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Iran
Concept of Export of Revolution
The concept of exporting the Islamic Revolution derives from
a particular worldview that perceives Islamic revolution as the
means whereby Muslims and non-Muslims can liberate themselves
from the oppression of tyrants who serve the interests of international
imperialism. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are perceived
as the two principal imperialist powers that exploit Third World
countries. A renewed commitment to Islam, as the experience of
Iran in overthrowing the shah demonstrated, permits oppressed
nations to defeat imperialism. According to this perspective,
by following Iran's example any country can free itself from imperialist
domination.
Although the political elite agrees upon the desirability of
exporting revolution, no unanimity exists on the means of achieving
this goal. At one end of the spectrum is the view that propaganda
efforts to teach Muslims about the Iranian example is the way
to export revolution. Material assistance of any form is not necessary
because oppressed people demonstrate their readiness for Islamic
revolution by rising against dictatorial governments. Those who
subscribe to this line of reasoning argue that Iranians received
no external assistance in their Revolution but were successful
as a result of their commitment to Islam. Furthermore, they cite
Khomeini's often stated dictum that Iran has no intention of interfering
in the internal affairs of other countries. This view is compatible
with the maintenance of normal diplomatic relations between Iran
and other countries.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the view of Iran as the
vanguard of a world revolutionary movement to liberate Muslim
countries specifically, and other Third World countries generally,
from imperialist subjugation. This activist perspective contends
that the effective export of revolution must not be limited to
propaganda efforts but must also include both financial and military
assistance. Advocates of this view also cite Khomeini to justify
their position and frequently quote his statements on the inevitability
of the spread of Islamic revolution throughout the world.
Although various viewpoints fall between these two perspectives,
since 1979 the two extreme views have been in contention in the
formulation of foreign policy. In general, those who advocate
exporting revolution solely through education and example have
dominated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while those who favor
active assistance to nonstate revolutionary groups have not served
in important government positions relating to foreign policy.
Nevertheless, because the supporters of an activist approach include
some prominent political leaders, they have been able to exercise
influence over certain areas of foreign relations. This has been
especially true with respect to policy toward Lebanon and, to
a lesser degree, policy in the Persian Gulf (see Relations with
Regional Powers , this ch.).
The earliest organization promoting the active export of revolution
was Satja, established in the spring of 1979 by Mohammad Montazeri
and his close associate, Mehdi Hashemi. Satja's contacts with
numerous nonstate groups throughout the Arab Middle East soon
brought the organization into direct conflict with both the IRP
leadership and the provisional government. Ayatollah Hosain Ali
Montazeri, the father of Mohammad Montazeri, rebuked his son publicly,
saying his son had been suffering illusions since being tortured
by the former shah's secret police. Satja was forced to disband,
but Mohammad Montazeri and Hashemi then joined the Pasdaran, where
they eventually set up within that organization the Liberation
Movements Office. Mohammad Montazeri was subsequently killed in
the June 1981 bombing of the IRP headquarters that claimed the
lives of over seventy prominent politicians. Following that development,
Hashemi emerged as the principal leader of those advocating both
moral and material support for revolutionaries around the world.
Under Hashemi's direction, the Liberation Movements Office operated
autonomously of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and maintained
contact with opposition movements in several countries. Inevitably,
its goal of promoting revolution abroad conflicted with the government's
objective of normalizing relations with at least some of the governments
that the Liberation Movements Office was helping to overthrow.
Control over the direction of foreign policy was eventually resolved
in favor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1984 the Liberation
Movements Office was removed from the jurisdiction of the Pasdaran,
and its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Ministry of Information and Security. Dissatisfied
with these arrangements, Hashemi resigned from his posts and went
to Qom. There he obtained a position within the large bureaucracy
of Ayatollah Montazeri, who supervised six seminaries, several
charitable organizations, a publishing house, and numerous political
offices. Having lost none of his zeal for exporting revolution,
Hashemi succeeded in setting up the Office for Global Revolution,
which, although nominally part of Montazeri's staff, actually
operated independently. By 1986 Hashemi's activities had once
again brought him into conflict with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In October he and several of his associates were arrested, and
the Office for Global Revolution was closed. During the summer
of 1987, Hashemi and some of his colleagues were tried for "deviating
from Islam"; Hashemi was found guilty and subsequently executed.
Data as of December 1987
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