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Iran
Foreign Influences in Weapons, Training, and Support Systems
Foreign influence on the regular armed forces has historically
been massive, vital, and controversial. Around the turn of the
century, before Reza Shah unified the military, officers from
Sweden, Britain, and Russia commanded various Iranian units (see
Historical Background , this ch.). These officers were unpopular
because they were perceived as occupiers rather than as advisers,
and the seeds of xenophobia were planted. Aware of these sentiments,
Reza Shah tried to minimize direct foreign military influence,
although an exception was made for Swedish officers serving with
the Gendarmerie. Between the two world wars, a large number of
Iranian officers attended military academies in France and Germany,
where they received command and technical training. In a further
effort to counter the influence of both Britain and Russia (by
that time, the Soviet Union) in Iranian affairs, Reza Shah attempted
to establish closer ties with Germany, a relationship that would
be controversial during World War II. After 1945 the United States
gradually became more influential and had a significant impact
on the Pahlavi dynasty's leadership and the military.
With the establishment during World War II of a small United
States military mission to the Gendarmerie (known as GENMISH)
in 1943, Washington initiated a modest military advisory program.
In 1947 the United States and Tehran reached a more comprehensive
agreement that established the United States Army Mission Headquarters
(ARMISH). Its purpose was to provide the Ministry of War and the
Iranian army with advisory and technical assistance to enhance
their efficiency. As a result, the first Iranian officers began
training in the United States, and they were followed by many
more over the next three decades. The United States initiated
its military assistance grant program to Iran in 1950 (the bilateral
defense agreement between Iran and the United States was not concluded
until 1959) and established a Military Assistance Advisory Group
(MAAG) to administer the program. In 1962 the two missions were
consolidated into a single military organization, ARMISH-MAAG,
which remained active in Iran until the Islamic revolutionary
regime came to power in 1979. Between 1973 and 1979, the United
States also provided military support in the form of technical
assistance field teams (TAFTs), through which civilian experts
instructed Iranians on specific equipment on a short-term basis.
Although the GENMISH program ended in 1973, United States military
assistance to Iran rose rapidly in the six years before the Revolution.
United States military assistance to Iran between 1947 and 1969
exceeded US$1.4 billion, mostly in the form of grant aid before
1965 and of Foreign Military Sales credits during the late 1960s.
The financial assistance programs were terminated after 1969,
when it was determined that Iran, by then an important oil exporter,
could assume its own military costs. Thereafter, Iran paid cash
for its arms purchases and covered the expenses of United States
military personnel serving in the ARMISH-MAAG and TAFT programs.
Even so, in terms of personnel the United States military mission
in Iran in 1978 was the largest in the world. Department of Defense
personnel in Iran totaled over 1,500 in 1978, admittedly a small
number compared with the 45,000 United States citizens, mostly
military and civilian technicians and their dependents, living
in Iran. Almost all of these individuals were evacuated by early
1979 as the ARMISH-MAAG program came to an abrupt end. Ended also
was the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program,
under which over 11,000 Iranian military personnel had received
specialized instruction in the United States.
Washington broke its diplomatic ties with Tehran in April 1980,
closing an important chapter with a former CENTO ally whose security
it had guaranteed since 1959. The relationship had evolved dramatically
from the early 1950s, when Iran depended on the United States
for security assistance, to the mid-1970s, when the government-to-government
Foreign Military Sales program dominated other issues. Arms transfers
increased significantly after the 1974 oil price rise, accelerating
at a dizzying pace until 1979. From fiscal year (FY--see
Glossary) 1950 through FY 1979, United States arms sales to Iran
totaled approximately US$11.2 billion, of which US$10.7 billion
were actually delivered.
The transfer of such large volumes of arms and the presence of
thousands of United States advisers had an unmistakable influence
on the Iranian armed forces. The preponderance of American weapons
led to a dependence on the United States for support systems and
for spare parts. Technical advisers were indispensable for weapons
operations and maintenance.
