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Iran
The Role of Minorities in Internal Security
Ethnic cooperation has been a consistent national security problem
for successive regimes throughout the twentieth century, and,
after the 1979 Revolution, the Khomeini government faced one of
its earliest challenges from Kurdish, Baluch, and Turkoman tribal
members. The Turkoman and Baluch rebellions, reminiscent of secession
attempts in the 1970s, were quickly ended. The revolutionary regime
went out of its way to accommodate opposition because it did not
want any instability to develop on the border with Soviet-occupied
Afghanistan. Tehran wanted at all costs to prevent foreign powers
from exploiting ethnic discontent in southwestern Iran. By emphasizing
shared religious and cultural values, the revolutionary government
persuaded some tribal members to accept the central authority
of Tehran, while it sought to co-opt others, such as the Turkomans
and Baluchs, by providing special economic incentives.
A more pressing ethnic challenge to the regime came from Kurdish
rebels in the northeast, who had long struggled for independence.
In several 1979 meetings, Khomeini warned key Kurdish leaders
that any attempts at dismantling Iran would be met with the harshest
response, and he sent Pasdaran units to the north, underlining
the seriousness of the government's intention. Despite these warnings,
in the spring of 1979, seizing on the turmoil of the Revolution,
the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, the Komala (Komala-ye Shureshgari-ye
Zahmat Keshan-e Kordestan-e Iran, or Komala, or Committee of the
Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kordestan) and the Kurdish branch
of the Fadayan mounted a well-organized rebellion, but the revolutionary
regime was ready.
The confrontation between Tehran and the Kurds intensified sharply
when the Iran-Iraq War broke out. It was assumed that Iraqi Kurds
and their Iranian brothers would cooperate to exploit weaknesses
on both sides. Past divisions within the Kurdish communities were
temporarily shelved in pursuit of the long-cherished goal of an
independent state. Not surprisingly, neither Baghdad nor Tehran
was willing to accept this outcome. Rather, both sides insisted
on organizing special loyalist Kurdish military units to participate
in the war and to demonstrate allegiance to their respective states.
In contrast to the Kurds, the Arab population of Khuzestan stood
firmly behind the revolutionary government. Iranian Arabs rejected
Saddam Husayn's call to "liberate Arabistan" from Persian rule
and overwhelmingly opted to remain loyal to their country. Since
1980 Khuzestan has witnessed some of the bloodiest battles in
the twentieth century, but its Arab inhabitants have not wavered
in their allegiance.
Iran regards ethnic minority challenges with apprehension. It
has taken every precaution, for example, to resist Iraqi- or Soviet-sponsored
efforts to persuade the Kurdish minority to secede from Iran.
Much as the Pahlavi regime before it had done, the revolutionary
government considered the unity of Iran vital to its national
security. The commitment to defend the entire country, with all
its ethnic groups, remained an uncompromised objective, and sensitive,
pragmatic, and political steps have been taken since 1979 to strengthen
national unity. Despite the commitment of the Khomeini regime
to the revival of the Islamic community (ummah), it,
no less than the shah's regime, sought to preserve Iran's territorial
integrity as an aspect of national security.
Of all the issues facing revolutionary Iran since 1979, none
was more serious than alleged human rights violations. Although
the trend was toward greater adherence to constitutional guarantees,
particularly after December 1982, when Khomeini issued several
directives relaxing the application of Islamic laws, Iran's human
rights record showed serious abuses. Procedural safeguards were
lacking for defendants tried in revolutionary courts, which handled
virtually all political cases. In evaluating the hundreds of executions
ordered each year, separating cases of executions for actual crimes
from executions based purely on the defendant's beliefs, statements,
or associations, was difficult, given the regime's practice of
cloaking the latter category with trumped-up charges from the
former category. Reliable statistics were not available in 1987
on the number killed for political or religious reasons under
the Khomeini regime, but the number of persons executed each year
for political reasons was high.
Amnesty International's 1986 annual report recorded an estimated
6,500 executions in Iran between February 1979 and the end of
1985; the report noted, however, that "Amnesty International believed
the true figures were much higher, as former prisoners and relatives
of prisoners consistently testified that large numbers of political
prisoners were executed in secret." These killings were largely
conducted by the government's own organizations, including the
Pasdaran and the SAVAMA.
