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Iran
Command and Control
According to Article 110 of the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the faqih (see Glossary) is empowered
to appoint and dismiss the chief of the Joint Staff, the commander
in chief of the Pasdaran, two advisers to the SDC, and the commanders
in chief of ground, naval, and air forces on the recommendation
of the SDC. He is also authorized to supervise the activities
of the SDC and to declare war and mobilize the armed forces on
the recommendation of the SDC. As faqih, Khomeini, although
maintaining the role of final arbiter, has delegated the post
of commander in chief to the president of the Republic.
In addition to specifying the duties of the commander in chief,
Article 110 establishes the composition of the SDC as follows:
president of the country, prime minister, minister of defense,
chief of the Joint Staff of the armed forces, commander in chief
of the Pasdaran, and two advisers appointed by the faqih.
Other senior officials may attend SDC meetings to deliberate national
defense issues. In the past, the minister of foreign affairs,
minister of interior, minister of the Pasdaran and his deputy,
air force and navy commanders in chief, War Information Office
director, and others have attended SDC meetings. The ground forces
commander in chief, Colonel Seyyed-Shirazi, is a member of the
SDC as a representative of the military arm for the faqih,
whereas Majlis speaker Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani
is representative of the political arm for the faqih.
Iran's strategic planning and the establishment of its military
and defense policies are the responsibilities of the SDC, which
has representatives at operational area and field headquarters
to provide political and strategic guidance to field commanders.
SDC representatives may also veto military decisions. But reports
in 1987 indicated that SDC orders to regional representatives
have been modified to limit the heavy casualty rates caused by
their inappropriate advice. Inexperienced nonmilitary religious
advisers have seen their interference in purely technical matters
dramatically curtailed.
The Urumiyeh reorganization proposals recognized the administrative
separation of the services as part of Iran's political reality.
Consequently, as of 1987 there were two chains of command below
the SDC, one administrative and the other operational. To some
extent this dual chain of command existed because the revolutionary
government had retained a modified version of the organizational
structure of the IIAF, which was modeled on the United States
division of powers between the administrative functions of the
service secretaries and the operational functions of the secretary
of defense and chiefs of staff. In addition, the IRP leaders wanted
to limit friction between the regular military and the Pasdaran.
According to Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the service commanders
in chief, the minister of defense, and the minister of the Pasdaran
were removed from the operational chain to avoid further friction
between the two groups.
In 1987 the Ministry of Defense continued to handle administrative
matters for the regular armed forces. The chain of command flowed
from senior unit commanders (division, wing, and fleet) to intermediate-echelon
service commanders and to service commanders in chief and their
staffs. Similarly, the Ministry of the Pasdaran handled the administrative
affairs of the Pasdaran. The chain of command flowed from senior
unit commanders (operational brigades in the case of combat units)
to the ministry staff officers. In the case of internal security
units, the chain of command went from local commanders to provincial
commanders (who were colonels) and then to provincial general
commanders (who were generals).
The Joint Staff of the armed forces, composed of officers assigned
from the various services, the Pasdaran, the National Police,
and the Gendarmerie, was responsible for all operational matters.
Its primary tasks included military planning and coordination
and operational control over the regular services, combat units
of the Pasdaran, and units of the Gendarmerie and National Police
assigned to the war front. Joint Staff members were also empowered
to integrate fully the regular and paramilitary forces in operational
planning. The components of the armed forces Joint Staff were
modeled on the United States joint and combined staff system.
Staff members of J1--Personnel and Administration--conducted
planning and liaison duties with their counterparts at the ministries
of defense, interior, and the Pasdaran. They also supervised budgeting
and financial accountability and the preparation of operational
budgets for Majlis approval for all the armed services.
Personnel of J2--Intelligence and Security--carried out operational
control for intelligence planning, intelligence operations, intelligence
training, counterintelligence, and security for all elements of
the armed forces. They also handled liaison with the komitehs
(revolutionary committees) for internal security matters and with
SAVAMA for foreign intelligence (see SAVAMA , this ch.).
Staff members of J3--Operations and Training--conducted training,
operational planning, operations, and communications. The operational
planning and operations sections were further divided into eleven
subsections for planning and coordination of the services, including:
the Iranian Islamic Ground Forces (IIGF), IIGF Aviation, IIGF
Chemical Troops, IIGF Artillery Troops, IIGF Engineer Troops,
Iranian Islamic Air Force (IIArF), Iranian Islamic Navy (IIN),
IIN Aviation, the Pasdaran, the Gendarmerie, and the National
Police.
Personnel of J4--Logistics and Support--coordinated and provided
liaison for the services. Primary responsibility for logistics
and supply rested with the services through the ministries of
defense, interior, and the Pasdaran; collection and coordination
of supplies and coordination of transportation to the war front,
however, remained under the control of J4.
