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Indonesia THE POLITICAL DEBATE
Since independence was declared in 1945, Indonesia has
been a
magnet for students of comparative politics as well as
foreign
diplomats and policy makers. Fascination with Indonesia
stemmed
in part from its population size (estimated to reach more
than
210 million population by the year 2000), its strategic
location,
its economic potential, its great cultural and ethnic
diversity,
and its fragmented archipelagic shape confounding
centralized
administration. Equally compelling was Indonesia's
tumultuous
political history, from Indianization and Islamization to
Dutch
colonialism and the violence of the decolonization
process.
Contemporary Indonesian political history can be
segmented
into three periods, each defined by a central issue.
First,
during the 1950s, there was the question of the political
integrity of the state itself, beset as it was by
religious,
regionalist, and ethnic revolts and rebellions. Second,
and of
great concern to United States policy makers, there was
the drift
that became a rush to the left and the PKI during the
period of
Sukarno's Guided Democracy (1959-65). Finally, since 1966,
there
was the continuing authoritarianism of Suharto's
army-dominated
New Order. A critical concern of many foreign policy
observers on
the international scene was Indonesia's failure or
unwillingness
to embrace liberal democracy either structurally or
procedurally.
This concern has led to sometimes heated debates among
policy
analysts about the nature of the Indonesian state and
political
system.
Some observers condemned the Indonesian government for
its
authoritarianism, corruption, human- and civil-rights
violations,
and ethnic suppression. Such criticisms were frequently
leveled
by Western academics, human rights advocates, and
journalists. To
the contrary, other observers argued that: the Suharto
government
enjoyed the support of a majority of Indonesians; that as
the New
Order had become institutionalized, its roles and
structures
would survive Suharto's presidency; and that there was no
real
alternative leadership. In the view of these observers,
the
apparent inconsistency between the image of a repressive
regime
and its success in gaining popular acceptance was
explained by
the simple fact that the Suharto government delivered on
its
economic promises. Some observers argued that real
economic
growth and its "trickle down" impact in improving the
standard of
living of many Indonesians offset grievances about a
closed
political system. As a result, these analysts described
the New
Order's economic success as a direct challenge to
conventional
Western developmentalist theory that economic growth could
only
occur simultaneously with democratization. In fact, in
Indonesia's case, economic development and widespread
increases
in the nation's standard of living consolidated the
support of a
government that was viewed as fundamentally undemocratic
(see The Politics of Economic Reform
, ch. 3). At the same time,
most
observers agreed that the complexity, the number, and the
interdependence of various social, cultural, economic, and
political factors are so great that no single answer
suffices.
Given the background of Suharto's ascent to power and
the
ultimate coercive authority of ABRI behind the New Order,
many
observers attributed the government's ability to sustain
popular
support to the role of the military in Indonesia. In fact,
the
dominance of the military in Indonesian politics was
apparent
early in postindependence Indonesia. By 1958 army chief of
staff
General Abdul Haris Nasution had enunciated a policy that
he
called the "middle way." According to this strategy,
military
officers participated in the affairs of government. By
1965 this
policy had expanded into the notion of dwifungsi,
or dual
function, according to which the military had two roles: a
traditional defense and security role and a new social and
national development role
(see The Armed Forces in the National Life
, ch. 5). Despite misgivings from some civilian
quarters,
dwifungsi became law in 1982, constitutionally
legitimizing what had been military ideology.
Thus, because Indonesia in the early 1990s was and had
been
since 1966 a military-dominated system, many observers
considered
discussion of the military's role integral to the debate
on
Indonesia's government and politics. Furthermore, these
analysts
called for a more sophisticated level of discussion than
one
based on concepts such as military dictatorship or
military
oligarchy. At one time, the "bureaucratic polity" model
was
popular among scholars as a way of describing the role of
Indonesia's armed forces. "Bureaucratic polity" defines a
system
in which a limited group of senior bureaucrats,
technocrats, and
military officers participate in authoritative decision
making.
The policy outcome tends to reflect the interests and
values of
this relatively closed elite group. According to this
view,
competition for real political power in Jakarta was
restricted to
the top bureaucratic and military echelons. The value of
the
"bureaucratic polity" model lessened, however, as
nonbureaucratic
classes, structures, and decision centers emerged in the
developmental process and began articulating autonomous
interests. The "political economy" model came to seem more
relevant to discussions of the Indonesian political system
because it relied on crucial linkages among the state,
economy,
and society. This emphasis reflected more accurately, in
the view
of many observers, the congruence of economic interests
between
Indonesia's ruling and entrepreneurial elites, in both
equity
sharing and corruption. In addition, an in-depth
understanding of
the Indonesian political system during the early 1990s
required
the understanding of the ethnic dimension, that is the
role of
Chinese Indonesians in the political economy.
The authoritarian aspects of the Indonesian state
provoked
the most nuanced debate among scholars, who used numerous
models
to explain its political system. Some Western scholars
termed
Indonesia's political system "soft authoritarianism" to
distinguish it from overtly repressive regimes. Soft
authoritarianism implied the existence of an
institution-building
ruling elite that, although limiting choices that might
challenge
its control over the nation's social, political, and
economic
resources, was still committed to bettering the life of
its
citizens. Only the most adamant critics have argued that
the
Suharto government ruled by fear and terror. What was it,
then,
these scholars asked, that has allowed a military
countercoup to
evolve into institutionalized "soft authoritarianism"? One
explanation framed Indonesian authoritarianism in terms of
"corporatism," that is, the funneling of political forces
and
interests into government-sponsored and -controlled
organizations. Under this theory, Golkar, the government's
political base that attracts mass support, was seen as an
example
of "corporatist" politics. Similarly, the All Indonesian
Workers
Union (SPSI) in 1992 was a government-controlled umbrella
under
which the trade union movement became centralized. Even
the media
had a responsibility to promote national goals.
Another scholarly approach cast contemporary Indonesian
"authoritarianism" into a historical mold, fitting it
squarely
into the indigenous pattern of patrimonial politics:
Suharto as a
Javanese king. Proponents of this approach speculated that
these
patrimonial tendencies grew stronger in the colonial
period and
were replicated in the modern state
(see Colonial Economy and Society, 1870-1940
, ch. 1). Whatever the approach used to
describe and analyze Indonesian government and politics,
in the
1990s it required an understanding of the legal basis and
institutional structures of the system.
Data as of November 1992
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