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Indonesia ABRI
The considerable policy achievements of the New Order
government cannot be overstated. Whether compared with the
Old
Order or with other large and culturally plural Third
World
nations, Indonesia's record of political stability and
economic
growth since 1966 was viewed by its leaders as the
empirical
justification of the system of government put in place by
the
military in 1966-67. Despite keterbukaan, there was
no
retreat from dwifungsi. Suharto and the military
elite
seemed united in their belief that there would be no
turning back
from the principle of dual function which ABRI considered
a
historical necessity. The spectacle of the ethnic
disintegration
of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was a sobering
example of
what can happen when authority is lifted in ethnically
plural
states. Beyond the agreement on dwifungsi, however,
the
relationship between the president and ABRI became one of
the
problematic issues of politics in the 1990s. Ultimately,
the
president depended on ABRI as the bulwark of his
authority. In
part, the legitimacy of ABRI's role in society was a
reflection
of the Suharto performance in office. As Suharto seemed to
become
increasingly distanced institutionally from ABRI and
issues of
corruption and favoritism brought the regime into
disrepute,
observers questioned how ABRI would position itself with
respect
to succession.
ABRI dissatisfaction with the course of events rarely
surfaced publicly. The demonstration against Sudharmono's
nomination to the vice presidency was an exception. Yet,
in the
subtle and indirect fashion seemingly inherent in Javanese
political culture, signs abounded that some senior ABRI
leaders
had reservations about a sixth term for Suharto. Steeped
in
distrust of Islamic politics, ABRI looked askance at
Suharto's
overtures to the santri, taking particular note of
the
military's exclusion from the ICMI. Moreover, it was no
secret
that ABRI leaders were disturbed by what some saw as the
unbridled greed of the president's family members and his
obvious
reluctance to restrain them. The cult of personality,
which
presidential palace functionaries fostered, also offended
ABRI's
leaders. ABRI's commitment to its own revolutionary values
and
the Pancasila seemed, in a sense, to be mocked at the end
of
Suharto's fifth term. On the other hand, ABRI's command
repeatedly assured the leadership of their commitment to
constitutional processes. ABRI's focus was on regime
continuity
rather than provoking a leadership crisis that might
resonate
negatively in the wider society. If the common wisdom that
Suharto's successor had to be a Muslim Javanese general
was
correct, ABRI wanted to be sure that it controlled the
designation.
As a practical matter, ABRI's desire to control the
succession scenario meant it had to play a leading role in
the
selection of the vice presidential candidate for Suharto's
sixth
term (1993-98). The list of potential nominees started
with the
ABRI commander General Try Sutrisno, followed by army
commander
General Edi Sudrajat. Even this careful ABRI selection
process
would not guarantee succession in 1998. Suharto was likely
to
have had a different scenario. Seemingly waiting in the
wings was
Major General Wismoyo Arismunandar, who in July 1992 was
advanced
to deputy commander of the Army from commander of the Army
Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), the post Suharto
himself
held in 1965. Wismoyo, Suharto's brother-in-law, was
widely
expected to become army chief of staff and even ABRI
commander.
Also rapidly moving up in the ranks was Lieutenant Colonel
Prabowo Subianto, a Suharto son-in-law. Prabowo, who,
according
to many observers, was a highly capable officer, served as
the
chief of staff of the Seventeenth Airborne Brigade. By
1998,
then, the succession issue was likely to be couched in
dynastic
terms, and the family's interests would be well protected.
Data as of November 1992
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