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Indonesia Political Parties
The Multiparty System
ABRI viewed the pre-1967 multiparty system as
unsatisfactory.
The army had been an ally of Sukarno in the emasculation
of
competitive party politics under Guided Democracy. In a
regime in
which consensus and mobilization of human and material
resources
for development had the highest priority, partisan
politics was
viewed as divisive and wasteful. Yet the parties, with the
notable exception of Masyumi and the PKI, had made the
transition
from the Old Order to the New Order and expected to play
an
expanded role. The Muslim political parties, in
particular, felt
they should be rewarded for enthusiastic participation in
crushing the PKI and alleged communist sympathizers in
1965. The
civilians who had thronged to alliance with ABRI under the
banners of various anti-Sukarno action groups also felt
they had
earned an autonomous stake in building Indonesia's future.
The
problem for ABRI was how to subordinate the political
party
system to the needs of unity, stability, and development
(and
implicit ABRI control). The answer was to establish a
political
structure that would be fully responsive to the interests
and
agenda of ABRI and the government. It needed to be a
structure
that would compete in elections with the regular political
parties but, as an expression of Pancasila democracy, it
would
not be a political party in the usual sense of aggregating
and
articulating interests from below.
Political party competition in Pancasila democracy in
late
twentieth-century Indonesia was conceived of in terms of
advancing the best programs and leaders to achieve the
national
goals. Opposition politics based on ideological
competition or
appeal to partisan interests growing out of social,
ethnic, or
economic cleavages had no place and, in fact, was defined
as
subversive. In Suharto's words, the adoption of the
Pancasila by
the parties "will facilitate the prevention of conflict
among
various political groups which in their efforts to attain
their
respective goals may cause clashes detrimental to national
unity
and integrity." In 1973, in order to guarantee that
disruptive
competition would not occur, the political party system
was
restructured and simplified by government fiat, forcing
the nine
existing traditional parties to regroup into two electoral
coalitions. The four Muslim parties, despite their
historical,
ideological, sectarian, and leadership differences, were
joined
together in the United Development Party (PPP), and the
Christian
and secular parties were uneasily united in the Indonesian
Democratic Party (PDI). The desired result was to further
weaken
the existing political parties. The Political Parties Bill
of
1975 completed the process of reconciling the parties to
the
requirements of Pancasila democracy.
The PPP, PDI, and the non-party Golkar became the
"three
pillars" of Pancasila democracy, the only legal
participants in
the electoral process. Other kinds of political activity
were
proclaimed illegal. The parties were placed under the
supervision
of the Department of Home Affairs, and the president was
given
the power to suspend their activity. Most importantly, the
1975
law institutionalized the concept of the rural population
as a
"floating mass," prohibiting the parties from organizing
and
mobilizing at the rice-roots level between election
campaigns.
This gave Golkar a great advantage, because government
officials
from the center to the village were members of Golkar. The
net
effect of political party legislation was to
"depoliticize" the
political parties of the 1945-65 period.
From the government's point of view, political parties
were
not considered vital elements in a continuous critical
political
process but structures that would function episodically
every
five years in "Festivals of Democracy" designed to promote
the
government's legitimacy. Golkar's crushing victory in the
1971
elections put an end to any expectation that meaningful
multiparty politics could be resurrected in Indonesia. By
maintaining a highly disciplined party system, the
government
provided a limited sense of public access and
participation in a
political system that was, at its core, military in
inspiration.
More narrowly, the party system allowed for the cooptation
of the
civilian leaderships of the old political parties into the
New
Order plan in a nonthreatening way. Although the
politicians may
have chafed under the restrictions, they at least were
part of
the process. Also, the continued existence of the
political
parties and elections contributed to the regime's
international
reputation, particular after the harrowing trauma of its
violent
birth
(see The Coup and Its Aftermath
, ch. 1). Finally,
parties
performed a useful "feedback" function. This role was
particularly true with respect to the Islamic parties
grouped in
PPP, who gave voice to issues close to Islamic values. For
example, the 1973 Marriage Bill as originally drafted
would have
legalized all civil marriages. However, due to Islamic
concerns
the law was eventually amended to legitimate marriages
made
according to the laws of respective religions. Still, the
government did not always heed the alarm raised by Islamic
outrage. Football pools (known as porkas from the
English
"forecast") were introduced in December 1985 to support
national
sports programs; the porkas were denounced by
Muslims as a
violation of the Islamic law against gambling. The
opponents of
porkas added a social dimension to the criticism by
pointing out that the players were those Indonesians who
could
least afford to gamble. Unmoved by the opposition, the
government
allowed the lottery to continue as of 1992.
Data as of November 1992
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