
of his predecessor, Sukarno. To emphasize the
discontinuity with
the failed and discredited policies of the Sukarno
era--what the
new regime called the Old Order--Suharto's government
called
itself the New Order. The policy priority of the New Order
was
economic development based on security, stability, and
consensus.
Although only a handful of top leaders in the 1980s and
early
1990s participated in the New Order decision-making
process,
pressure for greater access by nonofficially recognized
interests
and even opposition parties defined the contemporary
political
debate. The New Order appeared in the early 1990s to have
the
broad support of a majority of Indonesians. Its legitimacy
rested
not only on real economic development but also in appeals
to
traditional values including, but not limited to, the
Javanese
values with which Suharto himself was imbued.
In 1992 Indonesia was a unitary state with a highly
centralized governmental administration. This
centralization was
seen by Indonesia's leaders as necessary in a fragmented
geographical and highly plural ethnic setting with a
history of
regional and ethnic rebellion. Problems of integration
remained
in East Timor (Timor Timur Province), Irian Jaya Province,
and to
a lesser extent the Special Region of Aceh
(see
fig. 1).
After
independence was declared in 1945, ideological consensus
had been
sought through the vigorous propagation of a national
ideology called the
Pancasila (see Glossary):
belief in one Supreme God,
humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social
justice. The government claimed the exclusive right to give content to
these broad general principles, and by law all organizations
were
required to have the Pancasila as a common organizing
principle,
a single national commitment that took precedence over
their
individual programs.
The post-1965 political party system was simplified
with the
institution of Golongan Karya, or Golkar, the de facto
government
party organized around functional groups in society.
Golkar vied
in quinquennial elections with the United Development
Party (PPP)
and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), themselves
coalitions
of formerly competitive parties. Because of a built-in
advantage
of massive government support and highly restrictive
campaign
rules, Golkar had emerged victorious in all national
elections
since 1971. The two constitutional legislative bodies,
dominated
by Golkar and the Armed Forces of the Republic of
Indonesia
(ABRI), were often little more than rubber stamps for
government
policy in a strong presidential system. The latitude of
action
the government enjoyed also was enhanced by a judicial
system in
which the rule of law often seemed bent to the will of the
government. Moreover, the media in the early 1990s were
enmeshed
in a web of formal and informal controls that made them
relatively ineffective as a check on government.
By 1992 Suharto had been inaugurated five times as
president,
and a central political question since his fourth term had
been
that of succession. The succession issue could be resolved
only
with interplay among the leading political forces and
institutions: ABRI, the bureaucracy, Islam, business
groups, and
the presidency--but, as of late 1992, a sixth term for
Suharto
seemed likely to many observers who instead watched more
avidly
the selection of a vice president. With the exception of
the
presidency, none of these groups or institutions was
monolithic.
They all had factions, dividing not only on issues of
interest
but also on religion, race, and ethnicity. Issues of
interest
included economic equity, corruption, the role of ABRI in
society, environmental concerns, and democratization.
Foreign policy was not a significant issue in domestic
politics. Although there was bureaucratic infighting in
the New
Order era over foreign policy on a range of
issues--including
normalization of relations with China, policy toward
Vietnam's
incursion into Cambodia, and handling of the East Timor
problem--
the president's word was final. In a break with Sukarno's
confrontational foreign policy, Suharto's government
restored
Indonesia's international image as a peaceful and
cooperative
member of the international community. A founding member
of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN--see Glossary),
Indonesia was an important actor in ASEAN's diplomacy
ending the
Third Indochina War (1978-91). In the 1980s, Indonesia
began to
project a more assertive presence in the international
arena
corresponding to its huge population, natural resources,
economic
success, and growing nationalism. This was capped by
Suharto's
succession in 1992 to the chairmanship of the
Nonaligned Movement (see Glossary).
Indonesia's international image continued
to
suffer, however, from international criticism of its human
rights
record, particularly its suppression of an independence
movement
in East Timor.
Data as of November 1992
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