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Iran
The Impact of Casualties on Society
Iran's population, based on the preliminary results of the October
1986 census, was slightly more than 48 million, including approximately
2.6 million refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq. The population
was expected, according to United States Bureau of Census projections,
to increase to nearly 56 million in 1990 and 76 million in the
year 2000. In 1986 the 18 to 30-year-old and 31 to 45-year-old
male populations stood at about 5.2 and 3.5 million, respectively.
In the absence of reliable information on Iran's war casualties,
the significance of these figures was difficult to assess. Estimates
of war-related deaths ranged between 750,000 and 1 million. Loss
of life was especially high among the 18- to 30-year-old male
population; a generation of young and potentially productive citizens
had been cut by 15 to 20 percent, and the survivors had been physically
and mentally scarred by the war.
Casualties also affected Iran's attempts at industrial recovery.
The campaign to resuscitate steel, petrochemical, and other plants
faced critical manpower shortages, raising criticisms from the
more conservative elements in the regime. The manpower shortages
were exacerbated by the 1982 military campaigns that had mobilized
up to 1 million volunteers on more than one occasion.
Coupled with the deteriorating economic situation, the high human
cost of the abortive Iranian thrusts into Iraq in 1981 to 1983
generated war-weariness and discontent even among the regime's
staunchest supporters, the urban and lower classes. The number
of recruits dropped because of disenchantment stemming from political
divisions, which sometimes produced conflicts that turned violent
in the streets of major cities. The Khomeini regime, relying on
the total devotion of the Pasdaran and the Basij, appealed to
national and religious feelings to rekindle morale. In a series
of rulings issued in the autumn of 1982, Khomeini declared that
parental permission was unnecessary for those going to the front,
that volunteering for military duty was a religious obligation,
and that serving in the armed forces took priority over all other
forms of work or study. The government mounted a simultaneous
effort to quell demonstrations by political groups like the Mojahedin
and the Tudeh (see Internal Security , this ch.). The demise of
left-wing guerrilla organizations, however, did not reduce opposition
to the war. New elements calling for a settlement of the conflict
with Iraq emerged. Because of this opposition, former Prime Minister
Bazargan tried to negotiate an end to the war, realizing that
Iran might fall victim to its own political rigidity. For the
revolutionary regime, however, the war remained a legitimizing
tool, despite its high cost.
Data as of December 1987
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