|
Iran
POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS
The Revolution of 1979 brought about a fundamental change in
Iranian attitudes toward politics. Under the monarchy the political
culture had been elitist in the sense that all major governmental
decisions were made by the shah and his ministers. Most of the
population acquiesced in this approach to politics. The fusion
of traditional Shia Islamic ideals with political values during
the Revolution resulted in the emergence of a populist political
culture. The principal characteristics of this political culture
are pervasive feelings that the government is obligated to ensure
social justice and that every citizen should participate in politics.
These feelings are acknowledged by the political leadership, which
constantly expresses its concern for the welfare of the mostazafin
(disinherited) and persistently praises the people's work in a
host of political and religious associations.
The transformation of the political culture owed much to the
charisma of Khomeini. He was determined not simply to overthrow
the monarchy but also to replace it with a new society that derived
its values from Islam. Khomeini believed that the long-term success
of such an ideal Islamic government was dependent on the commitment
and involvement of the masses. He envisaged the clergy as responsible
for providing religious guidance, based on their expertise in
Islamic law, to the people as they worked to create a new society
in which religion and politics were fused. Khomeini's reputation
for piety, learning, and personal integrity, as well as his forceful
personality, have been important factors in the mobilization of
thousands of committed followers to carry out the desecularization
of the country's political institutions.
Mass political involvement has been both an objective and a characteristic
of postrevolutionary Iran. Political participation, however, is
not through political parties but through religious institutions.
The mosque has become the single most important popular political
institution. Participation in weekly congregational prayers, at
which a political sermon is always delivered, is considered both
a religious and a civic duty. For political aspirants, attendance
at the weekly prayers is mandatory. Numerous religiopolitical
associations are centered on the mosques. These organizations
undertake a wide variety of activities, such as distributing ration
coupons, investigating the religious credentials of aspirants
for local offices, conducting classes in subjects ranging from
the study of Arabic to superpower imperialism, and setting up
teams to monitor shop prices and personal behavior. These organizations
tend to be voluntary associations whose members devote several
hours per week to their activities. Although most of these voluntary
associations are for men, several are specifically for women.
Religious, rather than secular, organizations thus have the most
important political roles. Factories, schools, and offices also
have Islamic associations that undertake functions similar to
those of the mosque voluntary associations. Although many secular
groups exist, the majority of such associations as industrial
and professional unions, university clubs, and mercantile organizations
have acquired religious overtones. These private organizations
generally have religious advisers who provide guidance to members
on prayer ritual, Islamic law, and Shia history. Associations
that try to avoid mixing religion with business are suspected
of being anti-Islamic and risk having their articles of incorporation
revoked.
The Iranians who accept the dominant role of religion refer to
themselves as hezbollahis. They tend to be fervent both
in their profession of religious belief and in their loyalty to
the Islamic Republic. Self-identified hezbollahis join
the numerous mosque-related voluntary associations, the Pasdaran,
and the personal staffs of the leading ayatollahs. Given their
strong commitment to the regime, it was inevitable that hezbollahis
would resent those whom they perceived as critical of the government.
By 1987, however, it was still not possible, owing to the lack
of field research in Iran from the time of the Revolution, to
estimate what percent of the adult population considered themselves
true hezbollahis, what percent was generally indifferent
and simply acquiesced to regime policies, or what percent strongly
disapproved of the government.
Data as of December 1987
|
