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Indonesia THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The legal basis of the Indonesian state is the 1945
constitution, promulgated the day after the August 17,
1945,
proclamation of independence. The constitution was
essentially a
draft instrument hurriedly crafted by the Independence
Preparatory Committee in the last weeks before the
Japanese
surrender
(see
The Japanese Occupation, 1942-45; ch. 1).
According to George McTurnan Kahin, whose 1952 book
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia was the
pioneering
study of modern Indonesian politics, the constitution was
considered "definitely provisional." Provisional or not,
the
constitution provided structural continuity in a period of
political discontinuity. Beginning with the preamble,
which
invokes the principles of the Pancasila, the thirty-seven
articles of the constitution--ambiguous though they
are--set
forth the boundaries of both Sukarno's Old Order and
Suharto's
New Order.
The 1945 constitution was the product of a unitary
republic
struggling to emerge in the face of Dutch efforts to
reestablish
sovereignty and Islamic appeals for a religion-centered
state.
The constitution was not fully implemented when the
transfer of
sovereignty from the Netherlands went into effect on
December 27,
1949. The 1949 agreement called for the establishment of
the
federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI).
Subsequently, a provisional constitution adopted in
February 1950
provided for the election of a Constituent Assembly to
write a
permanent constitution
(see
The National Revolution, 1945-49
, ch.
1). A rising tide of more radical nationalism, driven
partly by
perceptions that the RUSI was a Dutch scheme to divide and
conquer, rapidly moved controlling political elites in the
direction of a unitary republic. A Committee for the
Preparation
of the Constitution of the Unitary State was established
on May
19, 1950, and on August 14 a new constitution (technically
an
amendment to the RUSI constitution) was ratified, to be in
force
until an elected Constituent Assembly completed its work.
The
new, interim constitution provided for a cabinet system of
government with the cabinet and prime minister being
responsible
to a unicameral legislature. The president was to be head
of
state but without real executive power except as a cabinet
formateur.
As the political parties wrestled ineffectually in the
parliamentary forum, dissident ethnic politicians and army
officers joined in resisting central authority and even
engaged
in armed rebellions, such as those occurring in 1950,
1956, and
1958-59
(see Independence: The First Phases, 1950-65
, ch.
1).
Sukarno assumed an extraconstitutional position from which
he
wielded paramount authority in imposing his concept of
Guided
Democracy in 1959. This move was backed by the senior
military
leaders whose revolutionary experiences had already made
them
suspicious, even contemptuous, of civilian politicians,
and who
were now dismayed by the disintegrative forces at work in
the
nation. The military moved to the political forefront,
where they
remained in 1992.
Sukarno sought to legitimize his authority by returning
to
the 1945 constitution. He would have preferred to
accomplish this
goal constitutionally by having the 402-member Constituent
Assembly formally adopt the 1945 constitution. However,
the
Constituent Assembly, elected in 1955 and divided along
secular
and religious lines, could not muster the required
two-thirds
majority necessary to approve new constitutional
provisions.
According to political scientist Daniel S. Lev, the body
deadlocked on two fundamental issues: the role of Islam in
the
state and the question of federalism. Furthermore,
division on
these issues meant that ideological consensus among the
anticommunist parties could not be translated into
effective
political cooperation. As long as the Constituent Assembly
failed
to agree on a new constitutional form, the interim
constitution
with its weak presidency continued in force. Backed by
ABRI and a
large part of the public, which was impatient with the
political
impasse and failure to implement the promises of
independence,
Sukarno decreed on July 5, 1959, the dissolution of the
Constituent Assembly and the return to the 1945
constitution.
Martial law had already been proclaimed on March 14, 1957,
and
Sukarno claimed that under martial law his legal authority
stemmed from his position as supreme commander of ABRI.
As a provisional legal framework for a modern state,
the 1945
constitution has proved to be extremely elastic, subject
to broad
interpretation depending upon the constellation of
political
forces in control at any given time. Other than outlining
the
major state structures, the document contains few
specifics about
relations between the citizen and the government, and
leaves open
basic questions about rights and responsibilities of
citizen and
state
(see The Structure of Government
, this ch.). For
example,
Article 29 states that "Freedom of assembly and the right
to form
unions, freedom of speech and of the press, and similar
freedoms
shall be provided by law." Subsequent laws enacted,
however, did
not fully carry out the fundamental rights of the
individual
citizen stipulated by the constitution. On the other hand,
the
document is an expression of revolutionary expectations
about
social and economic justice. Article 33 states that the
economy
shall be organized cooperatively, that important branches
of
production affecting the lives of most people shall be
controlled
by the state, and that the state shall control natural
resources
for exploitation for the general welfare of the people.
The political struggle from 1945 to 1959 over the
constitutional framework of the state stemmed not from the
ambiguities of the 1945 document or its heavy weighing of
executive power, but over deep disagreements about the
nature of
the state itself, particularly the issue of federalism and
the
role of Islam. Once the common battle against Dutch
imperialism
had been won, the passionate differences dividing various
nationalist groups about the future of Indonesia surfaced.
The
possibility of a federation of loosely knit regions was
denied by
the use of force--first in the crushing of the Republic of
South
Maluku (RMS) in 1950 and then the Revolutionary Government
of the
Indonesian Republic (PRRI)--Universal Struggle Charter
(Permesta)
regional rebellions of 1957 to 1962. Although in
subsequent
decades the government was almost always sensitive to the
issue
of separatism, the existence of a unitary republic,
expressed
through a primary "Indonesian" national identity, seemed
secure.
However, the difficulty of integrating an Islamic
political
identity with the Indonesian Pancasila identity remained
in force
in the early 1990s
(see Pancasila: The State Ideology
, this ch.).
Data as of November 1992
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