After the Revolution, Iranians continued to buy arms from the
United States using Israeli, European, and Latin American intermediaries
to place orders, despite the official United States embargo. Israeli
sales, for example, were recorded as early as 1979. On several
occasions, attempted arms sales to Iran have been thwarted by
law enforcement operations or broker-initiated leaks. One operation
set up by the United States Department of Justice foiled the shipment
of more than US$2 billion of United States weapons to Iran from
Israel and other foreign countries. The matériel included 18 F-4
fighter-bombers, 46 Skyhawk fighter-bombers, and nearly 4,000
missiles. But while the Department of Justice was attempting to
prevent arms sales to Iran, senior officials in the administration
of President Ronald Reagan admitted that 2,008 TOW missiles and
235 parts kits for Hawk missiles had been sent to Iran via Israel.
These were intended to be an incentive for the release of American
hostages held by pro-Iranian militiamen in Lebanon. Unverified
reports in 1987 indicated that Iranian officials claimed that
throughout 1986 the Reagan administration had sold Iran ammunition
and parts for F- 4s, F-5s, and F-14s. In addition, Tehran reportedly
purchased United States-made equipment from international arms
dealers and captured United States weapons from Vietnam.
Despite official denials, it is believed that Israel has been
a supplier of weapons and spare parts for Iran's American-made
arsenal. Reports indicate that an initial order for 250 retread
tires for F-4 Phantom jets was delivered in 1979 for about US$27
million. Since that time, unverified reports have alleged that
Israel agreed to sell Iran Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, radar
equipment, mortar and machinegun ammunition, field telephones,
M-60 tank engines and artillery shells, and spare parts for C-130
transport planes.
By 1986 Iran's largest arms suppliers were reportedly China and
North Korea. China, for example, is believed to have supplied
Iran with military equipment in sales funneled through North Korea.
According to an unconfirmed report in the Washington Post,
one particular deal in the spring of 1983 netted Beijing close
to US$1.3 billion for fighters, T-59 tanks, 130mm artillery, and
light arms. China also delivered a number of Silkworm HY-2 surface-to-surface
missiles, presumably for use in defending the Strait of Hormuz.
As of early 1987, China denied all reported sales, possibly to
enhance its diminishing position in the Arab world. North Korea
agreed to sell arms and medical supplies to Iran as early as the
summer of 1980. Using military cargo versions of the Boeing 747,
Tehran ferried ammunition, medical supplies, and other equipment
that it purchased from the North Korean government. According
to unverified estimates, total sales by 1986 may have reached
US$3 billion.
Other countries directly or indirectly involved over the years
in supplying weapons to Iran have included Syria (transferring
some Soviet-made weapons), France, Italy, Libya (Scud missiles),
Brazil, Algeria, Switzerland, Argentina, and the Soviet Union.
Direct foreign influence, however, was minimal because most purchases
were arranged in international arms markets. Moreover, the influence
of the major arms suppliers was balanced by other international
relationships. Many of the above-mentioned West European states
in 1988 had arms embargoes against shipments to Iran, but nevertheless
some matériel slipped through. Also, West European states often
wished to keep communication channels open, no matter how difficult
political relations might have become. For example, despite strong
protests from the United States, the British government in 1985
transferred to Iran a fleet-refueling ship and two landing ships
without their armament. The British also allowed the repair of
two Iranian BH-7 Hovercraft. In 1982 Tehran began negotiations
with Bonn for the sale of submarines. Iran also approached the
Netherlands and, in 1985, purchased two landing craft, each sixty-five
meters long and having a capacity exceeding 1,000 tons. The influence
of the Asian arms- supplying countries was further minimized because
purchases were made in cash upon delivery with no strings attached.
Finally, foreign influence was less pronounced in 1987 than at
any time since 1925 because a defiant Tehran espoused "independent"
foreign and military policies, based on a strong sense of Islamic
and nationalistic values.
Data as of December 1987
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