Indonesia THE MEDIA
The main assembly hall of the Indonesian parliament, a
notable example of modern Indonesian architecture
Courtesy Garuda Indonesia
At the fortieth anniversary of the Indonesian
Journalists
Association in 1986, Suharto congratulated the media for
their
commitment to the Pancasila. It was a commitment that was
grudging. Article 29 of the constitution states that
freedom of
the press shall be provided by law. Indonesian press laws
made
controlling the media an instrument in the government's
strategy
of stability and development. Thus, the notion of a "free
press,"
let alone an opposition press, contradicted the
government's need
to control the flow of information. The acronym
SARA--suku
(ethnicity), agama (religion), ras (race),
and
antargolongan (social relations)--listed the
prohibited
subjects, to which could be added less than adulatory
references
to the president and his family. Moreover, the government
had at
its disposal an enormous information machine consisting of
state
television, radio, news service, subsidized journals, and
the
Department of Information's nationwide public relations
operation
(see Post and Telecommunications
, ch. 3). The government
also
could limit the content of the nonofficial media through a
variety of restraints, most drastically the revocation of
a
paper's publishing enterprise license, which effectively
shut it
down. Press Law Number 21 of 1982 specifies the duty of
the press
as "strengthening national unity and cohesion, deepening
national
responsibility and discipline, helping to raise the
intelligence
of the nation and invigorating people's participation in
development." According to Minister of Information Harmoko
in
1983, a publishing enterprise license would be lifted only
"when
the press is not in line with the philosophy of the nation
and
the state." This conditional threat led to a form of selfcensorship on the part of editors and publishers as they
tested
the limits of government sensitivity. These sensitivities
were
made known in consultations with senior officials on how
to treat
stories.
Newspapers occasionally stepped out of bounds and, if
they
did not heed stern warnings, were banned for varying
periods of
time. For example, Sinar Harapan (Ray of Hope)--a
Protestant and non-Javanese-edited, mass circulation
(220,340)
daily--was closed in October 1986 for economic reporting
that
Harmoko claimed "brought about an atmosphere of gloom,
confusion,
and unease in society." Not mentioned in the termination
notice
was the fact that Sinar Harapan had been in the
forefront
of discussions on presidential term limitations. The ban
seemed
intended to have a self-censoring effect on the rest of
the
media. The lively daily Prioritas (Priority) was
shut down
in June 1987. The official tone was set by a commentary in
the
Angkatan Bersenjata (Armed Forces Daily) edition of
October 14, 1986, that said the government was prepared to
sacrifice any newspaper deemed to have jeopardized the
national
interest. The old Sinar Harapan was allowed to
reemerge in
1987 under a new name--Suara Pembaruan (Voice of
Renewal)-
-and, more importantly, with a new editorial board more
responsive to government concerns.
The effort to control media flow was not limited to the
press
in the early 1990s. Motion pictures had been censored
since the
colonial era and continued to be censored during the
Sukarno and
Suharto administrations. Prominent literary figures, such
as the
internationally recognized novelist Pramudya Ananta Tur
and poet
and dramatist Willibrordus S. Rendra, had their works
banned
although both read their writings in public. Nor were
foreign
publications immune. There was periodic banning of certain
editions or particular articles deemed offensive in
publications
such as the Asian Wall Street Journal, the Far
Eastern
Economic Review, and Time. Visa regulation of
journalists was another way the government sought to limit
foreign reporting. By threatening work visa status checks
on
foreign journalists, the government hoped that voluntary
selfcensorship would follow. Another way of controlling the
media was
to simply bar access. Australian journalists in particular
were
targeted because of their unfavorable reporting on East
Timor.
Censorship also extended to foreign books such as one by
David
Jenkins on the New Order's military and Richard Robison's
study
of its political economy--both deemed critical by Jakarta.
But in
Indonesia, as in other countries where the media were
tightly
controlled, the photocopy machine and the ubiquity of
foreign
radio and television news conspired to defeat censorship.
The inherent contradiction between media control as the
Department of Information usually applied it and the
emphasis on
keterbukaan since the late 1980s came to a head in
October
1990 when the mass circulation (700,000) tabloid weekly
Monitor had its publishing enterprise license
lifted. The
Monitor's mistake was to publish the outcome of a
reader
popularity poll that listed the Prophet Muhammad behind
Suharto,
Sukarno, and Iraqi president Saddam Husayn. Enraged Muslim
youths
stormed the Monitor's office, and Harmoko put it
out of
business, claiming the poll had caused religious
dissension, that
is, had violated the agama taboo. Many people,
including
the founders of the Democracy Forum, saw the closing of
the
Monitor as a repressive response to religious
pressure and
sectarian bias in a pluralistic society. Editor Arswendo
Atmowiloto was convicted of blasphemy and given the
maximum fiveyear prison sentence. Speaking of the stimulus that the
Monitor case had given the formation of the
Democracy
Forum, forum chairman Abdurrahman Wahid said, "Without
[it],
maybe it would have taken another couple of years."
The contradiction between media restraint and
keterbukaan was also taken up by the more assertive
DPR.
In May 1991, its deputy speaker called for an easing of
press
controls. Defending his record before a DPR commission,
Harmoko
replied that the government never acted rashly in revoking
a
paper's right to publish and that a press that shunned
"radicalism, liberalism, and communism" need have no
fears. As
the Jakarta Post said in a June 27, 1991, editorial
about
the DPR debate over the press, "there are so many people
who talk
about responsibility but very few who talk about freedom."
The
government's bending to Muslim outrage over the
Monitor
affair, despite purported support of keterbukaan,
revealed
its nervous awareness of the potential political force
mainstream
Islam could be even if denied traditional political party
platforms.
Data as of November 1992
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