Staff members of J5--Liaison--handled liaison and coordination
with nonmilitary organizations and with those military organizations
not covered by Joint Staff-level arrangements. Organizations covered
by J5 included the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior,
Ministry of the Pasdaran, Office of the Prime Minister, Council
of Ministers' Secretariat, SDC, Majlis (particularly the Defense
and Foreign Affairs Committee), the Foundation for Popular Mobilization,
the Foundation for the Disinherited, the Foundation for Martyrs
(Bonyad-e Shahid), the Foundation for War Victims, and the Crusade
for Reconstruction (Jihad- e Sazandegi or Jihad).
The office of the staff judge advocate provided legal counsel
to the Joint Staff and facilitated liaison with the revolutionary
prosecutor general and the military tribunal system of the armed
forces. The Political-Ideological Directorate (P-ID) staff members
operated the political-ideological bureaus of the Joint Staff
components and the political-ideological directorates and bureaus
of the operational commands. This office also developed and disseminated
political-ideological training materials, in close cooperation
with the Foundation for the Propagation of Islam and the Islamic
associations of the services. Finally, P-ID members conducted
liaison duties between the Joint Staff and the Islamic Revolutionary
Court of the Armed Forces.
Members of the Inspectorate General handled oversight functions
over the staff components and liaison with the inspectors general
of the operational commands. Special Office for Procurements staff
members controlled and coordinated procurement of military equipment
and supplies from foreign sources through the Ministry of Defense,
the Ministry of the Pasdaran, the Ministry of Commerce and Foreign
Trade, and the Central Bank of Iran.
In general, operational area commands were subordinate to the
Joint Staff, and each armed force component was subordinate to
the operational area command in accordance with its own command
structure. In 1987 there was only the Western Operational Area
Command, which was responsible for the war with Iraq. Established
to provide more effective control of wartime operations, this
area may have been the precursor of the planned Northern, Southern,
and Eastern Operational Area Commands.
The Western Operational Area Command was similar in structure
to the armed forces Joint Staff except that it was also the lowest
operational echelon at which naval forces were integrated into
combined-services operations and planning. Although operational
area command Joint Staff members exercised operational control
over all troops within their area, they were subject to several
constraints. Generally speaking, Pasdaran, Gendarmerie, and National
Police units operating in an internal security mission, particularly
against insurgents, were detached from the operational area command
and subordinated to the senior Pasdaran commander in the province
in which they were engaged. Air and naval units continued to be
partially controlled by their service commanders and responded
to the Western Operational Area Command Joint Staff through specialized
liaison staffs. The commander of the operational area was further
burdened by the presence at his headquarters of an SDC representative
and a personal representative of Khomeini. Both of these influential
individuals could effectively take any matter over the commander's
head to higher authority. In 1987 the SDC representative in the
Western Operational Area Command was also the Pasdaran commander
for the operational area command, a situation that further complicated
the command and control system.
Below the Operational Area Command were four field headquarters
(FHQ), code-named FHQ Karbala, FHQ Hamzeh Seyyed ash Shohada,
FHQ Ramadah, and FHQ An Najaf. The FHQs were organized on the
model of the Western Operational Area Command except that they
did not have naval integration. Subordinate to each FHQ were from
three to eight operational sectors. Each operational sector did
not necessarily have its own air support unit.
Additional echelons consisting of a commander and staff drawn
from the Joint Staff of the participating FHQs could be created
during major offensives. The purpose of these echelons was to
overcome logistical shortcomings, concentrate and deploy forces
as needed, and combine the services, particularly the naval forces,
in offensive operations.
The reorganization of the command-and-control system could largely
be attributed to the Urumiyeh proposals. The war with Iraq naturally
increased the level of integration, particularly between regular
military officers commanding Pasdaran units and Pasdaran officers
commanding regular military units. Logistical problems also came
under increasing scrutiny because of the war. The military's weak
infrastructure required the centralization of logistics and supply.
The sophisticated computer inventory and accounting systems of
the ground, air, and naval logistical commands had been sabotaged
during the Revolution, and the country lost valuable time while
bringing these systems back into service. Improvements in logistical
support proved quite rewarding, revealing, for example, that Iran
possessed twice as many critical spare parts for its aircraft
as were previously believed to exist. Nevertheless, the Iranian
armed forces faced a logistical dilemma in deploying supplies
to troops at the front; lack of maintenance skills translated
into a decreased repair and salvage capacity, creating serious
bottlenecks. Vehicles in need of repair had to be transported
to repair centers hundreds of kilometers from the front, along
stretches of poorly maintained roads and railroads. Under such
circumstances cannibalization of damaged equipment for spare parts,
particularly for sophisticated equipment, became the norm. Without
a solution in sight, Iranian authorities relied on the "down time"
between major offensives to resupply units before resuming offensive
operations. This practice further prolonged the war, because multiphased
operations could not be launched and sustained.
Data as of December 1987
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