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Indonesia Pancasila: The State Ideology
In its preamble, the 1945 constitution sets forth the
Pancasila as the embodiment of basic principles of an
independent
Indonesian state. These five principles were announced by
Sukarno
in a speech known as "The Birth of the Pancasila," which
he gave
to the Independence Preparatory Committee on June 1, 1945.
In
brief, and in the order given in the constitution, the
Pancasila
principles are: belief in one supreme God;
humanitarianism;
nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia;
consultative
democracy; and social justice. Sukarno's statement of the
Pancasila, while simple in form, resulted from a complex
and
sophisticated appreciation of the ideological needs of the
new
nation. In contrast to Muslim nationalists who insisted on
an
Islamic identity for the new state, the framers of the
Pancasila
insisted on a culturally neutral identity, compatible with
democratic or Marxist ideologies, and overarching the vast
cultural differences of the heterogeneous population. Like
the
national language--
Bahasa Indonesia (see Glossary)--which
Sukarno
also promoted, the Pancasila did not come from any
particular
ethnic group and was intended to define the basic values
for an
"Indonesian" political culture.
While the Pancasila has its modern aspect, Sukarno
presented
it in terms of a traditional Indonesian society in which
the
nation parallels an idealized village in which society is
egalitarian, the economy is organized on the basis of
mutual
self-help (gotong royong), and decision making is
by
consensus (musyawarah-mufakat). In Sukarno's
version of
the Pancasila, political and social dissidence constituted
deviant behavior. Suharto modified this view, to the
extent that
one of the criticisms of his version of the Pancasila was
that he
tried to Javanize it by asserting that the fundamental
building
block of the Pancasila was the ilmu kasunyatan
(highest
wisdom) that comes from the practices of kebatinan.
One reason why both Sukarno and Suharto were successful
in
using the Pancasila to support their authority, despite
their
very different policy orientations, was the generalized
nature of
the principles of the Pancasila. The Pancasila was less
successful as a unifying concept when leadership tried to
give it
policy content. For example, in 1959 Sukarno proclaimed a
new
unity in an important slogan called Nasakom--a state
trinity of
nationalism, communism, and religion--as the revolutionary
basis
for a "just and prosperous society." To oppose the PKI,
under
this model, was to be anti-Pancasila. However, the
principal
opponent to this kind of ideological correctness was ABRI,
creating political problems for Sukarno within the
military.
Suharto, on the other hand, gained the support of the
military
because he did not require ideological conformity. ABRI,
while
not necessarily actively promoting the Pancasila, shared
rather
than contended for power. Suharto noted this cooperation
in his
National Day address of August 16, 1984, when he said that
ABRI,
with its dual function, was "a force which preserves and
continuously refreshes Pancasila democracy."
Unlike Sukarno, whose use of ideological appeals often
seemed
to be a cynical and manipulative substitute for
substantive
achievements, even at times an excuse for policy failure,
the
Suharto government sought to engage in policies and
practices
that contributed to stability and development. The 1973
reorganization of political parties--from the nine (plus
Golkar)
that contested the 1971 elections to two (plus
Golkar)--was
justified as a step in the direction of Pancasila
democracy.
Beginning in 1978, a national indoctrination program was
undertaken to inculcate Pancasila values in all citizens,
especially school children and civil servants. From an
abstract
statement of national goals, the Pancasila was now used as
an
instrument of social and political control. To oppose the
government was to oppose the Pancasila. To oppose the
Pancasila
was to oppose the foundation of the state. The effort to
force
conformity to the government's interpretation of Pancasila
ideological correctness was not without controversy. Two
issues
in particular persistently tested the limits of the
government's
tolerance of alternative or even competitive systems of
political
thought. The first issue was the position of religion,
especially
Islam; the second issue was the role of legal opposition
in
Pancasila democracy.
From the very outset of independence, Islam and the
Indonesian state had a tense political relationship
(see Islamic Political Culture
, this ch.). The Pancasila's promotion of
monotheism is a religiously neutral and tolerant statement
that
equates Islam with the other religious systems:
Christianity,
Buddhism, and Hindu-Balinese beliefs. However, the Muslim
political forces had felt betrayed since signing the 1949
Jakarta
Charter, under which they accepted a pluralist republic in
return
for agreement that the state would be based upon belief in
one
God with Muslims obligated to follow the sharia. The
government's
failure to follow through constitutionally and legally on
this
commitment set the agenda for future Islamic politics. At
the
extreme was the Darul Islam rebellion of the 1950s, that
sought
to establish a Muslim theocracy.
The New Order's emphasis on the Pancasila was viewed by
orthodox Muslim groups as an effort to subordinate Islam
to a
secular state ideology, even a "civil religion"
manipulated by a
regime inherently biased against the full expression of
Muslim
life. Indeed, in 1985 the government capped its effort to
domesticate all elements in society to the Pancasila with
legislation requiring all voluntary organizations to adopt
the
Pancasila as their sole ideological principle, and
providing for
government supervision, intervention, and, if necessary,
dissolution of organizations to guarantee compliance.
Proclaimed
as a "perfection" of Pancasila democracy, the Mass
Organizations
Law's intent went to the heart of religiously based
groups. This
decision was forced on the Muslim-oriented PPP at its 1984
national congress, which was stage-managed by the
government. For
some Muslims it was the last straw. The government's
assurance
that Muslims were not threatened by the law seemed hollow
because
the new law restricted the practices of Islam to family,
mosque,
and prayer, rather than allowing Islam to enfold the
fullness of
human activity, including politics. An environment was
exacerbated in which more radical Muslims, incited by
fiery
clerics, prepared for direct opposition, including
political
violence. The government's stern reaction to
dissidence--swift
arrest, trial for subversion, and long prison terms--soon
inhibited any open public interest in confrontation.
On the other hand, by the 1980s, within the legal and
politically acceptable boundaries of Muslim involvement,
the
state had become a major promoter of Islamic institutions.
The
government even subsidized numerous Muslim community
activities.
Within the overall value structure of the Pancasila,
Islamic
moral teaching and personal codes of conduct balanced the
materialism inherent in secular economic development.
Suharto
himself went to great lengths to demonstrate that he was a
good
Muslim, including making the hajj to Mecca in May 1991. In
August
1991, he pledged Rp3 billion (US$1.53 million; for value
of the
rupiah--see Glossary)
to a new Islamic bank (Bank Muamalat
Indonesia) and declared he would encourage other wealthy
Muslims
to contribute. By wooing Islamic leaders and teachers, the
state
won broad support for its developmental policies. There is
no
question but that Islam was a state-favored religion in
Indonesia, but it was not a state religion. Nor, if the
New Order
prevails over the long term, will it be. That reality
defined the
most critical political issue for many orthodox Muslims.
Moreover, the question remained how opposition--religious
or
secular--could legally be expressed in the workings of
Pancasila
democracy.
Data as of November 1992
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