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Indonesia Elections
When Indonesians went to the polls every five years to
elect
members of the DPR, it was not with the expectation that
in
casting a vote they could effect any real changes in the
way
Indonesia was governed. The system was not designed for
opposition. The PDI and PPP did not present competitively
alternative platforms to Golkar's government platform. The
parties' candidate lists were screened and individual
candidates
approved by the government. For the 1992 elections, 2,283
candidates were on the lists for the 400 seats at stake.
The elector did not vote for a particular candidate but
for
the party, which if it won would designate the
representative
from the party's list. The elections were organized by the
government-appointed election commission headed by the
minister
of home affairs. All campaigns were conducted in the
framework of
Pancasila democracy, which meant that in the
twenty-five-day
campaign period, reduced in 1987 from forty-five days,
government
policy and programs could be criticized only warily and
indirectly, and the president could not be criticized at
all.
Strict campaign rules applied. For the 1992 election,
automobile
rallies and picture posters of political leaders were
banned. No
PDI posters of Sukarno, for example, were allowed. Large
outdoor
rallies were discouraged, which meant that acts of
violence and
rowdyism by youthful participants in the "Festival of
Democracy"
decreased in 1992. Radio and television appeals had to be
approved in advance by the elections commission. There was
no
campaigning at all in the five days before the elections.
Even if
there had been fewer constraints on campaign freedoms, the
results in terms of structural impact on the functioning
of the
government would not be much greater than those engendered
by the
large number of appointed members of the DPR and the
minority
position of the elected members of the DPR in the MPR.
Even so, elections did matter. They were one of the
elements
in the institutionalization of the New Order system. It
was
estimated that 111 million Indonesians were eligible to
vote in
1992. Giving the broad population a sense of participation
contributed to regime legitimacy. The elections also
provided, to
some degree, a channel of public opinion feedback to the
government. Finally, the election process helped to
mobilize the
public to support government policy. The feedback and
mobilization function of the electoral process was
becoming more
important as the number of voters who had no direct memory
of
pre-Suharto Indonesia increased. The 1992 election saw 17
million
first-time voters.
During the first twenty-five years of New Order
government,
there were five national elections (see
table 28,
Appendix). The
1971 election was Indonesia's second general election
since
independence and the first since 1955. (Provincial
elections were
held in 1957.) Golkar and nine other parties ran, compared
with
twenty-eight parties in 1955. The outcome was predictable
given
the rules of the game and the resources available to the
government supporters. Golkar won more than 62 percent of
the
vote. The four Islamic parties shared 27.1 percent of the
total,
led by Nahdatul Ulama's 18.7 percent. The remaining 10.1
percent
of the total was scattered among the other five parties.
Not surprisingly, Golkar dominated every successive
election.
In 1977 the second DPR election saw the field of parties
reduced
to three as a result of the 1973 party merger. The
relative
percentage of votes was not dramatically different, with
Golkar
losing less than 1 percent; the PPP gained 29.3 percent
and the
PDI, beginning its decline, fell to 8.6 percent. The size
and
loyalty of the PPP's electoral base, despite all-out
government
support for Golkar, reinforced the government's interest
in
limiting political Islam. In the 1982 elections, Golkar
won 64.3
percent of the total vote cast, trailed by the PPP's 27.8
percent
and the PDI's 7.9 percent. Golkar swept twenty-six of the
twentyseven provinces and regions, losing only strongly Islamic
Aceh to
the PPP. The victory was made sweeter for Golkar by its
recapturing the electoral edge in Jakarta from the PPP,
which had
won the district in the 1977 elections. In the 1987
elections,
Golkar won in a landslide, crushing the opposition parties
with
more than 73 percent of the vote to the PPP's 16 percent
and the
PDI's 10.9 percent. Golkar's victory led to fears that
Indonesia
had become a de facto single-party state. Golkar even
triumphed
in Aceh with a 52 percent majority. The precipitous (40
percent)
drop between 1982 and 1987 in the PPP's vote total can be
attributed largely to the 1984 decision by Nahdatul Ulama,
the
PPP's largest component, to withdraw from organized
competitive
politics. Analysis of the election returns showed that
many of
the former Nahdatul Ulama votes for the PPP went to Golkar
in a
demonstration of both Nahdatul Ulama's ability to deliver
its
constituents and a guarantee of continued government favor
to
Nahdatul Ulama's institutions and programs.
The June 9, 1992, election had no surprises. In a calm
and
orderly atmosphere, more than 97 million Indonesians
voted, 90
percent of the 108 million registered voters. Golkar won
68
percent of the popular vote, down by 5 percent from 1987,
but
nevertheless very satisfactory for the government. Golkar
support
ranged from a high of more than 90 percent in Jambi,
Lampung, and
Nusa Tenggara Timur provinces to Jakarta's 52 percent. The
PPP
held its own with 17 percent of the vote and, at least in
the
official final tally, actually ran ahead of the PDI in
Jakarta
with 24.5 percent of the vote to the PDI's 23.1 percent.
The
support for the PDI, the closest to a "democratic
opposition"
party, jumped from 10.9 percent in 1987 to 15 percent.
These
figures translated into 281 DPR seats for Golkar (down 18
seats
from 1987), 63 for PPP (down 2 seats), and 56 for the PDI
(an
increase of 16 seats).
The outcome of the 1992 election led to some cautious
conclusions. The election was "routine" because the
earlier
polarizing issues of Pancasila democracy had already been
firmly
resolved to the government's advantage. Since the stakes
seemed
even lower than in previous elections, there was a lack of
political passion on all sides. The decline in the Golkar
percentage may be partially attributed to ABRI's
distancing
itself from active intervention on behalf of Golkar as a
sign
that it should not be taken for granted. It did not appear
that
Suharto's campaign to woo the Muslims had an appreciable
electoral result. The PDI apparently won the largest
number of
first-time voters. Its rallies attracted a youthful crowd,
many
under voting age, and suggested that a basis did exist for
future
increases in voter support. Golkar won slightly more than
61
percent of the total number of votes cast on Java, where
nearly
two-thirds of the voters resided. That meant that about
four out
of ten voters at the country's core were in opposition.
Nevertheless, that Golkar increased its vote in Jakarta by
4
percent over 1987 despite an aggressive PDI campaign
directed at
the urban crowd, suggested that Golkar's appeal to
stability,
security, and development--the political status quo--was
powerful
even without other electoral advantages of the ruling
party.
Data as of November 1992
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