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Iran
Internal Security in the 1970s
The Pahlavi regime identified the Fadayan, the Tudeh, and several
ethnic groups as opponents to the shah's rule. To meet their rising
challenge, the shah relied on security forces whose agents infiltrated
many underground organizations. By early 1970, a sophisticated
intelligence-gathering system was in place, reporting all currents
of political dissent directly to the monarch.
In 1970 opposition forces took the initiative by launching a
terrorist campaign against the regime. At the time, this was perceived
as a nuisance and an embarrassment to the shah, because the monarchy
was not "threatened." Nevertheless, opposition to the shah grew
stronger when the monarch authorized unrelenting punishment of
those accused of security violations. Hundreds of young Iranians
were arrested, tried, and sentenced. Many were tortured and some
executed for their unwavering opposition. In 1976 opposition forces
clashed with the police in a series of gun battles that mobilized
thousands in the streets of Tehran. With heightened visibility,
terrorist groups mounted successful attacks on police posts, further
threatening the regime's hold on internal security. By 1978 organized
opposition to the monarchy reached a high point with ideologically
incompatible groups joining in efforts to overthrow the shah.
Leftist guerrillas joined student and religious organizations
in calling for political change.
The two most important leftist guerrilla groups operating in
Iran in 1978 were the Mojahedin and the Fadayan (see Antiregime
Opposition Groups , this ch.). The Mojahedin had changed its name
at least three times since its formation in 1960 under the name
of Nehzat-e Azadi-yi Iran, or the Iran Freedom Movement (IFM).
Although it was not formally a religious party, its rank-and-file
membership was religiously oriented, a fact that helped mobilize
clerical support in 1978. Unlike the clerical forces, however,
the Mojahedin and the Fadayan conducted a systematic assassination
campaign in 1977 and 1978 against Iranian security officials and
United States military and defense-related personnel stationed
in Tehran. The shah was also a target, as evidenced by periodic
uncoverings of assassination plots. This wave of violence was
met by an equally strong and determined campaign of arrests and
executions. Iranian students abroad also became part of a cycle
of action and counteraction: in the United States and Western
Europe, students who protested against the shah were kept under
surveillance so that punitive action could later be taken against
them. In addition, the Mojahedin and the Fadayan conducted a propaganda
campaign in support of "the Iranian armed struggle" and against
the shah, SAVAK (see SAVAK , this ch.), and what was termed "institutionalized
repression in Iran."
Within Iran's borders, stiff government security measures notwithstanding,
organized opposition was never eliminated. Although the shah had
declared illegal all opposition political parties, labor unions,
peasant organizations, and university student groups, antigovernment
sentiments remained high, especially among the clerical community.
By late 1977, student demonstrations increased in frequency, with
a vocal minority calling on Iranians to "raise their voices against
absolute rule." These protests, timed to call President Jimmy
Carter's attention to the human rights situation in Iran, resulted
in the arrest of hundreds of demonstrators, many of whom were
allegedly tortured by SAVAK forces.
In January 1978, conservative religious students demonstrated
in the holy city of Qom to express the long-standing clerical
opposition to the shah's land reform policies, which had resulted
in the expropriation of vaqf (religious endowment) and
other lands. Religious leaders were also outraged at what they
perceived to be the shah's violations of sacred Islamic laws in
such areas as the role of women in society and the imposition
of a secular legal system that usurped clerical authority. Attempts
by the police to disperse demonstrators resulted in several deaths.
The religious leadership called for a general strike across the
country for February 18, to highlight the forty-day mourning period
for those killed in Qom. Far more serious disturbances erupted
on that day in Tabriz and Tehran, precipitating the worst riots
since 1963. After several days of widespread arson directed at
banks, movie theaters, and hotels in Tabriz, the army moved in
to restore order. Similar measures were taken in Tehran and other
major cities. According to the government 12 persons were killed
in Tabriz and 250 persons arrested. In reality, the casualty figure
was much higher and the arrests more numerous. Ironically, the
deaths presented the next opportunity for confrontation. When
demonstrators, commemorating the forty-day mourning period, defiantly
marched through the streets of Tabriz, the armed forces reacted
as expected. To protect themselves and restore order, they opened
fire, killing and injuring more civilians. The result was a sequence
of events in which the opposition, led by influential clerics,
conducted "religious commemorations," and the government interpreted
them as challenges to law and order. With neither side relenting,
the cycle of violence spread.
Observers of these tragic events pointed out that the reemergence
of large-scale protest demonstrations was only made possible because
of the shah's more liberal policies toward the nonviolent expression
of dissent. Indeed, the shah confirmed on several occasions his
commitment to more "liberal" political reforms, but at the same
time he warned that the dissident movement was "completely illegal"
and that he would "not let it get out of hand." Illegal or not,
mass protest demonstrations did get out of control when the shah
openly chastised the clerics for "destroying the country." The
shah could not end these demonstrations, which gathered more support
throughout 1978. Workers from the oil industry, heeding the call
of the religious authorities, slowly paralyzed Iran's economic
sector. It became only a matter of time before the shah lost control
over Iran's internal security.
Data as of December 1987
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