|
Indonesia East Timor
East Timor, the former Portuguese Timor, was
incorporated
into the Republic of Indonesia in 1976 as Timor Timur
Province,
although Portugal never recognized what it saw as the
forcible
annexation of its former territory. This incorporation
followed
Indonesian armed intervention in December 1975 in a
reaction to a
chaotic decolonization process and the declaration of the
Democratic Republic of East Timor in November 1975 that
had led
to civil war. From Jakarta's point of view, this state of
affairs
held out the alarming prospect of a communist or radical
socialist regime emerging under the leadership of the
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
(Fretilin--see Glossary).
Moreover, Fretilin's rhetorical invocation of
kinship
with other Third World communist revolutionary movements
raised
the specter of a national security threat. Jakarta
formalized its
takeover of East Timor in July 1976 after the
Indonesia-sponsored
People's Representative Council requested that East Timor
be
integrated into Indonesia as a province. The human cost of
the
civil war--Indonesian military actions and the famine that
followed--was heavy. Estimates of Timorese deaths because
of the
conflict between 1975 and 1979 range from 100,000 to
250,000. The
ability of Fretilin to mount a low-intensity resistance,
the
draconian countermeasures adopted by Indonesian military
forces
against suspected Fretilin sympathizers, and charges of
Indonesian aggression against East Timor combined to make
the
problem of the status of East Timor a continuing foreign
policy
problem for Indonesia in the early 1990s. For many
individuals
and nongovernmental organizations, as well as for some
foreign
governments, Indonesian policy in East Timor became the
touchstone for negative attitudes toward the Suharto
government.
Internally, however, Indonesia considered East Timor an
integral
part of the unitary state, a status that, despite foreign
criticism, was non-negotiable.
On paper, East Timor in 1992 conformed administratively
to
the general Indonesian pattern. In fact, however, de facto
military rule existed. For ten years, Jakarta-appointed
governor
Mario Carrascalão, a Timorese committed to integration,
sought to
moderate interethnic conflict and resolve intra-Timorese
divisions among indigenous political parties. Carrascalão
called
upon the Timorese people to understand that there were
only three
political groupings in Indonesia: Golkar, PPP, and PDI.
Although
the central government invested heavily in Timor's
development
with more Inpres funds per capita than any other province,
resentment of Indonesian rule persisted and was growing in
the
early 1990s. The problem of integration in Timor was
similar to
that of Irian Jaya: the imposition of Indonesian political
culture on a resistant population. Although Indonesian
officials
insisted that opposition to Jakarta's rule was confined to
Fretilin hardliners, other forces were at work in ways
that
aggravated a sensitive political environment. The Roman
Catholic
Church staunchly defended the Christian identity of the
Timorese
in the face of an influx of Indonesians from other
provinces. The
church worried about the government's condoning, to the
point of
encouraging, Islamic proselytization, and about its own
freedom
of action in a national political system disciplined to
Pancasila
democracy. Pope John Paul II's four-hour stopover in Dili,
the
capital of East Timor, on October 12, 1989, called
international
attention to the church's extraordinary position in the
province.
The disruption of traditional and Portuguese institutions,
as
well as forced resettlement of segments of the population,
led to
land disputes, official corruption, and economic
exploitation by
non-Timorese Indonesians attracted to the province. These
grievances were exacerbated by a heavy-handed military
presence
not always respectful of Timorese rights. One consequence
of
Indonesian rule was the spread of literacy and skills
acquisition
by a younger generation of Timorese who were faced with
growing
unemployment but who also were politically conscious. It
was the
emerging militancy of the East Timorese youth, rather than
the
scattered Fretilin elements, that seemed to pose the
greatest
challenge to security and stability in the province in the
early
1990s.
Indonesian officials who were aware that on a per
capita
basis East Timor had received a disproportionate share of
developmental funds interpreted Timorese resentments as
ingratitude. Nevertheless, the combination of military
pressure
and economic and social development programs had
progressed to
the point that on January 1, 1989, East Timor was
proclaimed an
open province to which travel and tourism were permitted
on the
same basis as elsewhere in Indonesia. Some tensions
followed a
minor demonstration during the pope's visit, but a
reshuffling of
the lines of military command and a more determined effort
by the
new military leadership in the province to improve
civil-military
relations were expected to ease tensions even further.
These
hopes were dashed on November 12, 1991, when troops fired
on
youthful marchers in a funeral procession that had become
a proFretilin political demonstration in Dili. At least 50 and
perhaps
more than 100 people were killed.
The National Investigation Commission appointed by
Suharto
found the army guilty of "excessive force" and poor
discipline in
crowd control. The senior officer in East Timor, Brigadier
General Rafael S. Warouw, was replaced, as was his
superior in
Bali; three officers were dismissed from the army, and at
least
eight officers and soldiers were court-martialed. However,
the
punishments were relatively light when contrasted with the
harsh
sentences meted out to Timorese arrested as instigators of
the
incident. Nevertheless, the president's acceptance of a
report
that directly contradicted the army's contention that the
shootings had been in self-defense and his willingness to
take
action against military personnel were pragmatic decisions
that
took the risk of offending ABRI members who preferred
solidarity.
The central government's main concern seemed to be to
contain the
international criticism of what some foreign observers
called the
Dili Massacre.
The November 12 affair confirmed that there were still
strong
social and political problems in East Timor. It also
raised
questions as to the relative efficacy of the differing
military
approaches. Some officers felt that the relative tolerance
shown
by the military to the restless youth since 1989 was too
permissive and encouraged opposition. The Dili affair also
pointed out the strong emotions on the military side,
which led
to the unauthorized presence of members of the local
military
garrison who were widely accused of misbehavior. The
investigation commission mentioned this in its official
report,
stating "another group of unorganized security personnel,
acting
outside any control or command, also fired shots and
committed
beatings, causing more casualties." Carrascalão called the
replaced Warouw the "best military commander East Timor
has ever
had." Tragic as it was, the November 12 incident prompted
both
military and civilian government agencies to conduct a
broad
review of development and security policies in East Timor
including the question of civil-military relations. In
fact,
Carrascalão's successor, Abilio Soares, was also a
civilian as
had been widely expected.
Data as of November 1992
|
