Indonesia Golkar
Golkar V-for-Victory campaign sign
The government's chosen instrument for political action
was
Golangan Karya (Golkar), the ABRI-managed organization of
"functional groups." Golkar had its roots late in
Sukarno's
Guided Democracy within the left-dominated National Front
as an
army-sponsored functional grouping of nearly 100
anticommunist
organizations. These groups had a diverse membership, from
trade
unionists and civil servants to students and women. As a
political force to balance the weight of the PKI and
Sukarno's
PNI, this Golkar prototype--the Joint Secretariat of
Functional
Groups--was ineffective, but it provided a framework for
the
military to mobilize civilian support. After 1966 it was
reorganized by Suharto's supporters, under General Ali
Murtopo,
head of ABRI's Special Operations Service (Opsus), as an
ostensibly nonpartisan civilian constituency for the New
Order's
authority. Golkar's mission was "to engage in politics to
suppress politics." Its core membership was the Indonesian
civil
service and government officials at all levels of society,
including the villages, and employees of state enterprises
were
expected to be loyal to Golkar. Behind the patronage and
the
semimonopoly on communications and funding that
facilitated
Golkar's electoral superiority, was the unspoken but
occasionally
overt power of ABRI.
Suharto was directly involved in Golkar's organization
and
policies from the beginning of the New Order. The
organization's
top advisory leadership was composed of senior ABRI
officers,
cabinet ministers, and leading technocrats. Day-to-day
operations
were under the direction of the chairman of the Central
Executive
Board. Under the chairmanship of Sudharmono from 1983 to
1988,
Golkar increasingly became Suharto's personal constituency
as
opposed to an ABRI-New Order regime-oriented grouping.
Sudharmono
attempted to make Golkar a more effective political
instrument by
transforming it from a "functional group" basis to
individual
cadre membership. It was expected that the cadres,
augmenting the
official outreach, would help in the rice-roots
mobilization of
the "floating masses" at election times. As a
mass-mobilizing,
cadre party loyal to Suharto, there was some speculation
that
Golkar was emerging as an autonomous political force in
society,
no longer fully responsive to ABRI. Credence was given to
this
speculation by Suharto himself, when he admonished Golkar
in 1989
to adopt a central position rather than "sit on the
sidelines."
Further evidence of the change in Golkar was seen in the
emergence of a second-level younger civilian leadership as
represented by its secretary general, Sarwono
Kusumaatmadja,
brother of Minister of Foreign Affairs Mochtar
Kusumaatmadja.
Concerns about Golkar's direction probably contributed
to
ABRI's initial dissatisfaction with Suharto's selection of
Sudharmono to be vice president in 1988. The possibility
that as
vice president Sudharmono might seek concurrently to keep
his
Golkar position came to the fore at Golkar's October 1988
Fourth
National Congress. At the congress, ABRI pushed
countermeasures
including installing military men in Golkar's regional
leadership, and Suharto avoided confrontation by replacing
Sudharmono with Wahono, the relatively obscure former
governor of
Jawa Timur Province. Wahono was a man personally loyal to
Suharto
and without succession aspirations. Nevertheless, Golkar's
commanding position in the "open" political process left
unanswered the question of its potential to become a rival
to
ABRI or an alternative political base for future aspirants
to
power.
Data as of November 1992
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