Political opposition to the revolutionary regime was punished
in ways other than execution. Iranians listed as "killed while
resisting arrest," but actually alive and in jail, were too numerous
to count, according to Amnesty International. Torture in Iran's
prisons was rampant and covered a wide range of inhuman practices,
particularly in Tehran's notorious Evin Prison. Mock executions,
along with blindfolding and solitary confinement, were favorite
methods of torture, according to witness reports assembled by
Amnesty International. Beatings of all kinds were common, and
prisoners were regularly beaten on the soles of their feet until
they could no longer walk. Individuals also suffered damaged kidneys
as a result of being kicked and beaten.
The revolutionary prosecutors continued to revise Iran's civil
code to conform more closely with their interpretation of Islamic
law. In January 1985, for example, Tehran announced the inauguration
of a new machine for surgical amputation of the hands of convicted
thieves. As interpreted in Iran, this punishment consisted of
amputation of the four fingers of the right hand. There were subsequent
announcements of the occasional use of this device to administer
justice. Death by stoning was allegedly reinstituted as a punishment
for certain morality crimes, at least in remote areas of the country.
There were many reports of floggings, both as a means of torture
and as a formal punishment for sexual offenses.
Although the Constitution guarantees many basic human rights,
including rights related to due process (e.g., the right to be
informed in writing of charges immediately after arrest, the right
to legal counsel, the right to trial by jury in political cases),
the revolutionary court system ignored these provisions in practice
for "security reasons." When there was a formal accusation, the
charge was usually subversion, antiregime activities, or treason.
Political arrests were made by members of the Pasdaran or, less
commonly, by komiteh members. Member of the National
Police and Gendarmerie were not normally involved in arrests made
on political or moral charges. In political cases, warrants for
arrests were seldom used. Consequently, there was no judicial
determination of whether these detentions were in conformity with
Iranian law. Detainees were frequently held for long periods without
charge and in some cases were tortured. For political crimes,
no access to a lawyer was permitted; such cases were heard, if
at all, by the revolutionary judiciary, and bail was not permitted.
Religious opposition as well as political opposition has met
with severe punishment. For example, Iran's largest non-Muslim
minority, the Bahais, have suffered persecution. Charges against
Bahais were vague, but penalties were severe. As of December 1986,
767 Bahais had been imprisoned and approximately 200 Bahais had
been executed or had died following torture (see Non-Muslim Minorities
, ch. 2).
Between 1979 and 1982, these abuses of human rights were all
defended as necessary to safeguard the Revolution. Tehran launched
a systematic attack on its opponents in order to protect its own
interpretations of revolutionary norms. Since then, many revolutionary
leaders have adopted a more relaxed mood without jeopardizing
perceived internal security requirements. It remained to be seen
in late 1987 whether the revolutionary regime would be able to
maintain the internal security it felt it needed without returning
to the drastic measures characteristic of the early period of
the Revolution.
* * *
An early, albeit cursory, introduction to the Iranian armed forces
after the 1979 Revolution is William F. Hickman's Ravaged
and Reborn. Gregory F. Rose's "The Post-Revolutionary Purge
of Iran's Armed Forces: A Revisionist Assessment" and "Soldiers
of Islam: The Iranian Armed Forces since the Revolution" provide
detailed information on the purges of the military and the ensuing
reorganization. Nikola B. Schahgaldian's The Iranian Military
under the Islamic Republic is the most complete source on
the Pasdaran and Basij forces. The best source of current data
on the size, budget, and equipment inventory of the armed forces
is the annual The Military Balance, published by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies. Historical background
material is presented most completely in J.C. Hurewitz's Middle
East Politics. On the postrevolutionary period, Dilip Hiro's
Iran under the Ayatollahs and Ruhollah K. Ramazani's
Revolutionary Iran are indispensable. For the Iran-Iraq
War, Jasim M. Abdulghani's Iraq and Iran provides comprehensive
coverage of events leading up to the war. The writings of Anthony
H. Cordesman on the war itself are very valuable, as is the excellent
account in Efraim Karsh's "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis."
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Data as of December 1987
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